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The 32nd in a series of conferences on American relations with Europe and formerly communist Eurasia was held August 20-26 in Dublin. Eight Senators and nine members of the House of Representatives took part, along with ten scholars and speakers.

The discussions at the conferences are designed to enrich the Members' understanding of the background and context of American relations with Europe and formerly communist Eurasia and to address issues of policy with which they must deal, without merely recreating the ongoing debates in Washington. No consensus statement on desirable directions for American foreign policy is produced, but it is hoped that the discussions can lead to a better understanding of the issues and of the different approaches to them that are represented in the Congress. In this way, the conference series can contribute to the search for common ground on which effective American policy must rest. The subject of this conference was U.S.-Russia-Europe: Cooperative Efforts.

The first session, Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action, was introduced by Rose Gottemoeller. The efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons can be divided into two categories. In both of them, international cooperation in general, and cooperation between the United States and Russia in particular, are necessary for success.

The first category involves efforts directed at sovereign states. The most urgent of these efforts concern countries that are by all evidence attempting to violate the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and acquire nuclear weapons, namely North Korea and Iran. Nonproliferation efforts concerning these two countries are difficult because of the secretive and radical character of the regimes that govern them. Multilateral negotiations involving both are nevertheless underway, negotiations in which the United States is participating directly or indirectly. Russia is relevant to both nonproliferation efforts because it has past or present nuclear relationships with the two countries.

The North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs raise a common problem: weaknesses—in fact loopholes—in the Nonproliferation Treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, it is legal to obtain the capacity for preparing fuel for nuclear power reactors, and that capacity can then be used to make the material for nuclear explosives.

There is a need to plug this loophole, and one way of doing so is to put the fabrication of nuclear fuel and the disposal of the fuel once it is used in nuclear reactors under international auspices, so that countries can make use of nuclear power without having the means to make bombs. Putting the nuclear fuel cycle under international control will become more important as nuclear power generation becomes increasingly popular; and it is likely to become more popular as fossil fuels, or at least
oil, become more expensive and the major
sources of oil remain subject to political insta-
bility. Addressing the weaknesses in the NPT by
placing the nuclear fuel cycle under interna-
tional auspices is an area for cooperation among
the United States, Russia, and Europe.
Nonproliferation efforts also involve sover-
eign states that have not signed the NPT but
have, or are thought to have, nuclear weapons.
For the United States, the key country here is
India. With India, the Bush administration has
agreed to waive longstanding and internation-
ally adopted rules prohibiting the transfer of
nuclear power-generating technology to coun-
tries not adhering to the NPT. The challenge
for American policy is to obtain maximal Indian
compliance with the terms of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, although not necessarily
its signature on the treaty, in exchange for this
technology.

The second category of nonproliferation
efforts involves non-state actors. Such efforts
address the potential for nuclear terrorism, a
potential of which the United States became
acutely aware on September 11, 2001 and to
which Russia is also sensitive because of terrorist
episodes on Russian soil in recent years.

The most important step in combating
nuclear terrorism is keeping nuclear materials
out of the hands of terrorist networks. The largest
vulnerable repository of such materials contin-
tues to be within the territory of the former
Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Program
addresses this problem. The challenge for the
United States and Russia in the years ahead is to
deepen their cooperation under its auspices so
as to expedite their joint efforts to secure
nuclear material, and perhaps also to find ways
to expand their cooperation beyond its present
geographic scope.

The conference’s second session, on The
Putin Restoration: Origins, Policies, and Risks,
was introduced by Leon Aron. The events in Russia
over the last few years may be described as a
partial restoration. As with other great revolu-
tionary upheavals of history, some of the fea-
tures of the old regime—that is, communism—
have returned.

In politics, there has been a consolidation of
power at the federal level in the executive
branch of the government at the expense of the
legislature—the state Duma—and the judiciary.
The powers of the central authorities in Moscow
have expanded at the expense of local and
regional governments. Moreover, the central
government has exerted pressure on the news
media and effectively controls the national tele-
vision channels.

In the economy, the role of the state has
grown and the government has reasserted direct
control over much of the energy sector. In for-
eign policy, the post-September 11 solidarity
with the United States has diminished. At the
same time, the Russian government is carrying
out an increasingly assertive series of policies in
neighboring countries, the former republics of
the Soviet Union known as Russia’s “Near
Abroad.”

None of this portends the reappearance of
the Soviet Union. Russia is not a police state. It
continues to have a lively and independent print
press. There is no chance of a repositioning of
centralized economic planning of the Soviet
type. Nor is there popular support for the mea-
sures that would be required for a serious attempt
to reassemble the territories that consti-
tuted the Soviet Union itself.

Nor does the Kremlin always wield the power
it has amassed in effective fashion. Recently the
Putin administration has exhibited a certain
political maladroitness, as demonstrated by its
clumsy and unsuccessful intervention in the
Ukrainian election. Russia’s short-term politi-
cal future depends, in part, on the future of its
current president. Here the question is
whether he and his associates will seek to
change the Russian constitution or reconstruct
its political system in order to retain effective
power after the present presidential term ends
in 2008, at which time Mr. Putin is presently
scheduled to leave office.

Whatever his personal fate, Russia’s immedi-
ate future will be shaped by broad and deeply
rooted social and political trends. The country’s
population, for example, is shrinking. This is
partly the result of fertility trends at work in
other countries, but also partly a consequence of
poor public health conditions, which are a
legacy of the Soviet period. Russia is also
plagued by corruption, the result of habits, prac-
tices, and attitudes that date back decades, per-
haps even centuries.

As for Russia’s relations with the United
States, several sources of tension exist. The
Russian government does not appreciate the
new American emphasis on the promotion of
democracy worldwide. There are also actual
and potential political conflicts between the
two countries in the “Near Abroad.”

On the other hand, there are also three areas
of ongoing cooperation, which seem likely to
persist. In energy, Russia is a large supplier, and
the United States is the world’s largest con-
sumer. In the field of terrorism, both countries
have been victims of terrorist attacks. In nuclear
proliferation, both are opposed to the spread of
nuclear weapons and Russia may be coming to
view this problem with the kind of urgency with
which the United States regards it.

The third session of the conference, America
Unprepared: Dealing with Fragility and Conflict,
was led by Frederick Barton. In the post-Cold
War period, the United States has found itself cop-
ing with the aftermath of conflict and the
absence of effective local government, and
sometimes both, in a series of countries. In
these countries it has undertaken a number of
tasks that have come to be known collectively as
nation-building.

There are reasons to expect that this pattern
will continue, and that the American role in
nation-building may even expand. Other coun-
tries besides those in which the United States
has already become involved have similar, and in
some cases greater, problems. These problems
may prove impossible for the United States to
ignore and avoid. Indeed, as the United States
achieves success in nation-building, this can cre-
ate opportunities for greater peace and pros-
perity in the countries involved, their neighbors,
and the world as a whole.

If nation-building is to occur on any scale
throughout the world, American leadership, for
better or for worse, seems indispensable: only
the United States has the resources and the
expertise for this collection of tasks. The rest of
the international community is, unfortunately,
lacking in both.

A series of lessons have emerged from the
American post-Cold War experience in nation-
building. Perhaps the most important of them
is that in any country, public order and a sense
of personal safety form the indispensable foun-
dations for success. It has also become clear that
where nation-building is concerned the United
States needs to adopt a sense of urgency, and
perhaps even concrete deadlines, so as to avoid
having nation-building become a permanent
responsibility. Local responsibility for the rele-
vant tasks and a sense of local ownership are also
vital. The maximum feasible cooperation with
the international community is important as a
way to lighten the burden on the United States in
nation-building and, equally importantly, to
increase the legitimacy of the exercise. Advance
planning is also necessary.

These lessons imply that in the future the
United States may need to think of nation-
building in terms of the longer term. Planning
and preparations for it a higher priority of post-
Cold War foreign policy than in the past, per-
haps even putting it on a par with coping with
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
These lessons further imply a need to change
the way the American government is organized
to cope with nation-building.

There are formidable obstacles to success in
this exercise. One is public skepticism in the
United States about the wisdom and necessity of
spending resources on the task, especially in
view of the competing priorities America has.
Other countries have proven reluctant to con-
tribute to nation-building in part, but only in
part, because their capacities are limited. A
final obstacle, and perhaps the most difficult
one, is the fact that the task of nation-building is inherently difficult. Mistakes and setbacks are virtually inevitable. How much the United States can do in this regard, and how well and how swiftly the United States can do it, will always be limited by local conditions.

The conference’s fourth and final session, Quo Vadis Europe?, was introduced by Dominique Moisi. The rejection of the proposed European Constitution by French voters on May 29, 2005, and by the voters of the Netherlands a few days later on June 2nd, administered a shock to the European Union.

The French vote had three major causes. First, the French public felt uncomfortable with the expansion of the European Union in 2004 to include 25 members. This diluted French influence in the EU and created a union different from the one to which the French had become accustomed. Behind the vote also lay discomfort with the process of economic globalization, which the French blamed for some of their economic troubles, including high unemployment and low economic growth. The “no” vote was a protest against these. A third cause of the French rejection of the Constitution was the unpopularity and lack of leadership of President Jacques Chirac.

The French and Dutch rejections will have a profound impact on the European Union in the immediate future. They mean that the expansion of EU membership, although a great success in the past in promoting democracy and prosperity, is stalled for the moment. Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia will not be invited to join any time soon, if ever.

Another implication of the two votes is that the methods by which European integration have proceeded for well over a half a century, as an elite-driven project, cannot be sustained, at least in the immediate future. The votes also mean that Europe will not be able to act as a single political unit in the foreseeable future. The kinds of political divisions evident in the differing attitudes toward the Iraq War in 2003, and also toward the proper policies toward Russia, will persist.

As for the future, two visions of the European Union have been proposed. One foresees Europe as a single political unit. Germany and France have been the principal champions of this vision. The other sees the European Union as primarily an economic association. This vision is associated with Great Britain. As a result of the two votes, the second, British-promoted vision seems to have prevailed; but it has prevailed by default, because of the rejection of the Franco-German political aspiration.

As important for the future of Europe as the future of the European Union will be the policies adopted by the member states concerning their economies. Here, two economic models compete. One, the social model of France and Germany, with high levels of social protection, has done badly in recent years. The other model emphasizes market mechanisms. It has been adopted by the countries of the European periphery including Britain, the Baltic countries, and the Nordic countries. This model has achieved greater recent economic success. A major question for Europe’s immediate future is whether France and Germany can find the political basis for adopting the second model and so resuming high rates of economic growth.

Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action

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In the spring of 2005, the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences undertook a joint study on how to speed up implementation of the nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. These programs, often called "Nunn-Lugar" after the two Senators who created the legislation to launch them in 1992, had suffered many problems over the years. They sometimes seemed caught in a bureaucratic mire from which there was no escape.

Based on an earlier joint study, however, the two Academies had found that quite a bit of progress was being accomplished in the programs as their implementation became more routine. Without much fanfare, American and Russian managers had been able to speed up the pace of projects on the strength of their joint experience and mutual confidence, as well as better-established procedures.

"Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action," the new study, seeks to advance this insight, highlighting recommendations for improving implementation of the programs based on this wealth of joint experience. It is a fully joint report of the U.S. National and Russian Academies, chaired on the Russian side by Academician Ashot Sarkisov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and on the U.S. side by Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Project team members were drawn from both U.S. and Russian experts, and experts from both countries provided peer review for the report.

The study is unique in three different aspects. First, it provides consenus recommandations by U.S. and Russian experts about how to speed up and improve implementation of the joint nonproliferation programs, often called, in addition to "Nunn-Lugar," "cooperative threat reduction" programs. Second, the recommendations are balanced, addressed to both Moscow and Washington, instead of following what has frequently been the practice in the past—Washington dictating to Moscow.

Finally, it is unique in that the Russian team members were significantly more ambitious than their U.S. colleagues. They urged a move toward a much stronger partnership in the nuclear nonproliferation arena than the two countries have had in the past, including cooperation in setting priorities, managing the projects, and providing resources. They also urged that the United States and Russia should consider how to cooperate on proliferation problems in new countries and regions, beyond Russia and the newly independent states.

This Russian interest in broader partnership is interesting in that it contradicts some of the criticisms of the programs that have been heard lately in Moscow at various points on the political spectrum, from far right Duma member Vladimir Zhironovskiy to media and industrial baron Boris Berezovsky, owner of the respected business newspaper "Kommerzant." These
Russian critics have been claiming that the U.S. is using the programs to get inside the Russian nuclear complex and "take over" Russian nuclear weapons—a preposterous idea. It seems clear that the Russian Academy of Sciences is willing to challenge these critics and advance the agenda of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation.

To give a flavor of the nature of the recommendations, a few examples are provided below. They underscore the point that the U.S.-Russian study team was seeking a high level of detail as well as balance, in order to propose recommendations that would be truly useful to the executive and legislative branches in both capitals. To highlight this point, these recommendations focus on three issues that have especially plagued the cooperation in the past few years: access, taxes and liability protection.

- The **access** recommendation is addressed to Washington: U.S. government agencies have a legal as well as a policy requirement to visit Russian facilities where the U.S. is paying for work, in order to ensure that it is being properly done. Acknowledging this requirement, the study recommends that the U.S. government agencies should define requests for access as clearly as possible, should associate them explicitly with project goals, and should keep to agreed procedures, such as making use of master lists of precleared visitors. The study also recommends further development of technologies and procedures that would ameliorate the need for direct access by U.S. citizens, while maintaining a high level of confidence in the quality and completion of project tasks.

- The recommendation on **taxes** is addressed to Moscow. For many years, the U.S. and Russian governments have been wrangling over the necessity to ensure that the funds provided in the nonproliferation programs are considered free assistance and not subject to Russian federal, regional or local taxes. Progress has been made on this issue in recent years with the development of the Russian tax code. However, many of the procedures established have been complicated to implement, thus slowing the flow of funds to these vital national security programs. The study recommends that Russia should take specific steps to amend its tax code, to make possible a free flow of funds to nonproliferation projects. For example, the exemption procedures for Value Added Taxes need to be greatly simplified in order to unblock and speed the process.

- The recommendation on **liability protection** is addressed to both capitals. Washington and Moscow have been wrangling for several years about who should bear responsibility in case a U.S. contractor causes damage, injury or loss of life during project work in Russia. In some cases, this disagreement has caused grave delay in key projects, such as that designed to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. The study team recommends that the U.S. and Russian governments should seek a long-term, comprehensive solution that would involve ratifying the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) in the U.S. Senate and Russian Duma, and then moving to develop a body of national law that would implement it. These steps would go well beyond the short-term diplomatic fixes that are currently being put in place. As important as these short-term measures are to "unblocking" existing cooperation, they do not provide a comprehensive solution. These recommendations give a flavor of the level of detail in the report, which the study team hopes will spur real opportunities for policy change in Moscow and Washington. One leading figure of the Russian Academy of Sciences, upon reading the report, commented that President Putin often asks for actionable recommendations for improving implementation of the nonproliferation programs. This report, he commented, provides such recommendations.

The most startling and significant of the recommendations, however, originated with the Russian team members. They asserted that it is time for the nature of the relationship between the United States and Russia on nuclear nonproliferation to change and become more ambitious. "The report states ... that cooperative efforts are at a turning point. No longer should one the Russian Federation be solely the recipient of assistance. It is now able, politically and economically as well as militarily, to take its place as a true partner of the United States in the effort to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world." (Report text, p. 51)

To become reality, this assertion requires that many important questions be answered, among them:

- Is Russia really ready to take more of a leadership role, by putting its own resources on the table and by taking more responsibility for setting priorities and managing the projects?

- Will the United States be comfortable with Russia in a leadership role? In particular, would the U.S. be willing to let a Russian project team take the lead in managing projects in certain countries or regions, without constant U.S. involvement?

- Indeed, can the U.S. and Russia work together effectively in new countries and regions, such as North Korea or South Asia? How will the regional partners react?

- What implications does a fuller U.S.-Russian partnership have for speeding up and completing the vital work that still needs to be done in Russia and the other newly independent states?

To answer these important questions, the study recommends that the U.S. and Russian governments convene a High-Level Commission, made up of government and non-government experts, with the goal of formulating a strategy for fuller partnership in current and future U.S.-Russian cooperation to combat nuclear proliferation.

This startling conclusion, originating as it did in the conviction of the Russian team, has an important implication for Russia as it undertakes the G-8 Presidency in 2006. **Russia has a real opportunity to use its G-8 leadership year to advance nuclear security and nonproliferation on a global basis.** Some important goals for Moscow during its G-8 year should be:

- Accelerating the pace of highly enriched uranium (HEU) "clean-out" from research reactors in vulnerable sites throughout the world. The current ten-year deadline could be cut to four if the Russians will push for it. This will speed the effort to keep easy bomb-making material out of the hands of terrorists.

- Establishing the model for an international fuel services program, drawing on the experience of Russia's "pilot project" with Iran to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor. This should include mechanisms for incorporating other international fuel providers into the equation, and developing assured take-back and fuel disposition procedures, as well as providing critical assurances, in the form of transparency and other safeguards, to the international community.

- Developing a clear agenda for action if the Six-Party Talks ever "get to yes" with North Korea. Russia was involved in the early stages of the North Korean program and trained the North Korean scientists. Thus it is well-positioned to think in advance about how to work with North Korea on shutting down its nuclear programs, decommissioning its sites, and engaging its nuclear scientists.

The attacks on London on July 7, 2005 are but another reminder of the terrible tragedy that would result if nuclear weapons or fissile materials fell into the hands of terrorists. They could use them to attack cities anywhere in the world, not only in the United States or Russia or among the other members of the G-8. An intensified and accelerated effort is needed,
and Russia can be a leader in its implementa-
tion. Russia can succeed in its G-8 Presidency
on nuclear nonproliferation as it can in no
other area of economic reform or political
development. Moscow should recognize that
fact and embrace it.

The attacks in London are also, however, a
reminder of a key theme of this meeting, that
is, how can the United States and Russia and
Europe work together on important interna-
tional policy problems such as nonprolifer-
ation? The main European powers have all
become involved in the Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Nuclear and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Materials,
which was launched at the 2002 Summit of the
G-8 in Karonissos, Canada.

In the three years since its launch, the Global
Partnership has expanded to include non-G-8
countries in Europe as well as Asia. Some of
them, for example Norway, have been success-
ful in their own right in working with Russia to
address the nuclear vestiges of the Cold War.
After many difficult years of negotiation and
project development, Norway is working effi-
ciently to dismantle Russian general-purpose
submarines and clean up various nuclear waste
sites, in the interest of preserving the Arctic
environment. Norway now brings that experi-
ence to the table for coordinated efforts with
the Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership countries have
agreed to spend a minimum of $20 billion over
ten years to address nuclear security and prolif-
eration problems, principally in the Russian
Federation, but also to some extent in the other
newly independent states in the region.
Despite its great promise, however, the Global
Partnership has been difficult to implement.
The same problems that dogged U.S.-Russian
cooperation have been difficult to overcome,
more so because the countries that are
newly entering into the effort do not have the
wealth of experience that the U.S. has in work-

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only be spent in Russia, not even in the other
newly independent states. In some cases, there
are actual legislative limitations on how the
funds can be spent. The European Union, for
example, argues that it has no consolidated
legal basis on which to base expenditures for
nonproliferation projects. As a result, even in
Russia, the EU's contribution to nonprolifera-
tion projects has been quite limited.4

This EU position is ironic, because the EU is
taking the lead in negotiating with Iran, with
the goal of persuading that country to extend a
moratorium on building nuclear fuel cycle facil-
ities and in that way removing a profound
nuclear proliferation threat. The ultimate goal
is to bring about a permanent shut-down and
closure of the facilities, in the context of a wider
agreement about normalization of relations
with Iran. It is high time to ask the EU policy-
makers, "If you do achieve your ultimate goal,
how are you going to implement it?" If the EU
is constrained from working on nonprolifera-
tion projects, then it will have to turn to its indi-
vidual member states, to Russia, or even to the
United States to work with the Iranians to shut
down the facilities. This seems a strange posi-
tion for a negotiator to be in, stymied from
implementing his own agreement.

Thus, although the Global Partnership has
been a major step forward in international
cooperation, transforming it into a truly global
effort is a long way in the future. The prolifera-
tion "tough cases"—North Korea, Iran—will
not likely stand still, however. Whether they
worsen or improve, the international commu-
nity will have to make a concerted effort to deal
with them. Given the potential for the United
States and Russia to work together in greater
partnership, these two countries should use
Russia's Presidency of the G-8 to move the agen-
da forward on critical nonproliferation goals,
especially in addressing the tough cases, Iran
and North Korea. In doing so, however, they
should exert every effort to urge Europe to clear
away the legal and policy brushwork that
prevents it from joining in this vital effort.

1. "Overcoming Barriers and Impediments to
Research Council of the U.S. National Academies

2. For example, a Norwegian government official indicated
to this author in May 2005 that it has become a "Virtual
Klonandel" in the Arctic, with various Global Partner-
countries driving up the price of contracts in their efforts
to get projects started on the environmental front.

3. The Center for Strategic and International Studies
maintains an excellent project, "Strengthening the
Global Partnership," that tracks the initiative and pro-
vides recommendations for its improvement. Their
website can be found at http://cpprogram.org,
accessed July 15, 2005. Their fact sheets on individual
donor countries are an especially helpful reference.

4. The EU in this case must be distinguished from its indi-
vidual member states, many of which are members of
the Global Partnership and contribute to projects on
that basis.
Recommendations for Washington from RAS-NAS Study
"Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action"

Political
- The United States and Russia should transform the cooperative nonproliferation relationship to a partnership defined by shared responsibilities for program priorities, management, and funding; and with scope beyond Russia.
- The U.S. and Russian governments should establish a Joint High-Level Commission to prepare strategy for implementing this partnership:
  2. Responsible for "brainstorming" new ideas.
  3. Working Groups to be convened under the Commission to explore detailed issues.

Legal
- The U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma should ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) as a key step in the long-term, comprehensive solution of the liability issue; and put in place necessary implementing legislation.
- The U.S. Congress should either repeal certification requirements for the programs, or provide the President with permanent waiver authority.
- The U.S. Congress should devise ways to provide more funding flexibility for the programs. (Funds appropriated by the Congress to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund of the U.S. Department of State, for example, can be expended notwithstanding any other provision of law. The flexibility that this language affords has made it possible to use NDF funds quickly and effectively in urgent situations.)
- The United States and Russia should collaborate to identify practical steps to implement President Bush’s call for more reciprocal access.
- The U.S. and Russia should establish a more direct dialogue and information sharing between U.S. and Russian legal experts, including scholars and non-governmental experts.
- The U.S. government should require U.S. agencies and contractors working on joint nonproliferation projects to define their requests for access:
  1. Requests for access should be clear; the purpose of the visit should be defined as narrowly as possible.
  2. Access requests should be linked to specific project goals.
  3. Mechanisms such as prepared master lists of visitors should be used whenever possible.
  4. Requests for access should be coordinated so that the administrative burden on Russian facilities is minimized.

5. Joint work on remote monitoring and verification technologies, as well as procedures, should be expanded, to provide adequate monitoring of joint projects, in cases where appropriate, without direct physical access by U.S. personnel.
- The U.S. and Russian governments should provide multiple-entry visas to program participants who regularly need to visit the other country on program business.

Program Organization and Management
- The U.S. and Russia should develop joint program-level strategic master plans under the authority of implementing agencies or ministries.
- To the extent possible, Russian and U.S. federal authorities should give primary problem-solving responsibility to project managers, rewarding them for achieving good results and taking responsible risks to insure speedy results.
- Incentives should be created to retain and support quality personnel. Personnel changes should be planned and implemented in a way that reduces disruption to cooperation.
- A broad range of tools, such as program websites, newsletters, working groups and conference calls, should be used to enhance communication.
- The United States and Russia should consider a "General Security of Information" Agreement as a means to enhance communication.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation
- Scientists, to the maximum degree possible, should focus their work in the projects on science and technology issues, rather than administrative or management details. In that way, the projects are assured of good scientific input, and the scientific resource is being spent well.
- Existing modes of technical cooperation relevant to implementation of the joint projects should be developed and implemented by the U.S. and Russian governments.
- Working groups should be convened under the Joint High-Level Commission to explore possible areas of scientific cooperation in environmental remediation, counterterrorism science and technology, and nuclear energy.
- The nuclear energy group should focus especially on risk assessment and mitigation relating to nuclear-energy projects in non-nuclear weapon states.
- Russia and the United States should jointly review the adequacy of operative science and technology agreements, with a view to assessing what new agreements might be needed.
Recommendations for Moscow from RAS-NAS Study

"Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action"

Political
- The United States and Russia should transform the cooperative nonproliferation relationship to a partnership defined by shared responsibilities for program priorities, management, and funding; and with scope beyond Russia.
- The U.S. and Russian governments should establish a Joint High-Level Commission to prepare a strategy for implementing this partnership:
  2. Responsible for "brainstorming" new ideas.
  3. Working Groups to be convened under the Commission to explore detailed issues.

Legal
- The Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate should ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) as a key step in the long-term, comprehensive solution of the liability issue; and put in place necessary implementing legislation.
- In particular, the Russian government should adopt a comprehensive nuclear liability law consistent with the CSC, covering civilian and defense nuclear sites.
- The Russian government should take steps to amend the tax code to exempt gratuitous assistance from taxes at the national, regional and local levels.
  1. Russian law should be clarified to the effect that any taxes paid while applications are pending will be refunded after exemption is confirmed.
  2. A complete list of requirements regarding documentation should be published.
  3. The mechanism for exemption from the value-added tax should be improved:
     - VAT exemptions should include organizations implementing nonproliferation programs as well as donors and beneficiaries;
     - VAT exemptions for small and recurrent transactions should be facilitated (e.g. monthly phone and electricity bills);
  4. The Russian tax code should be amended to exempt gratuitous assistance from the excise tax.
  5. Both sides should work together to resolve issues of exemption from regional and local taxes.
- The U.S. and Russia should establish a more direct dialogue and information sharing between U.S. and Russian legal experts, including scholars and non-governmental experts.
- The Russian and U.S. governments should provide multiple-entry visas to program participants who regularly need to visit the other country on program business.

Program Organization and Management
- The U.S. and Russia should develop joint program-level strategic master plans under the authority of implementing agencies or ministries.
- To the extent possible, Russian and U.S. federal authorities should give primary problem-solving responsibility to project managers, rewarding them for achieving good results and taking responsible risks to insure speedy results.
- Incentives should be created to retain and support quality personnel. Personnel changes should be planned and implemented in a way that reduces disruption to cooperation.
- A broad range of tools, such as program websites, newsletters, working groups and conference calls, should be used to enhance communication.
- The United States and Russia should consider a "General Security of Information" Agreement as a means to enhance communication.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation
- Nonproliferation projects should incorporate, to the maximum degree possible, scientific expertise, so that such projects can be made more attractive to the best scientific talent in each country.
- Existing modes of technical cooperation relevant to implementation of the joint projects should be developed and implemented by the U.S. and Russian governments.
- Working groups should be convened under the Joint High-Level Commission to explore possible areas of scientific cooperation in environmental remediation, counterterrorism science and technology, and nuclear energy.
- The nuclear energy group should focus especially on risk assessment and mitigation relating to nuclear energy projects in non-nuclear weapon states.
- Russia and the United States should jointly review the adequacy of operative science and technology agreements, with a view to assessing what new agreements might be needed.
In the past few years, President Vladimir Putin’s political dominance in general and his March 2004 lopsided re-election victory have often been explained by the Kremlin’s neo-authoritarian interference in the political process, including its manipulation of the media and intimidation of the opponents. Yet close examination reveals a far more complicated picture.

To attribute Putin’s popularity solely to semi-authoritarian political technology is to mislead the American public and American policymakers. Instead, his regime is part of a broad and multifaceted trend affecting Russia today: a post-revolutionary “restoration” that, in one form or another, has followed every great revolution.

**A New Consensus**

After years, sometimes decades, of revolutionary turmoil, economic crisis and dislocation that have always accompanied revolutions, people at all times and everywhere longed for three things: political stabilization, economic revival, and physical safety. In the Russian context of the late-1990s/early 2000s these goals translated into an ardent wish for a steady improvement in the standard of living; the maintenance of “law and order;” and protection from terrorism. At the heart of Vladimir Putin’s high approval ratings has been his ability to “deliver”—de facto or symbolically, but convincingly—on all three points. Although today, he is increasingly vulnerable in all three areas (and the public opinion polls clearly reflect political erosion), early on Putin “connected” with the majority of Russians by projecting the image of an energetic and caring advocate for the people’s well-being, a determined opponent of corruption, and a tough but competent defender against terrorism.

To begin, any chief executive in a capitalist democracy is very likely to be re-elected and remain popular if in his first term in office the economy grows by at least 30 percent and continues to grow 5-6 percent a year. Yet the roots of Putin’s political success run deeper. Among millions of Russians there is an intense and widespread longing for regaining bearings and restoring a measure of continuity and predictability—after a decade of political and economic revolutions, the disappearance of the very state in which they lived their entire lives, the relentless and dizzying onslaught of the new realities, and the taxing choices and responsibilities of freedom.

**A Shift in People’s Attitudes**

As in all previous restorations, there is a shift in popular sentiment from a near-total negation of the ancien régime to a desire for a partial recovery of traditional policies, institutions and symbols. A plurality (if not a majority) of Russians is not ready to dismiss the entire Soviet past. Among other cherished memories, they are proud of the Soviet Union’s victory over the Nazi invaders in World War II, its nuclear parity with the United States, and its pioneering achievements in space exploration.
Among the basic features of this new national consensus, confirmed by public opinion polls, is strong state and effective central government that would enforce the laws, secure public order, and protect the weak and the poor—even at the expense of some (but by no means all) newly gained liberties. While no more than 25 percent of Russians wish to return to socialism, a strong plurality supports "a fair distribution of state income in the interest of common people" and "the strengthening of the role of the state in the economy."

Although they wish for a strong and healthy military, in foreign and defense policy, the Russians no longer equate national greatness with global military superiority and the ability to instill fear. Rather, many Russians think that "becoming more competitive economically" is the best way to assert their country's place in the world. No matter how nostalgic for the security of the Soviet Union millions of them feel, most Russians reject out of hand a recreation of empire by military means.

Putin's Remarkable "Fit"

It is because of his remarkable "fit" into Russia's mood that Vladimir Putin has accrued much of his extraordinary popularity. Instinctively or by design (or likely both), he came to embody to millions of Russians a still very precarious balance between freedom and order, and between old and new. During his first term in office, Putin demonstrated an uncanny ability to make millions of people think that he is "just like them." Like the Russian people, who are roughly divided between those who believe Stalin was a "bloody dictator" and those who remember him as a "great military leader" who saved the nation by defeating the Nazi invasion and made Russia a great power, Putin deplores "totalitarianism" for its lack of freedom and concentration camps, yet bemoans the disappearance of the "great" Soviet Union. Similarly, Putin seems to admire Boris Yeltsin as, in Putin's words, "the person who has done the most important thing" in Russian history by "giving [Russia] freedom," and, at the same time, like most Russians, he recalls the Yeltsin era as a time when the "oligarchs" (industrial and financial tycoons) were "appointed billionaires" and "state officials stuffed their pockets...under the cover of state interests."

Continuing the Reforms

Historically, restorations rarely represented a "clean break" with the revolutionary policies and practices. Here, too, Putin's regime is no exception. In the first three years of his term, backed by Putin's sky-high popularity because of the economic revival, the rapidly growing Treasury revenues from rising oil prices, and the results of the 1999 Duma elections (which for first time since 1993 produced a pro-Kremlin and pro-reform plurality in the parliament) the Kremlin proceeded to implement some of the Yeltsin-era structural reforms that had been blocked by the leftist plurality in the Duma or impeded by the state's empty coffers. Among the measures were the flat 13-percent income tax, privatization of urban and rural agricultural land, the progressive Criminal Procedural Code, the creation of private pension accounts, and the laws on breaking up and privatizing the government electricity monopoly.

The Kremlin's show of solidarity with the United States after the September 11, 2001, attacks was remarkable. Overruling his generals (and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Putin declared support for the U.S.-led war on Islamic terrorism, ordered intelligence and logistic cooperation in preparation of the U.S. war on the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, allowed the unprecedented overflight of Russia's territory by U.S. and NATO transport planes and the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops at the former Soviet bases in Central Asia.

...And Reversing the Revolutionary Trends

Gradually, starting with the fourth year of his first term and, especially, after his triumphant re-election, the careful balance between the new, post-Soviet ways of governance and nostalgia for the old began clearly to tilt toward the latter.

If there is an overarching theme to the Kremlin's policies, it is the exploitation of institutional loopholes and ambiguities in order to erode checks and balances and replace the separation of powers with what President Vladimir Putin likes to call "the vertical of power." Thus, in the wake of the September 1, 2004 terrorist attack in Beslan, President Putin proposed that all Duma deputies be elected by party lists. While party-list-only elections are practiced in a number of established democracies (for instance, Israel), the elimination of single-mandate races in today's Russia, where less than 1 percent of the population belongs to a party, is a body blow to democratic self-government at a national level.

Undermining Local Self-Governance

Last September Vladimir Putin also proposed that governors should be "nominated" by the Kremlin rather than directly elected by their constituents, and on December 12, 2004, signed into law the corresponding legislation passed by the federal assembly. Again, the government used the absence of an explicit mention of gubernatorial elections in the country's constitution to violate the spirit (and almost certainly the letter) of the basic law. This breach is even more obvious than in the case of the federal assembly "reforms" and has been widely recognized as such by Russian observers.

In this breach from the country's basic law, Putin has embarked on a very dangerous experiment of attempting to re-create a unitary state, risking Russia's destabilization and perhaps even disintegration. The official reasons for the "reform"—to protect people from their bad choices, to prevent the election of inept or corrupt individuals, and to reign in governors' capacity or dictatorial tendencies—are seen by leading Russian critics as a cure that is worse than the illness and a fig leaf for what the Kremlin really seems to want: "strict subordination to the center." Can Russia really be governed as a unitary state? In the words of one Russian analyst: "A definite no . . . The vertical of power, so cherished by the administration, will begin to buckle under the weight of corruption, popular dissent, and administrative inefficiencies."

The people agree. Polls on September 18, 2004, five days after Putin announced his intention to abolish gubernatorial elections, 61 percent of respondents in a national survey said governors should be elected by the citizens of the regions, while only 25 percent supported their appointment "by the leadership of the country."

The Legal System and Judicial Independence

Perhaps no other key institution has been so affected by the retreat from the revolutionary achievements of the previous decade as Russia's legal system. The post-Soviet legal revolution ended the state's monopoly on dispensing justice, bringing a measure of independence unimaginable before 1991.

In 2003, the government started legal proceedings against the principal owners of YUKOS, Russia's largest private company, including its CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for alleged fraud. The case subsequently expanded to incorporate charges against the company itself for nonpayment of taxes. Underbundly, there are legitimate legal concerns about how enormous private wealth was accumulated in a relatively short time in Russia during the 1990s. Yet, regardless of the factual basis of the prosecution's case against YUKOS and its owners, in both instances what could have become a great precedent for diapassion and scrupulous investigation and fair competition between prosecution and defense has increasingly deteriorated into a travesty scripted by the prosecution. Khodorkovsky has been found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison.
Recapturing the “Commanding Heights” and Abandoning Structural Reforms

The effective seizure and renationalization of YUKOS signaled the Kremlin intent to recapture the “commanding heights” in the economy, at least in the most lucrative natural resources areas. According to Putin’s personal economic adviser, the radical liberal economist Andrei Illarionov, the “effectiveness” of Russian economic policy has been “declining” because of the “movement toward state intervention” and because, “out of a pool of choices, bureaucrats tend to take decisions that have a higher rate of return for themselves, not for the country (redistributing rent rather than implementing responsible economic policies).”

As a result of what Illarionov described as the Kremlin’s “utterly incompetent interference,” Russia’s economic growth has failed to keep pace in the past year with the rising price of oil, falling behind by almost 2 percentage points according to Illarionov’s calculations. Had it not been for high oil prices, he argues, “Russia most likely would have had a recession.”

Coupled with the Khodorkovsky/Yukos affair, the greater state intervention in the economy has produced a chilling effect on entrepreneurial activity in Russia, with billions of rubles in potential investments transferred for safekeeping abroad. Down to just $2 billion in 2005, capital flight from Russia is estimated to have reached $16.9 billion between January and September of 2004. An uncertain, and worsening, legal regime has resulted in little foreign investment outside the oil and gas sectors. Yet even here, with oil prices near record levels, some of the largest potential players are increasingly unwilling to commit funds.

After adopting a slew of revolutionary pro-market reforms between 2000 and 2003, the Putin administration has slowed its pursuit of structural reforms or abandoned them altogether. Among the desperately needed but unfinished or subverted measures are a radical administrative reform that would free small and medium businesses from bureaucratic blackmail; compliance with and enforcement of the 2001 Criminal Procedural Code, including the strengthening of courts’ independence and the protection of the rights of defendants; and stronger guarantees of property rights, especially for acquisitions made during the 1990s.

The glacial pace of Russia’s military reform, which aims to create a much smaller, all-volunteer force, has left intact the widely hated draft. With all manner of medical and educational deferments available to the better educated or the better off, conscription increasingly delivers only the poor and often the physically unfit, rendering parts of the Russian defense establishment virtually dysfunctional and utterly unprepared to deal with a large-scale terrorism threat.

Apart from hampering long-term economic growth, the postponement or abandonment of the gradual privatization of state monopolies in the impoverished housing, utilities, and health care sectors is bound to increase social tensions. Of greatest concern is the delay in the privatization of electricity generation plants and the gradual decontrol of wholesale and retail prices of electricity. The reform, approved by the Duma a year and a half ago after exhaustive review and debates, was designed to attract badly needed private capital to the worn-out and archaic industry.

Liberties and Risks

Of course, economic and political re-centralization notwithstanding and contrary to the grotesquely misinformed classifications (such as the one by Freedom House, a human rights watchdog based in New York), Russia is not in the same category of "unfree" states, such as China, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea or Saudi Arabia. The legacy of the democratic revolution is far from extinguished.

Political opposition is free to organize, and though television is under government control, the press is free from censorship, and many publications are quite critical of the Kremlin. People can demonstrate, form political parties and disseminate their views.

Yet the dangers are real. In the past several years, the center of gravity has moved all the way up to the Kremlin. The political and social shock absorbers and stabilizing mechanisms of a democracy—local self-government, parliamentary opposition, independent judiciary—have all been weakened and eroded. With a steady decline in Putin’s approval rating to its lowest levels since 2000 and the share of those who trust the president dipping below 50% for the first time, the system is unstable, and with a strong shock could faller.

What could produce this tipping point? Economic stagnation or even a downturn—which could come from a combination of falling oil prices, inflation or a reluctance of Russian entrepreneurs to invest in the system—could send such shockwaves. The revolution over bad governance, especially corruption, also could trigger a dangerous upheaval. In January and February of this year, the country was rocked by mass protest rallies by pensioners, or retirees, who felt cheated by a restructuring of the country’s social security system.

Finally, another major attack by Chechen terrorists is a virtual certainty. More than 330 people, half of them children, died in the assault on a school in Beslan last year, and trust in the government plummeted. Another massacre could send Putin’s approval ratings into a spiral, and thus lead to a government breakdown, if not collapse.

Possible Destabilization

While initially stemming from the new consensus, the Kremlin’s newly-authoritarian project has gone far beyond the original mandate and carries greater risks than commonly appreciated. Although officially justified as necessary to “strengthen” state and society, these policies in fact are likely to do the very opposite, destabilizing Russia’s politics, economy, and national security.
The United States and the international community need to find a pragmatic and catalytic approach to elevate our efforts in strife-torn lands. It must not be ideological or utopian or built off the grandiose concept of “nation building,” with its colonial antecedents, but a more practical view that engages local people and encourages the expansion of their basic freedoms. Liberating or “jump starting” the pent-up demand for greater liberties of average citizens in conflict prone places is a model that the United States should advance.

The difficulty of post-conflict challenges requires that we build our efforts from the most unifying elements of American political philosophy: the common sense language of enlightened self-interest; the centrality of a government of the people, by the people and for the people; the primacy of rule of law; and the social value of equality of opportunity. A majority of Americans have supported the complex work of peace building when anchored in these traditions—but have grown weary of more ethereal arguments.

In 1966 Senator William Fulbright wrote of two dominant strands of U.S. foreign policy. He argued that Americans tend to see the world with reason and championed moderation, which he termed our “democratic humanism.” But at those times when problems seem less clear, finite, and manageable, he argued that Americans come to see the world through a distorting prism of moralism, which he termed “intolerant Puritanism.”

Pragmatism does not mean that we ignore war-torn societies and fragile states or support authoritarians in the name of stability. Rather, when we choose to act, as we have in Iraq and Afghanistan, we do it in a more practical, strategic way. We develop clearer rationales and strategies. We anticipate events. We build our rapid response capacity—on the civilian and military side. We focus on local ownership. We improve our public diplomacy. We put the people of the place first.

Recent Lessons
Despite ever increasing efforts in six countries in the last ten years, the United States has remained conflicted about its role in reconstruction. Almost all of our interventions, from Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq, have generated considerable internal debate about the value of a U.S. effort. The concerns range from whether we should be undertaking the work at all to the efficacy of what is being attempted. Top political leadership has sent mixed signals, from grand rhetoric to promised exits and the public has mostly been called upon to support our troops and provide emergency financing.

A compounding ambiguity has come from our major governmental institutions. They have dealt with each situation as an unpleasant surprise that should be pursued with reluctance in an ad hoc way; the Department of Defense has not warmed to the post-war challenge of
restoring, maintaining and policing public order; the Department of State has shown little ability to put skilled people in the field; the Agency for International Development has wanted the more deliberate and stable development environments; the intelligence agencies have failed to build on-the-ground information sources or analysis; and humanitarians have objected to the intensely political nature of conflicts.

International institutions have struggled as well. Overcommitted with 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations, the United Nations has also faced resistance from within its institutions and from key member states. As we scan global capacity, we see a race between tortoises.

Some good work has been done, but the larger successes remain elusive. The outsized experiences of recent years have provided a bountiful bouquet of lessons in five general categories:

1. **Strategy and Rationale**
   - The United States has to believe in the importance of the challenge. It must be a central motivation of our national security strategy.
   - The larger the task, the more friends and allies we need to involve from the outset. When the enormity of the task is overwhelming, because of geography, demographics, length of time or need for speed, a global, burden-sharing approach is a necessity.

2. **Anticipation and Planning**
   - Start with a broad and thorough analysis of the situation and continue to build innovative ways to collect information.
   - Have a unity of U.S. leadership in place for the post-conflict period and make sure that the senior team has time to work together. It will need to be equally strong in the field and in Washington, central to the development of the overall strategy, well informed about the place, familiar with complex transitions, and temperamentally suited to dealing with near impossible challenges.
   - Develop an integrated “action strategy” that cuts across bureaucratic divides, recognizes priorities, makes choices, and recommends three to five elements that must go right.

3. **Agile Response**
   - Provide fast, flexible funding and access to the human talent that will increase field agility.
   - Establish security and public safety in the immediate aftermath of war. Without a new, reliable order in place to fill the vacuum, chaos will spread. Recognize that this will be a combination of soldiers, police, judges, jailleurs, prosecutors, and defense attorneys—all working in an environment where a straight shooting sheriff and a circuit riding judge would be a pleasant surprise.

4. **Local Ownership**
   - Build and empower local ownership in every sector from day one, including the management of funds. Require that local people build good governance habits with all international assistance: open accounting, transparent planning, the participation of citizen groups.
   - Ally with change agents—individuals or groups with a vested interest in transforming society. Advancing peaceful, democratic change takes courageous friends. Help them out, promote them and protect them.
   - Scale all work to the context. Sabotage and insecurity are given, so create a thousand points of light vs. larger, showcase efforts.

5. **Public Diplomacy**
   - Develop a clear message and then dominate communications.
   - Establish credible goals and measures of progress. Let America’s parents, taxpayers, and citizens know the story.
   - These situations are complex, ever changing, and unpredictable; in short, chaotic. It is folly to imagine controlling such a tableau, yet it is possible to shepherd it. Once you understand and establish a clear sense of direction and build a winning team, then the key is to win the confidence of the people.

**What is our government’s state of play?**

“Across the government, there were failures of imagination, policy, capabilities and management,” was the 9/11 Commission description of preparedness prior to the terrorist hijacking attacks of 2001. Many of the same weaknesses have become apparent in the post-conflict experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. Almost nothing was in place and little was being done to prepare for the post-war realities in these places. As a result, a great deal of activity is underway.

USAID Administrator Brian Atwood made an early start when he created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994 to deal with the political development of countries that were facing or emerging from distress. While a tiny office of $20-50 million per year, OTI was a unique U.S. government entity that could work on priority, root cause issues, anywhere in the world, with highly flexible funding. Although it found partners for many of its projects in the Special Forces, other U.S. military entities, eager U.S. Ambassadors, and the United Nations, it remained a solitary U.S. government response in a growing marketplace of potential interventions.

A seminal study was the Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict in December 1997. It stated, “War and mass violence usually result from deliberate political decisions, and the Commission believes that these decisions can be affected so that mass violence does not result.”

In 2002-2003, the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army and comprised of 27 distinguished Americans, sought to address U.S. weaknesses with a series of 17 recommendations. The Commission said, "We know that this difficult work can be done better." With its seven Congressional members, it proceeded to encourage legislation that addressed U.S. strategic, operational, and funding shortcomings.

The legislation reached its highest profile with the introduction of the Lugar-Biden bill in 2004, which focused on the civilian side of operations. While it had the unanimous support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it did not move forward. Other initiatives included efforts to build up U.S. capabilities to provide reconstruction assistance; create a UN civilian police corps to work with peace forces; and require the President to include a post-conflict strategy as part of the War Powers Resolution.

While legislation has not passed, it has helped to encourage other changes in the U.S. government. Among these are the following:

- **Department of State —** After a Principals decision, a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created in 2004. Led by a talented interagency group of 35, the Office is working to: build civilian capacity, including an Active Response Corps of State Department officers to deploy as first responders; provide frameworks, war games, and other tools for the government; build alliances within our government and with similar offices in other countries (Canada, UK, Nordic countries, and the European Union) and the UN; identify funding; and prepare to help guide future efforts in Sudan, Haiti and
elsewhere. Concerns about paltry funding, bureaucratic skepticism, and a lack of clear authorities persist.

• Department of Defense — At the strategic level there is a great deal of discussion about making changes to the National Defense Strategy of 2005 recognizes stability operations as central to three areas of transformation; the Defense Science Board focused its 2003 summer study on the issue and a draft DOD Directive on Stability Operations states that they "be given priority and attention comparable to combat operations;" the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review deals with failed states and other nontraditional threats and emphasizes foreign language speakers, cultural awareness, and local skills; the Secretary's January 2005 Joint Operating Concept makes clear that limited governance, security, restoration of essential public services and other reconstruction assistance will apply to all pre-crisis, combat, and post-war phases; and, a recent Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Act study by CSIS also highlighted these issues.

• At the operational level, DOD has established the Defense Reconstruction Support Office to coordinate efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, expanded its Commander's Funds which allow discretionary spending at the local level, created Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan that combine security and assistance in multi-agency teams, and expanded its plans for Army Civil Affairs units as well as dozens of other initiatives, including expanded training.

• USAID — The January 2005 "Fragile States Strategy" makes a connection between the President's 2002 National Security Strategy and seeks to reverse state decline and advance recovery. The Office of Transition Initiatives has continued its rapid growth, the new Office for Conflict Mitigation and Management has been created, and regular programming has been drawn into conflict zones.

Complimentary efforts to advance reconstruction and stabilization capabilities are underway among allies. The United Nations and NATO have created standby arrangements to speed up the international response and European Union defense ministers have committed to having 20,000 rapid reaction forces ready for deployment within a week by 2007. The EU is also developing a standby Gendarmerie Force of 3,000, with 800-900 ready to deploy within 30 days. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is asking its members to develop national ready rosters and the African Union has conducted operations in Burundi and Darfur, Sudan. West Africa has seen a regional organization, ECOWAS, deploy soldiers in several countries; and South American militaries are building capabilities.

The recognition of the need is growing but the response continues to lag behind the challenge. Further changes will be required.

Necessary Changes

In order to improve the likelihood of success, several major, but achievable changes are required.

1. A Decision Maker — The President will always have the final say, but huge reconstruction and stabilization efforts need day-to-day White House leadership, preferably from a second National Security Adviser. Without this, decision-making will continue to be fractured and slow and ultimate ownership confused. Upon returning from Iraq in July 2005, it was apparent that America's effort needed a "Karl Rove-type:" a go-to person who could make and execute decisions. All-consuming efforts like Afghanistan and Iraq should not be a part of someone's portfolio—the job is too big and will not get done.

2. A Culture of Anticipation — We need to improve our anticipation and analysis. Why are we constantly surprised? Why do we choose to intervene in one place and not another? (What would a $200 billion investment in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute have done for regional transformation vs. a larger effort in Iraq? At what point does a billion dollars in Haiti matter more than in Afghanistan or Sudan?) Is our spending in Pakistan addressing any of the core issues that might produce conflict? What sort of risk-reward and cost-benefit analysis do we do?

3. A Laser-like Focus — We have to commit our political will and government institutions to a tightly focused effort on establishing real operational capabilities. The approach of letting countless scattered and ad hoc arrangements blossom is not a workable strategy for a problem this complex and an organization as large as the U.S. government. Post-conflict reconstruction tasks require new levels of agility and entrepreneurial ways.

4. Integrated Priorities — We need integrated strategies that cut across parochial and bureaucratic interests, including traditional sovereignty arguments.

5. Leaders With Teams — We should recruit a cadre of 15 government leaders to prepare teams for future country cases, much like the original astronauts were recruited years before their space shots. These diplomats, soldiers and civilians should be well versed in areas of the world and in the intricacies of post-conflict reconstruction with on-the-ground exposure prior to assignment.

It is incumbent upon the United States to establish a strategic commitment to this work that goes beyond the de facto approach of recent years. To be a leader—intellectual, theoretical, practical, operational—we must be in a state of preparation for the plentiful supply of conventional wars—often civil wars—that the world will offer. America's decade of recent experience suggests that we can make a difference, but multiple changes will be required. We will have to build the capacity to be successful.

Potential benefits

Years of intimidation and war do not allow citizens to pursue previously held dreams. Survival is the order of the day, with a recurring cycle of fear and inhumanity imprisoning entire populations. Can we help to liberate people's potential and provide the necessary support and protection? Is there a way to encourage a positive evolution of troubled societies? What will it take?

Now is the time to set a clear direction and build a national commitment to "jump starting" war-torn and fragile lands. We have seen that ignoring the aftermath of wars or hoping to contain them on the cheap most often leads to greater complications—from recidivism, where 50% of peace accords collapse within five years, to wellsprings of terrorism or even genocide. The United States, in partnership with its allies, the United Nations and other international organizations should strive to promote and protect basic freedoms and serve as a catalyst for change.

Recent presidents have involved the United States in this work for a variety of reasons, including humanitarian concerns, bolstering alliances, democracy promotion, or to address perceived threats. A gradual progression has taken shape: from modest burden-sharing engagements (Somalia); to coalitions of the willing (Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo); to full-scale U.S.-dominated efforts (Afghanistan and Iraq). What has been missing is a unifying, central rationale. We have backed into outsized efforts without a unifying purpose.

Over the past ten years, hundreds of thousands of Americans have worked in conflict settings, as civilians and soldiers, for our government, the United Nations, and in private and non-profit sectors. We care about building peace because we recognize that it makes our
world safer and more productive. The United States has sacrificed the lives of many and the resources of our land to address the challenges of state collapse. With a practical approach and the resolve to do this well, in ten years our efforts could make the world a dramatically more peaceful place.

A phrase first used by Alexis de Tocqueville to describe America’s community building motivations.

The CSIS/AUSA framework for working in post-conflict situations parallels these ideas with an integrated, four pillar model: security and public safety, governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, and economic and social wellbeing.

Quo Vadis Europa?

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Three dates are essential to understand where Europe stands today: May 29, June 1 and July 7, 2005. The first two dates constitute a turning point in the history of the European Union. The third one is a tragic wake-up call for a Europe that knew the terrorist threat existed in intellectual and real terms after the attacks on Madrid in 2004, but had difficulty in integrating it politically and emotionally. After the attack on London, Europe will never be the same.

What are the consequences for Europe, and Europe’s relations with the United States and Russia of these new and momentous events?

May 29 and June 1—the dates of the French and the Dutch “no” votes to the constitutional treaty—may be seen by historians of the early twenty-first century as a symbolic turning point for Europe, a date that will enter history as surely as November 9, 1989. Although the fall of the Berlin Wall was a much more spectacular event—it marked the end of the Cold War—the French no, followed by that of the Dutch, may mark the end of the post-war period, which was characterized by a sort of reverence for the European Union project, associated with peace, prosperity and freedom. The cause of Europe was common ground for a majority of Europeans. But for the young French and the young Dutch who voted no to the constitutional treaty, peace is not a marvelous conquest; it is the only situation they have known. And the high level of unemployment makes the association between the words “Europe” and “prosperity,” at best an irony and at worst a provocation.

May 29 marks a moment for reflection and for listening. What really went wrong can be summarized in three words: enlargement, globalism and “Chirac,” if by the name of the French President one means the growing divorce between society and the political elites in France. One was expecting the ghost of the Turkish worker to weaken the “yes” camp. It was instead the “Polish plumber” who did it. The issue of enlargement proved to be decisive, but not future enlargement, rather, the past ones. In reality, according to public opinion polls, the issue of Turkey was mentioned by only 14 per cent of the “no” camp to justify their vote. But if the Turkish issue was not responsible for the “no” vote to the constitution, the “no” result may delay forever the Turkish candidacy to become a full member of the European Union.

The French were not directly consulted on May 1, 2004 to approve the passage of Europe from 15 to 25 members. They therefore expressed their sense of alienation towards the New Europe on May 29, 2005. In the past, Europe was for France the pursuit of national ambition through other means: the mechanism through which one could continue a policy of glory and influence. Through the Franco-German coupling the French could continue to perceive themselves as head of the European family. Today looking at the table of twenty-five, the French have lost that sense of familiarity
The European Union is acting as a mirror reflecting their growing sense of insecurity. Who are these people whose language I do not recognize, whose faces and names are unknown to me, and who tend in diplomatic terms to listen to Washington more than to Paris?

If Europe is no longer the continuation of France it is also because it is no longer linked to prosperity but to unemployment in the popular imagination. Europeanization is equated for the "no" camp with globalization, i.e., delocalization. And the "yes" camp has failed to convince the French that the real problem was not the "Polish plumber" but the Chinese and Indian workers. This strong protectionist tendency is, of course, encouraged by the unholy alliance between the extreme right and extreme left and the lack of charisma of the majority of France's and Europe's political elites. There is a direct connection between the level of education and revenues and the vote. Such a correlation was obvious in a city like Paris which voted yes, in direct proportion to the value of the housing market: the higher the price, the more likely the vote in favour of the constitution. It was not only a division between the "haves" and the "have nots," but one between those who believed in the future and those—like the majority of farmers—who were afraid of it.

The backlash against enlargement and globalization continues to spread. But the "accident" of history that made them irresistible may have been the presence in power in France at this critical juncture of the man who will be recorded by historians as the weakest President of the Fifth Republic. A man who could not be the right messenger for the constitutional treaty because the message was objectively difficult to convey—the constitutional treaty was 49,000 words long compared with the 4,000 words of the beautifully written text of the American constitution—and because the messenger was at best lukewarm towards the cause of Europe. According to recent public opinion polls, the Germans too would have said no to the constitutional treaty if they had been consulted by referendum, rather than submitting it to the vote of the Bundesstag. When representative democracy and direct democracy give such different results, it is the very nature of democracy that is in crisis. One thing remains to be said: the results of the French referendum exposed the growing uneasiness of the French not only with Europe, but more deeply with their own identity. Insecure in their performance in the world of globalization, the French were asking themselves more fundamental questions about their essence and their ability to preserve their model of social protection and national cohesion in an open, interdependent and increasingly dangerous and competitive world.

Yet if a pause is necessary, it should not be equated with immobilism and inaction. In the meanwhile, four directions have to be pursued. The first one consists of saving foreign policy from the electoral disaster. Europe must not be perceived by countries such as the United States, China and Russia as irrelevant, passive and totally obsessed with herself. Whatever the title—whether high representative, foreign minister, vice-president—the position of Javier Solana must be extricated from the political hurricane that has enveloped Europe. If Europe needs to take a "pause" inside, it must demonstrate some political will to the outside world. Such a requirement can be understood by a majority of Europeans and will not be perceived as a transgression against the French and Dutch vote.

The second and even more fundamental field for action concerns economic and social reforms. Germany, France and some other countries have not done enough in terms of labour market, welfare state and budget reforms. The statist and relatively rigid continental social model cannot be pursued anymore. Only if this homework is done can we overcome the European Paradox. To quote Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of President Jacques Chirac's ruling party and minister of the interior, it is necessary to "give back reality to the social model." And the alternative to pure market-dictated economies exists more in Nordic Europe and Great Britain than in traditional continental Europe.

Thirdly, in spite of the fact that the "no" vote was part of the product of the negative reaction of Frenchmen to past enlargement and the passage of Europe from 15 to 25 members, the cause of enlargement must be fought for with courage and determination by Europe's political elites. It must be explained that enlargement constitutes Europe's greatest political triumph and not Europe's greatest economic catastrophe. Delocalization is not the product of "Europeanization" but of globalization.

The process of enlargement must continue to include the two countries already accepted, Bulgaria and Romania, and in time all of the Balkan countries that satisfy the criteria of the European Union. Yet we cannot proceed as if the people of Europe had not expressed themselves, as if the feelings and aspirations of the majority view in the two countries on the passionate identity question did not exist.

The fourth field of action is directly linked to the current budgetary process. The battle over the new budget for the EU can either deepen the atmosphere of separation between the old and the new member states (and among the old ones) or it can contribute to the improvement of the atmosphere in Europe if the principle of solidarity is clearly reaffirmed. It is essential to rapidly reach a compromise, especially between France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland and Spain.

In post-war Europe, crisis situations often served as challenges and opportunities to push forward the cause of European integration. In 1954 the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense Community. In that critical situation, a group of countries concentrated on the economy in the pursuit of European integration. We can now once again transform the crisis into an opportunity: provided we manifest the will to strengthen our togetherness, to reform our economies and to be ready to take our share of responsibility in world affairs.

We have been taking Europe for granted. What has been achieved through patient efforts in the last fifty years can be unraveled much more quickly. To be sure, it will not be a return to the wars of the past, but a sliding into irrelevance. If it keeps missing the rendezvous with history, the fate of the European Union can be that of the Republic of Venice: once a key actor in world affairs, now turned into a museum for others, more dynamic and more determined to succeed.

After July 7, the reference to Venice should not falsely reassure Europeans. Decline may come accompanied with terror and, what is worse, home-grown terror. What is new in the European situation is that, unlike the United States, it is not just a target of terrorism but also a base for terrorists. Second and third generation Moslems born in Europe are now fighting in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. They are the kamikaze bombers in London. They are the product of the deadly encounter between Sunni fundamentalism and Europe's nihilism. We cannot understand them without making references to Leftist extremist groups that existed in Europe in the early 1970s, such as the "Red Brigades" in Italy and their equivalent in Germany and France, and their morbid culture of death and violence. They are our worst nightmares coming true because, at least indirectly, we have created those monsters by failing to instill in them our democratic principles and our tolerant values, and by allowing them instead to be seduced by an ideology of religious hatred. What is the purpose of closing our boundaries if the enemy is within—in terms of nationality if not in terms of loyalty. After 9/11 Americans were asking themselves the following question: "Why do they hate us?" Today's interrogation for Europeans is even more disquieting: "Why have we failed so badly in our integration efforts?" Is it us, or is it them, i.e., Islamic fundamentalists? We were preaching to Americans the best way to deal with the "Other." We had very little to be proud about.
What can be the impact of these negative and tragic developments on transatlantic relations first, and on Europe-Russia second?

As Europe enters an era of greater turbulence, the United States may either feel comforted in its unique and primary status or instead suffer from a new sense of internationalism, if not cultural, loneliness.

Since his re-election President Bush had given Europeans a sense that he had discovered or rediscovered the existence of the European Union. He intended to play with “Brussels” and not only with London and Rome, against Paris and Berlin, in a traditional bilateral fashion. In President Bush’s emphasis on the values of “democracy and freedom” for the greater Middle East and the world at large, confronted with a more ambitious and successful China and a more despotic Russia, only India and even more so the European Union can be seen as natural and legitimate allies. The more difficult and hopeless the situation in Iraq, the more the United States needs allies sharing its values system and, so to speak, belonging to its world.

But Europe today, since May 29, is less of a “natural solution.” It is precisely at a time when Washington would wish to see by her side a strong and united Europe, that the European Union gives sign of a deep crisis of identity about her future. And if the European Union cannot be counted upon as a solution, could it be becoming a problem as a key terrorist base? During the “Cold War,” Europe existed in American eyes as the first line of defense of the United States. After 1989, Europe became marginalized in the strategic thinking of Washington by the fall of the Soviet empire, the rise of Asia and the growing threat of the Middle East. Could Europe return to be a main stake of world politics—through the terrorists it has generated, which have to be contained, reduced and ultimately eliminated—thanks to the close collaboration between the United States and Europe? Could the fundamentalists, more than the Chinese or the Russians, prove to be “fundamental” in helping us to “reinvent” the West?

And what about Russia? Could she be benefiting from a combination of factors such as the high price of energy, the institutional disarray of the European Union and the obvious priority given to the “war on terror”? The domestic evolution of Putin’s Russia is an obvious source of concern, even if the two present leaders of France and Germany—Chirac and Schroeder—are refusing to confront this reality. But since May 29 and June 1, the dual “no” of the French and the Dutch, the prospect of future enlargement to countries such as Ukraine is more remote than ever, and not only because of the opportunities lost by Ukrainians themselves. Moscow should feel reassured at least in the foreseeable future. Of course the existence of a stable Europe and of a manageable Russia depend upon the existence of an independent Ukraine, but that does not necessarily imply the full entrance of Kiev as one of the new capitals of the European Union. All the more so if the political evolution of Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” proves to be less democratic than it could or should be.

The more the terrorist threat will unite “us,” the more the notion of “us” enlarged thus encompassing regimes whose “democratic values” are less than impeccable.

The European Union and Russia

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The break-up of the Soviet Union opened a period of stability in Europe which the continent has not witnessed for centuries. One positive element of the new European peace order was the emergence of a new non-Communist and non-totalitarian Russia which chose to open itself up and eventually ally herself with the West.

The Russian journey to the West succeeded only partly. Russia transformed herself from a Soviet planning state to a capitalist market economy and abolished the former Communist ideology. Private property has been fully legalized in Russia. Given the negative attitude in Russian society to private ownership for almost one century, this was an historical achievement.

Throughout the 1990s, Russia also laid the fundament for a pluralistic state. A division of power between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches became reality. But in many ways, Russia’s democratic system resembled a Potemkin village. Russia got somewhat stuck half-way in its process of democratization. The government of liberals was quickly removed. It was replaced by old Soviet-style managers, who, contrary to the young liberals, knew how to build authority. But they, too, were soon replaced by the so-called oligarch breed of new businessmen who basically privatized power in the country using their influence and fortunes. Their rule lasted half a decade, before they had to relinquish power back to the traditional “power ministries” with the emergence of President Vladimir Putin.

Since 2000, Russia’s economy has experienced remarkable growth. This positive development led Russian leaders to think that they could reach stability, foreign investment, full international recognition and integration into the world economy without adopting liberal values. Putin managed to consolidate his elite and society on non-democratic and nationalist ideas.

In the 1990s, the Yeltsin government paid little attention to reintegration processes on the post-Soviet territory. The Kremlin leadership was overburdened with other domestic tasks. Yeltsin openly rejected any ideas of Russia reconstituting itself as an empire. Under Putin things changed. By the end of Putin’s first term, a “Union” consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine became realistic.

The West welcomed Russia’s revolution and the end of Communism. The Cold War ended peacefully. The U.S. and the European Union (EU) supported Russia with financial credits and other assistance in the 90s out of fear that a weak Russia may collapse and throw Europe into chaos. But since the rise of Putin they became increasingly worried about a strong Russia which took anti-western traits and was more difficult for the West to influence.

The West took great advantage from the dramatic changes of 1989-1991. The EU realized the historical chance to reunite Western and Central-Eastern Europe within a little more than a decade. Twenty-five to thirty European countries are now forming a unique union of
common values, are part of the same economy and are creating structures to conduct a joint foreign and defence policy. The EU and NATO have become gravity centres even for countries in the post-Soviet space. Nobody can deny that the revolutions staged in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 expressed the wish of many people in these countries to join the West.

However, the new dramatic changes in the East came for the EU at the wrong moment. Fifteen years of rebuilding a new Europe have exhausted the EU. The great spirit of new political and economic liberties, which had been felt throughout the continent after the Cold War, has vanished. The EU concluded that it cannot expand forever. The rejection of the EU Constitution in countries of the "old" Europe created a stalemate in the further political integration of Europe.

This is a short picture of Europe and Russia after the first half of the first decade of the new century. Is the idea of a Common European House dead? Will the European continent be divided in the future between an EU-Europe, Russia and the states in between?

Russia, whose democratic leaders dissolved the Soviet Union in 1991, partly because they wanted to join the West themselves, made two unsuccessful attempts to knock at the doors of the EU and NATO. But, contrary to Central East European states, which saw their integration into EU-Europe as a reunification with a historical and cultural Europe of which they had been deprived as a result of the Yalta world order, Russia’s idea of integration with the EU was a more practical one.

After taking over from Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin suggested creating a joint democractic system consisting of Russia, the U.S., the EU and Japan. He thought then that this was the only way to protect Russian civilization from challenges from the South. The war in Chechnya and Western NATO-expansion buried this plan before any serious discussions started.

Vladimir Putin also embraced the EU and the U.S. at the beginning of his presidency. He made a proposal to extend the partnership between the EU and Russia from a pure economic perspective to a strategic level, including a security dialogue with the newly-established European Defence and Security Policy institutions. Two years later he suggested in his speech to the Bundestag to merge the energy-resource-rich space of Siberia and the Far East with the technologically-rich space of Western Europe. The idea of a new Union of Coal and Steel—created by the arch rivals Germany and France shortly after the War as a first fundament for the West-European economic union—was born.

Putin spoke in Berlin two weeks after the horrible events of 9-11. Hours after the terrorist attacks on the U.S., Putin was the first foreign leader to call President George W. Bush. The U.S. and Russia quickly joined forces in the war against terror and together freed Afghanistan from its terrorist structures. Putin welcomed the stationing of U.S. combat troops in Central Asia: a new U.S.-Russia alliance unseen since World War II was unfolding on the world political stage.

Russia’s opposition to the U.S-led war in Iraq; Moscow’s participation in the creation of the so-called “axis” Berlin-Paris-Moscow, which, in the view of many observers, almost split the transatlantic alliance; Putin’s adherence to authoritarian rule in domestic policies; the destruction of Yukos; and the U.S. loss of interest in a strategic partnership with an unwilling Russia spoiled the relationship.

The relationship between Russia and the EU deteriorated even faster. The EU, extremely focused on protecting its liberal value system under the new challenges and pressures from globalization, found less and less common ground with a Russia that wanted to build its relationship with the West not on a partnership of values but on a pragmatic partnership of common interests.

The entrance of four former Warsaw Pact states and the three Baltic republics to the EU further changed the latter’s political and moral attitude towards Russia. Contrary to the “old” Western nations, the new member states had not reconciled with post-Communist Russia. And Russia did not forgive them their drive toward the West.

As a result, the negative part of the Russia agenda of the EU, which included such issues as human rights abuses in Chechnya and the limitation of media freedom and manipulations of electoral procedures, was enlarged by the negativism in the relations of the new member states toward Russia. The agenda of Russia and the EU became diluted with minor quarrels over such issues as visas for Russian travelers between Russia and its European enclave Kaliningrad and the diversification of energy pipeline routes.

Until 2004, Russia and the EU had simply different views on values. Conflicts, which were characteristic for both sides in the past, seemed to have been buried under the ruins of the Cold War.

The years of 2003-05 were probably from the European long-term historical perspective as dramatic and significant as the years of 1989-91 which witnessed the collapse of the Communist world in Eastern Europe. What happened in the post-Soviet space in 2003-05 may result in a serious deterioration of relations between two frustrated partners—Russia and the West—a new Cold Peace in Europe, a reorientation of Russia’s search for strategic partnerships from the U.S. and the EU to China and India.

Geopolitics—a term which has been labelled as old-fashioned because, in the opinion of Western political scientists, modern world politics has nothing more to do with "hemispheres" or "zones of influence"—cannot be hidden in the European continent’s newly-emerging architecture.

The EU has proclaimed a new "European Neighbouring Policy" towards Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. The EU is now determined to define and structure its common foreign and defence policy. The European security strategy is set to assist democracy and economic reform, prevent instabilities and help to resolve conflicts in its broader neighbourhood, especially in regions which are seen as transit routes, raw material bases or potential markets for the EU.

The EU regards the Western states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the South Caucasus increasingly as its "new abroad". Countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (if President Alexander Lukashenko goes) may even gain EU membership perspective should they succeed in reforming their economic and political systems and fulfil the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which define the liberal values today. Particularly the Black Sea and Caspian regions have risen in the strategic significance of the EU. In some decades, the western and southern states of today’s CIS could become the prolongation of Europe into Asia and be culturally, economically and politically closely connected with EU-Europe. It is possible that Russia, if it chooses the path of democratisation, will also be part of this entity.

Russia, which tended to see the former republics of the Soviet Union as their "near abroad", developed a rivalry toward such geopolitical plans of the EU, Russia obviously underestimated the new political muscles of the enlarged EU. Moscow was too ignorant to detect the transformation of the EU from a pure economic union to a political actor. Russia accepted that the individual EU countries would speak to Russia from a common position and agreed to give up the sovereignty of the institution of EU-Russia summits which have become the main platform for relations between the two. Russia, however, also skillfully developed bilateral relations with more friendly countries, such as Germany, France and Italy.

At the end, the bilateral platform did not work properly. Russia did not manage to reach an individual bilateral agreement with Germany on visa relaxations for Russian citizens to the EU. (The visa issue has become a particularly frustrating negotiation issue for Moscow diplomats, since citizens of many Latin American and North African states can legally enter the EU without visas, but Russians can’t). It is possible that the world is witnessing a second breakup of what over three centuries constituted the territory of Great Russia.
• After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has politically torn its connections with Russia and keeps one foot firmly in the door to the West.

• As a result of the Georgian revolution and the accomplishment of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Russia has lost its influence over the Southern Caucasus.

• The troop withdrawal from Georgia, which Moscow sought to extend, and the probable deployment of U.S. bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan within the next few years, will change the geopolitical situation in this key area.

• Russia has also lost its influence over Moldova and the regulation of the Transdniestrian conflict. Moscow's attempt to transform Moldova into a confederation—a step which would have kept Russia as the main arbiter in the political process—was rejected by the EU.

An increasingly frustrated Russia is presently turning away from partnership with the EU. Since Putin may soon lose his friend, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, as his main advocate in the West, he might also face difficulties in dealing with the EU in the future. The partnership relations may change. A conservative German government would alter the present "troika" of Germany-France-Russia into a "troika" of Germany-Poland-Russia. Germany's attempts to move closer to the West and provide Moscow with at least some influence on European affairs through this unofficial "troika" mechanism will fade. Russia's main problem with the EU is that it has no seat in the real decision-making bodies, like NATO and the EU, which design the future European architecture.

The U.S., Poland, Romania and the Baltic States have endorsed their support for the political strengthening of the GUAM organisation, which plans to set up a non-Russian energy alliance in the south-east of Europe. This policy may jeopardise the current planning of the classical Russian-EU energy alliance, which is so heavily pushed by a country like Germany. If the construction of an energy alliance between Russia and the EU is also stopped—due to intervention from the Central East European countries which fear too much energy dependence on Russia—a key strategic element in the partnership between the EU and Russia will vanish.

Putin's recent turn to China and India, and his attempts to regain control at least over Central Asia, are the first signals of further emerging changes on the European continent and the world stage in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century.

Similarly worrying is the growing rift between the EU countries and Russia's perception of recent history during World War II and the occupation of Eastern Europe by Soviet Russia. Many in Europe tend to see Hitler and Stalin as similar criminal dictators. Russia, however, has again started to shape its historical identity and legitimacy as a great power from its victory in World War II. The two different "cultures" bring Europe and Russia into another collision.

A real improvement of relations between the EU and Russia may occur only after a new major crisis, such as a terrorist strike against Europe like 9-11. Then, Europeans and Russians may feel the need to search for joint protection from a common enemy. And perhaps the EU will become seriously interested in Russia as an alternative energy supplier from the Persian Gulf.

As of today, the European elites are more interested in repairing the rifts created in transatlantic relations during the Iraq war than engaging with an authoritarian Russia.

The Russian elites also don't need Europe. In their view, Russia's new capitalististic economic system has advantages over Europe's social-economic model, which does not have the same kind of growth. The EU is for Russians a pragmatic target: a source for modernization, a market for technical equipment, a consumer of energy, a place to buy secure property, and a place to park money.
Observers
Barry Gaberman
The Ford Foundation

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Dick Clark
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Michael Mandelbaum
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Aspen Institute Staff
Diane Anello
Simon Bourgin
Sara Kuhn
Bill Nell
Pat Walton

U.S.-Russia-Europe: Cooperative Efforts

CONFERENCE AGENDA
Dublin, Ireland
August 20-26, 2005

Ireland and the European Union
Remarks by The Honorable Mary Robinson, Former President of Ireland

Nonproliferation: The Next Steps
Rose Gottemoeller
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Discussion Questions
• What are the most urgent current challenges for nonproliferation policy?
• Are the proper policies and institutions in place to cope with the nonproliferation challenges of the twenty-first century?
• What is the status of U.S.-Russian cooperation to prevent proliferation?

Russia’s Perspectives and Policies on Nonproliferation
Remarks by Vladimir Orlov, Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Russia: Current Developments
Leon Aron, American Enterprise Institute

Discussion Questions
• How democratic is Russia today?
• How well is the Russian economy performing?
• What is the current status of U.S.-Russian relations?
Russia’s View of the World
Remarks by Vyacheslav Nikonov, Polity Foundation

An American Role in Nation Building?
Frederick Barton, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Discussion Questions
• What are the main lessons from recent American experiences with nation-building?
• Is the American government adequately organized to cope with the challenges that nation-building presents?
• In what places are future nation-building challenges likely to occur?

The European Union: Current Issues and Relations With Russia and the U.S.
Dominique Moisi, French Institute of International Relations

Discussion Questions
• What are the major consequences of the defeat of the referendums on the proposed EU constitution in France and the Netherlands?
• What is the status of relations between the United States and the EU?
• What is the status of relations between Russia and the EU?

Russia’s Relations with the European Union
Remarks by Alexander Rahr, German Council on Foreign Relations