Future of the NPT

“We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Report, 2005

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Future of the NPT

1. Why Worry?

2. Why Not Worry?

3. What is to be Done?
Why Worry?

• **Question:** Is the risk of the current nuclear order today unraveling or collapsing as great as that of the global, financial order a year and a half ago when it was sturdy and resilient?

• **Kissinger:** Defining challenge for statesmen is to recognize “a change in the international environment so likely to undermine national security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears.”

• **Bottom Line:** Even if the likelihood of collapse of the nonproliferation regime is only 10%, the consequences would be so devastating that preventing this outcome must be an urgent priority.
Why Worry?

• North Korea
• Iran
• Pakistan
• Residual Al-Qaeda
• Push-Back against Nonproliferation Regime
• Demonstrated Utility/Disutility of Nuclear Weapons in International Affairs
• Reexamination of the Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Affairs
• Nuclear Renaissance
• Inescapable Dissemination of Nuclear Technology
• Possible New Nuclear Programs
North Korea

• Emerging as defacto nuclear weapons state: self-declared but unrecognized; from CVID to CVIN? Arsenal of 10 bombs-worth of plutonium (PU); harvesting PU for an eleventh bomb; possibly restarting Yongbyon with the capacity to produce two bombs worth of PU a year; possible uranium enrichment line; conducted two nuclear weapons tests; proliferated nuclear technologies.

– Could Kim-Jong Il imagine getting away with selling a nuclear weapon to Osama bin Laden?

– What are the consequences for the NPT regime if one of the least powerful states among 200 can successfully defy international rules and stiff the most powerful nations charged with enforcing the NPT regime?
Iran

• On the Pakistan road following AQ Khan playbook: methodically building up nuclear infrastructure, having mastered the technological know-how to build and operate cascades of centrifuge; spinning 4,500 centrifuges producing 2.8kg LEU/day with an additional 3,700 centrifuges installed and ready to begin operating; with stockpile of over 3,000 pounds of LEU— an amount sufficient, after further enrichment, to make 2 crude nuclear bombs; maintaining covert enrichment facilities that provide backup in case of a military strike on Natanz and potential breakout option and.

  — On the current path, when will Iran test its first nuclear bomb?
Pakistan

- Nuclear arsenal has tripled in size over the last eight years; decreasing stability of the government; increasing reliance on nuclear arsenal to deter India; with consequent increasing risk of unauthorized use or theft of a nuclear weapon; threatened by Taliban insurgency within and American AfPak activity without; WMD Commission: "Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan."

  — Pakistani public opinion: what is the #1 threat to Pakistan? India. What is #2?
Residual Al-Qaeda

• Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri have nuclear 9/11 objective; Pakistan’s nuclear weapons the prize; desperation.
  – Is a nuclear 9/11 more or less likely than it was 8 years ago?
NPT Cynicism

• Cynicism and push-back against the nonproliferation regime: instrument for the “have’s” to deny the “have-not’s”; 2005 Review Conference as a bust largely caused by American hamfistedness (e.g. banning the word “disarmament”); suspicion in run-up to 2010 Review Conference exemplified in IAEA board resistance to IAEA managed fuel bank of last resort; Pakistan’s spiking discussion of FMCT at disarmament conference.
  
  – Can the US mobilize leaders of governments to overcome powerful preferences of professional arms controllers, disarmament, negotiators, and military?
Demonstrated Utility/Disutility of Nuclear Weapons in International Affairs

- American nuclear weapons of zero use in Iraq and Afghanistan; nonetheless, against the axis of evil, lesson taught by US attacking the state that demonstrably had no nuclear weapons or activity and giving a pass to the state that had 2-bombs worth of PU.
  - If Iraq had North Korea’s arsenal of ten bombs worth of PU and had conducted a test, would the Bush Administration have attacked Iraq?
Reexamination of the Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics

• Obama transformed optics in Prague speech embracing vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and proposing an ambitious agenda with long road and high obstacles to the next base camp; blurring of that message by simultaneous commitment that as long as the US has nuclear weapons they must be “safe, secure, reliable”—the last phrase providing license for building up infrastructure of nuclear weapons that suggest they will be very long lived; Russia judo: embrace of Obama’s vision while establishing conditions for realization that make commitment essentially equivalent to most of the American national security community’s understanding of the US Article VI commitments in the NPT, i.e. elimination of nuclear weapons right along with “general and complete disarmament”; Nuclear Posture Review that will underline reliable; China’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal; Pakistan’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal; France calling its next generation nuclear arsenal its “national life assurance policy.”
Nuclear Renaissance

• In greenhouse gas constrained environment, nuclear the most established clean alternative energy. Currently: 20% of US electricity, 80% of France, 25% of Japan; Increase in the number of nuclear energy plants equals increasing nuclear knowledgeable; increasing enrichment, even at international enrichment facilities equals increasing nuclear knowledgeable about enrichment—which is the only high hurdle to nuclear bombs.

  – Will the expansion of nuclear energy reactors lead to a proliferation of uranium enrichment facilities and reprocessing facilities?
Inescapable Dissemination of Nuclear Technology

• Relentless advance of science and technology combines with an even more rapid diffusion of knowledge to empower larger and larger numbers of states and individuals to have the capacity to kill massively.
Possible New Nuclear Programs?

• *Syria*: September 2007, Israel destroyed a North Korean supplied plutonium production reactor in Syria, large enough to produce sufficient plutonium for one bomb per year; *Myanmar*: In June 2009, three individuals arrested for attempting to illegally export dual-use equipment to Myanmar under direction of company associated with North Korean military.
Why Not Worry?
Why **Not** Worry?

- **Bottom Line**: risks, of course, but less than meet the eye. How many additional nuclear weapons states are there today than there were at the end of the Cold War?
  - Answer: 0. From 9 to 9: minus 1 (South Africa) and plus 1 (North Korea).
Why **Not** Worry?

- How many nations have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, committing themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons?
  - Answer: 184

- How many nations began down the path to nuclear weapons with serious intent to getting nuclear weapons, were capable of completing the journey, but stopped short of the finish line and turned back?
  - Answer: 13: Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia.

- How many nations had nuclear weapons but eliminated them?
  - Answer: 4: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus together inherited more than 4,000 nuclear weapons on their territories when the Soviet Union dissolved; in 1994 they agreed with the U.S. and Russia to return them to Russia. South Africa built six nuclear weapons in the 1980s and just prior the transfer of power to the post-apartheid government, dismantled them.
North East Asia Cascade?

- Japan deep rooted nuclear neuralgia and relative confidence in US nuclear umbrella.
- South Korea more afraid of life without the US nuclear umbrella and US troops on peninsula than of North Korea nuclear weapons.
- Taiwan penetrated by China, seduced by China’s new approach, and terrified if caught cheating.
- Burma? If bought a Yongbyon-style operator, could they operate it?
Middle East Cascade?

- If a nuclear Iran, many abstract aspirations, but what realistic objective and plans; little S&T infrastructure for nuclear weapons programs.
  - Saudi: buyer vs. maker. Conceivable prior discussions with Pakistan about an Islamic bomb. Have bought secretly MRBM from China in 1980s that could serve as delivery vehicles.
  - Egypt: Given limited S&T infrastructure, limited possibility unless buy expertise.
  - Turkey: limited infrastructure; would endanger good standing in NATO; seriously undercut any remaining chance of Turkish accession into EU
Al-Qaeda on the Run

• Al-Qaeda under attack and on the run: 9 out of 20 high-level al-Qaeda leaders killed.
  – DNI Admiral Dennis Blair, “al-Qa’ida today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago.”
What’s to Be Done?
Obama’s Serious Opening Ploy

- Prague speech: transforming the optics.
- Emerging international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.
- Renewal of arms control with Russia towards START follow-on.
- Historic UNSC session and unanimous adoption of nonproliferation resolution (UNSCR 1887)
- Realign missile defense against Iran: from symbolic to threat-based.
- Opening to engaging Iran.
- Strengthen six-party consensus re North Korea and refuse to pay the third time for the same horse.
- Realistic nuclear posture review likely to postpone RRW, while rebuilding infrastructure.
- Nuclear security summit, April 2010 to speed securing all nuclear weapons and materials to gold standard within four years.
From Words to Deeds

• Obama administration’s tough year ahead: from words to work—with obstacles and adversaries that will make achieving results uncertain, and challenging in the extreme.
Clues and Crutches

- **Trench Warfare.** Case by case using all sticks and carrots in bilateral relationships. Example, South Africa and Pelindaba with 30 weapons equivalents of HEU.

- **Consciousness of leaders.** Seizing the minds, imagination, and guts of leaders and layers of officials and employees in other countries about the reality of the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism to themselves and their countries; most today simply do not “get it.” Brute Fact: 99% of the actions that secure nuclear weapons and materials—or leave them vulnerable—are taken by foreigners.

- **How?**
  - Thick intelligence cooperation, joint threat briefing, fast-paced nuclear vulnerability surveys, realistic security performance tests, joint red-teaming, nuclear terrorism war games, shared-threat incident databases, and threat focused training.
Clues and Crutches (2)

• **Doctrine of Nuclear Accountability.** Increasing accountability for nuclear weapons and materials beginning with **unambiguous accountability** for North Korea by **extending deterrence now.** Three elements:

  – **Advancing our nuclear forensics** sufficiently to make credible to Kim-Jong Il that if a bomb of North Korean origin explodes in one of our cities, we will be able to identify his fingerprints on it;

  – **Articulating a Doctrine of Nuclear Accountability** according to which if a bomb of North Korean origin explodes here, we will respond precisely as if it were delivered against us by a missile.

  – **Communicating this to Kim Jong-II directly in a manner that would make this credible** to both him and the other members of his leadership
Clues and Crutches (3)

• **New Architecture.** A Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.
  – Mission: to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism anywhere by taking every action physically, technically, and diplomatically possible to prevent nuclear weapons or materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.
  – Larger aspiration: revitalization/reconstruction of global nuclear order shaped by Five No’s: No Loose Nukes; No New Nascent Nukes; No New Nuclear Weapons States; No Role for Nuclear Weapons in International Affairs; No Nuclear Weapons.
  – Key Pillars:
    • Assured nuclear security - States would have to guarantee that all nuclear weapons and materials in their territories were secured to a "gold standard." States' means of securing these materials would have to be sufficiently transparent that leaders of other member states could reassure their own citizens that terrorists would never get a nuclear bomb from another Alliance member.
    • Doctrine of Nuclear Accountability - If nuclear weapons or materials should be stolen, states that had satisfied the requirements for assured nuclear security, met the new standards in securing their materials and made their safeguards sufficiently transparent to the other members would be judged less harshly. A state that was unwilling to participate fully in the Alliance would automatically be put on a list of suspect sources of a terrorist nuclear bomb.
    • Counterproliferation - Development of joint-action plans to prevent, not only the urgent challenge posed by North Korea and Iran but in the cases that could follow after.
    • Structure - Hierarchy of membership that requires specific actions for specific benefits
    • Reinforcing Global Nuclear Order - Alliance should also become the “adult supervisor” of the global nuclear order with regular assessments of its fragility, stability, and ways to strengthen.

• **Nunn Questions:** on the day after a nuclear terrorist attack, what will we all demand be done urgently? Why are we not taking those actions today?