New York City’s Preparedness for Terrorism
(and Catastrophic Natural Disasters)
By Clark Kent Ervin
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Clark Kent Ervin

Aspen Homeland Security Program
Clark Kent Ervin
Director
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Introduction

Sooner or later, somewhere or other, another natural disaster will strike America, be it a hurricane, a tornado, an earthquake, or a flood.

Sooner or later, somewhere or other, terrorists will attempt to strike America again. Indeed, many experts believe that the threat of another attack is rising.¹ Al Qaeda is resurgent, having reconstituted itself along the Afghan-Pakistan border.² And, recent history shows that terrorists are especially prone to strike during the transition from one administration to another or early in the term of a new government. Adding to our vulnerability, the nation is now bogged down in two wars and groaning under mounting debt, while our economy is sinking from the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression.

While another powerful act of nature and another attempted attack are both inevitable, catastrophic death, injury, and economic damage need not result. If we have learned from the epic tragedies of Hurricane Katrina and 9/11 the lessons we should have learned from them, we will be able to minimize the effects of any future natural or man-made potential catastrophe.

But, have we learned these lessons? Is America significantly better prepared today for another natural disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina? Are we significantly better prepared for another terror attack on the scale of 9/11?

If the answer is “yes,” the American people can rest assured that the nation is as safe from danger as it can be. If the answer is “no,” specific steps can be taken to move the nation toward maximum practicable preparedness as soon as possible.

To answer these urgent questions, the Aspen Institute’s Homeland Security Program obtained a generous lead grant from the Ford Foundation, supplemented by additional ones from the Rockefeller Foundation, the McCormick Foundation, and the Houston Endowment. We have chosen five cities (namely, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and New Orleans), each of which is either a top terror target,
prone to natural disasters, or both, as test cases. If these cities are as well prepared for catastrophes as they can be, they can serve as models for the nation as a whole.

Our goal in each city is to identify best practices that can be replicated in other cities around the nation; to identify any gaps in preparedness; and to determine how to close any such gaps. We are conducting these assessments primarily through roundtable discussions in each city with key local, state, and federal government officials, corporate and non-profit stakeholders, and academic and think tank experts, with some supplemental research and follow-up interviews. The audience for each roundtable consists primarily of representatives of funding foundations, congressional staff, and homeland security policy experts and students, who are helpful in engaging the speakers in dialogue and discussion following their formal presentations. To encourage the speakers to be as candid as possible, particularly with regard to gaps in preparedness, members of the audience do not include members of the press.

The ultimate product will be a composite report for the next President and Congress early in 2009, outlining these best practices, preparedness gaps, and recommendations to close these gaps. Focusing on New York City, this is the first interim report. It is based upon the results of a roundtable held at the Ford Foundation on December 3-5, 2007, as well as research and follow-up interviews, as noted above. A copy of the agenda for this roundtable, the biographies of each speaker; and a list of audience members are attached as Exhibits A, B, and C, respectively.

A caveat or two are in order. First this report, and its subsequent counterparts regarding the other cities, is not, and is not represented to be, an exhaustive and rigorous examination of homeland security preparedness. It is, instead, the product of the considered judgment of front line practitioners and nationally recognized experts as of a particular moment in time. It, should, nonetheless, be an invaluable tool for the new set of national policymakers as they begin the process of determining what has worked over the last seven years as regards homeland security preparedness and what has not and what our priorities going forward should be.
Second, this report, at least, focuses more on counterterrorism preparedness than natural disaster preparedness even though “homeland security” is meant to focus on “all hazards.” But in New York City, for obvious reasons, far and away the bigger concern is terrorism. The balance of emphasis will likely change from city to city in subsequent reports.

There are many important recommendations in this report. But, perhaps the most important one is only implicit. To make it explicit, Washington policy makers should talk less and listen more to the “preventers” and responders” around the country who are on the front lines every day in the ongoing struggle to protect us from terror attacks and natural disasters. Homeland security is not a federal enterprise; it is a national one. Perhaps the best thing the federal government can do is to support state and local public and private actors with money, intelligence, and authority, and facilitate the sharing among them of best practices and ways and means of closing remaining security gaps.

Clark Kent Ervin
Director
Homeland Security Program
The Aspen Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As noted above, there are many important findings and insights in this report, so selecting the most important to highlight is especially challenging. Among them, certainly, are the following:

Best Practices

A Dedicated Cadre of Counterterrorism and Intelligence Analysts within the Police Department: This is not for every city, certainly. The bad news is that most cannot afford it; the good news is that most probably do not need it.

But, it does make sense that the nation’s number one terror target – New York City- and other large and/or iconic cities – devote as many officers full-time to countering terrorism as they can spare. And, likewise, it makes sense for cities that are likely terror targets, which tend to be multi-lingual and multi-ethnic, to develop their own intelligence units and to make a strength of their diversity by tapping into it to develop in-house linguistic and cultural expertise that can aid in the collection and analysis of intelligence.

But, even those cities without the need or resources for dedicated counterterrorism officers should incorporate counterterrorism training into their classroom and on-the-job training regime. There is often a nexus between terrorism and ordinary crime. The more aware police officers are of these potential connections, the likelier they are to spot terrorism indicators when going about their regular beats.
Further, even cities unlikely to be targeted by terrorists should consider implementing those of the New York Police Department’s various counterterrorism programs (outlined in detail in the report) that make sense for them and that they can afford.

**Bringing all relevant governmental and non-governmental actors together to share information, leverage expertise and resources, and prioritize among competing needs and interests:** New York City and New York State have done a highly commendable job of bringing all the key counterterrorism players to the proverbial table, making the whole, as a result, greater than the sum of its parts. Particular note should be made of the degree to which private sector security officials are made privy to government intelligence and the degree to which the private sector augments the government’s intelligence collection by serving as additional “eyes and ears” on the ground. Likewise, particular note should be taken of the degree to which private resources, including logistical management systems, are leveraged to maximize the city’s and state’s ability to prepare for and respond to crises.

**Analyzing intelligence in a systematic fashion so as to spot trends and patterns that might indicate terrorist activity:** In New York, reporting tips that might be connected to terrorism is encouraged, and such tips are aggressively investigated. But, that and other intelligence is not merely collected, stored, and, as appropriate, shared. It is analyzed to see whether a given fragment of information in connected to similar information, so as to spot suspicious trends or patterns. 9/11 shows that, as important as collecting the proverbial “dots” is, connecting them is at least as important.

**The deployment, in the aviation sector, of cutting-edge counter-terrorism technology and the roll-out of innovative programs:** While certainly not unique to New York City, airports there are beginning to deploy technologies like millimeter wave (sees through clothing, without revealing sensitive body parts) and multi-view x-ray (rotates bags in a three-dimensional fashion so that otherwise obscured items in a carry-on bag can be seen) that can help screeners get as close to 100% detection of concealed weapons as possible. And, programs like the use of Behavior Detection Officers, Travel Document Checkers, and Bomb Appraisal Officers can greatly aid in spotting terrorists and identifying terrorist weapons.
Periodic surges of security personnel in order to disrupt terrorist plotting and planning. A number of programs touted in the report are based on periodic surges of security personnel to strategic locations like mass transit and rail stations and iconic sites. Such surges are designed to disrupt terrorist plotting and planning by suggesting that counter-terrorism forces are constantly on the alert and able at any moment to appear on the scene. Such programs are a particularly effective way to maximize the use of limited manpower. They can not only frustrate the plans of terrorists; they can also reassure the public that everything possible is being done to protect them from the threat of another attack.

Gaps

Funding: Counter-terrorism funding is hugely expensive, and even relatively wealthy cities like New York will find it increasingly difficult to bear this burden more or less alone. As more time passes without another attack, as crime rises, and until the economy improves, we are likely to see a continuing concern on the part of local police departments – the “first preventers” of terrorism and the “first responders” to terrorism - that they can ill afford to devote ever scarcer resources to fighting a danger that increasingly seems anything but clear and present. Whatever the public perception, though, terrorism remains a major threat facing the nation, if not the major threat. If anything, the threat of terrorism is rising. It is urgent, then, that the new Administration and Congress make the hard budgetary choices necessary to ensure that localities, states, and, where appropriate, the private sector, have the federal funding to close the gap between how prepared for the next attack we should be and how prepared we actually are. If we disabuse ourselves of the false distinction the Bush Administration has drawn between “national defense” and “homeland security,” we can find at least some of the additional money we need in the Pentagon’s budget. If the homeland is insecure, the nation’s defenses are down, so it is entirely appropriate to re-order spending priorities to some degree from preparing for traditional warfare abroad to preparing for a terror attack here at home.

Metrics: Speaking of the “preparedness gap,” how do we measure how prepared we are and how prepared we need to be? Should we follow Vice President Cheney’s “1% percent doctrine” - the notion that
even if there’s only a minute chance of a nuclear (or similarly cata-
clysmic) terror attack, given the consequences, we should devote the
bulk of our resources and attention to preventing it? Or, should we
focus on scenarios that might be lower in consequence but higher in
probability? And, once that threshold decision is made, how much pre-
paredness is “enough,” and how will when know when we have reached
that point? Everyone agrees that these are critical questions, but no one,
really, can answer them.

Focus on Recovery Rather than Preparedness: The nation lacks a
“culture of preparedness.” The government and the private sector are
quick to respond to terror attacks and natural disasters, but reluctant to
devote attention and resources to attempting to minimize their effects by
better preparing for them. Unlike, say, global warming and Al Gore, or
Tibetan rights and Richard Gere, preparedness “has no Angelina Jolie.”

Turf Wars and Culture Clashes: Though it appears to have improved
since 9/11, there continue to be turf wars and culture clashes between
the police department and the fire department. FDNY continues to
resent NYPD’s position as the lead counterterrorism agency. Absent
another attack, it is difficult to assess the degree to which such clashes,
present since time immemorial, endure and their practical effects in
terms of counterterrorism preparedness. But, any such clashes, and any
redundancies and other inefficiencies, are counter-productive. This is
especially so at a time when the threat of another attack is rising, and
our resources are dwindling.

Intelligence-Sharing and Coordination: Ensuring that intelligence
is shared among relevant federal, state, and local governmental and pri-
ivate sector actors, and coordinating their activities so as to maximize
the collective effect, remain challenges all these many years after 9/11,
despite the parties’ best intentions and good faith efforts.

Need for Regulation and/or Legislative Mandates: At least some
security officials are arguing against the Bush Administration’s insis-
tence on allowing industry essentially to regulate itself. “Verify but
trust” programs like “C-TPAT” (the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism) that allow companies in the global maritime supply chain to
receive the benefit of a reduced likelihood of inspection in exchange for
merely asserting that they have rigorous security programs in place,
with any verification taking place after the fact, create only the illusion of security. Given the now manifestly disastrous effects of a laissez-faire approach to economic matters, we are likely to see wider political support for a firmer government hand in security matters in the years ahead. Regulatory and/or legislative mandates need not be, and should not be, incompatible with economic efficiency. Some are arguing that security expenditures can and should be integrated into business processes, as, say, safety concerns were integrated into the tanker industry’s business processes in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster by double hulling. And, recognizing that as time goes by without another terror attack, the “business case” for undertaking and funding security measures becomes weaker, even some private sector actors are themselves beginning to argue for prudent regulatory or legislative mandates. In addition to providing an impetus for action that would otherwise not be taken, such mandates can level the playing field so that companies are not competitively disadvantaged by “doing the right thing” where security is concerned. Certain minimum security standards should be mandatory and then benefits provided to companies that go above and beyond the minimum, commensurate with the additional security measures that such companies are willing to adopt.

The difficulty of working with the Department of Homeland Security: The procurement process is said to be lengthy and complex. Regulatory activities, policy direction, and research and development efforts are diffuse and uncoordinated.

The lack of reliable radiation detection technology to scan maritime cargo: After much prodding from Congress, the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) bureau is now aggressively engaged in efforts to scan 100% of incoming cargo containers for radiation by 2010, so as to spot a nuclear weapon or nuclear material that could be used to make a dirty bomb. But, scanning cargo will be for naught unless and until we develop technology that can accurately distinguish between deadly radiation and the harmless kind. Nearly every expert agrees that nuclear terrorism is the number one threat facing the nation, and cargo containers are at least one way (and perhaps even the most likely way, though there is considerable debate about this) that a nuclear bomb or nuclear material could be smuggled into the country. The effects of 9/11 would pale in compari-
son to those of a nuclear attack, and a dirty bomb attack would have a huge psychic and economic effect, even if the toll in deaths and injuries were relatively low. The energy now put into scanning containers should, then, be put instead into a Herculean, Manhattan Project or Project Apollo-like effort to develop and deploy reliable radiation detection technology as quickly as possible.

**Failure to scan non-containerized maritime cargo:** So-called “roll on/roll off” or “roro” non-containerized cargo (like vehicles) is not scanned at all. Conventional explosives could easily be placed in cars and then set to detonate once they are unloaded and driven about the country. An urgent effort must be made to develop and implement a plan to scan roro.

**Who is working at sensitive sites and/or in sensitive jobs in the transportation sector, and, by extension, other critical infrastructure sites?** It should be of concern that, all these many years after 9/11, we still know so little about those who work in the aviation and maritime sectors. In New York City airports, “many” airport workers are foreigners; no one in authority seemed to know exactly how many. Their jobs range from engineers and systems administrators to restaurant and concession stand workers, janitors, baggage handlers, and even security guards. Officials say that it is “tough” to get background information on foreign workers. There are no polygraph tests, due to concerns about civil liberties and reliability, and no interviews, because of concerns about liability and efficiency. Checks are run against databases of known and suspected criminals and terrorists, and such checks “may be” re-run on a monthly basis. But, then, those known to be terrorists, or even widely suspected of being terrorists, would be unlikely to apply. Checks to determine whether workers are illegal aliens are spotty at best, as occasional law enforcement raids confirm. Finally, the conversion to a biometric-based identification system (Transportation Worker Identification Cards or “TWIC”) at airports is “going slowly.” If and when a biometric system is in place, airports can ensure that the person using a TWIC card is the same person who was initially fingerprinted. In the absence of biometrics, New York City airports use a “badge challenge system.” Employees are “required” to challenge anyone in a sensi-
tive or “sterile” area beyond checkpoints without the appropriate badging. There are random checks to ensure that employees are properly badged. Such a system is better than nothing, certainly, but it is no substitute for confirmation that people working in airports are who they say they are.

Essentially the same concerns obtain in the maritime sector. We know “nothing” about those who service ships. There is no scanning of provisions that ships take on board “at anchorage,” (as opposed to at a dock) and no validation of the companies that supply those provisions. Similarly, vessel or steamship agents board arriving ships, take off the bill of lading and manifest, and deliver those documents to CBP. CBP uses these documents to perform risk assessments to determine which ships should be examined. CBP has “no idea” who these vessel agents are. They are “unlicensed, unregulated, and untrained.” As for pleasure cruise ships, crews tend to be made up entirely of foreigners – especially men from Indonesia, the Phillipines, and Pakistan, all countries plagued by terrorism – and all of the ships are foreign-flagged. While TWIC cards, once fully deployed, will help to lessen the risk of terrorists among port workers, TWIC will not apply to crews working on foreign ships. So, we really know nothing about the security bona fides of these crew members.

**Serious Deficiencies Remain in the Aviation Sector:** This is a particular concern, given that greater efforts have been made since 9/11 to secure the aviation sector than any other (for all practical purposes, the Transportation Security Administration is really the Aviation Security Administration), and Al Qaeda seems fixated on this sector as a target. Security officials seem not to know or care much about how screeners perform on undercover tests of their ability to spot concealed weapons. Results from various governmental (including TSA’s) and media investigations indicate that screeners are little better at spotting potentially deadly items than they were on 9/11. And, airport security officials seem to be disconnected from the federal air marshal program, not knowing how many air marshals cover flights into and out of their airports or whether that number is enough.
General Concerns

For want of a better term, I have called certain overarching issues that are neither best practices nor gaps per se “general concerns.” Among them are the conviction among security professionals that another terror attack is inevitable; that, notwithstanding, the general public, and even the business community, have grown complacent about the threat of terrorism; that the nation is particularly vulnerable to attacks by suicide bombers, attacks using improvised explosive devices, and attacks on mass transit systems and cyber networks. There was also a concern about the “displacement effect,” the fear that a given city’s success in developing an effective counterterrorism program could have the negative effect of persuading terrorists to target another less prepared city. Finally, mention should be made of the tension between the belief of some security officials that the best counterterrorism strategy is randomness, and the belief of others that only an “absolutist” approach (i.e., 100% scanning of maritime cargo for radiation; or 100% screening of air cargo for conventional explosives) is effective. As noted above, the value of randomness is that it can give the illusion that counterterrorism measures can be deployed anywhere and anytime, suggesting that they may be deployed at any given place and any given time. Such a perennial Sword of Damocles can serve as a terror deterrent. On the other hand, terrorists know that the likelihood that such measures will be deployed at any given place at any given time is relatively low, and they realize that they need to succeed only one time and in one place. The value of the absolutist approach, at least in theory, is that every attempted attack is thwarted. But, such an approach can be expensive and time consuming, and it is predictable. Certainly, with finite resources, randomness makes eminent sense, the theory being something is better than nothing. But, where feasible and cost-effective, the upside of 100% solutions surely outweighs the downside.
PREVENTERS AND RESPONDERS*

New York Police Department (NYPD)

“When you stop a terrorist, they (sic) have a map of New York City in their pocket.” So, the city’s mayor, Mike Bloomberg, famously put it a few years ago when complaining about the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) plan to cut New York’s share of federal counterterrorism funds that year by 40%.

Bloomberg’s point is inarguable. The top terror target in this country (and, for that matter, probably the world) is New York City. Though it tends to be forgotten now, 9/11 was the second attempt to knock the Twin Towers down. And, since 9/11, no fewer than six planned attacks have been thwarted in New York City.

That New York City would be circled on terrorists’ maps with a bulls-eye is only logical. While the exact whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants remains a mystery, and, likewise, exactly how and when they will attempt to strike America again, there is nothing mysterious about their intentions. As they have made clear many times, Al Qaeda’s aim is to maximize deaths, injuries, economic damage, and psychic shock value. It follows, then, that iconic New York would be at the very top of their target list. At 8.2 million people, it is our most populous city, our financial center, and our cultural capital. It is probably accurate to say that New York looms larger in the world’s imagination as the very symbol of America than the nation’s actual capital, Washington, D.C.

If the bad news is that, for all these reasons, New York is more likely to be attacked by terrorists than any other city in the nation, the good news is that New York is better prepared than any other city in the nation to detect, deter, and respond to an attack. And, because, as former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld aptly put it in another context, “weakness is provocative,” as a practical matter this means, that, though still high, the risk of an attack on New York is at least somewhat lower than it would otherwise be.

* For want of better terms, “preventers” and “responders” refer to those entities that play some role in attempting to prevent and, failing that, respond to terror attacks and, where appropriate, natural disasters, respectively.
These happy facts are due in large part to the dynamic leadership of the city’s police commissioner, Ray Kelly, and the stalwart support that he has received from Mayor Bloomberg. The beginning of wisdom for Kelly was the recognition that he could not rely on DHS (or any other part of the federal government) to protect his city. He set about to make NYPD New York City’s de facto “Department of Homeland Security.”

Toward that end, he has dedicated 1000 police officers exclusively to counterterrorism and organized them into a “Counterterrorism Division.” Needless to say, this degree of focus on counterterrorism is unique in the country. To be fair to other cities, New York is in a much better position than others to spare hundreds of police officers for a dedicated mission. Its total police force numbers in the tens of thousands. At approximately 35,000, the city’s police force is about three times larger than the FBI, and it is larger than the standing armies of some 84 countries. Still, Kelly points out that, at 35,000, there are 5,000 fewer NYPD officers than there were on 9/11. So, 1,000 officers is an even larger percentage of the force than it was at the inception of the division.

The cost—$223 million last year, according to Kelly—is staggering, and federal counterterrorism grants here and there, notwithstanding, that cost (especially the ongoing operational expense of salaries and benefits, about which more later) has largely been borne by the city itself. Again, New York City is in a better position than any other American city to afford such a cost. But, it is a huge financial burden nonetheless, and one made even bigger as the economy worsens. The burden has been eased somewhat by the help of the non-profit New York City Police Foundation, led by Pamela Delaney. The Foundation funds, among other things, the department’s International Liaison program at an annual cost of $500,000. It also provided a $1.2 million grant to establish the department’s Counter Terrorist Operations Center, its focal point for the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of threat information.

The Counterterrorism Division is not just big and expensive. Kelly has made a point of picking superbly qualified people to lead it. The first chief was Frank Libutti, a retired Marine Corps general, who went on from NYPD to serve as the first head of the unit within the Department of Homeland Security that focuses on synthesizing and analyzing homeland security related intelligence and using it to protect critical infrastructure around the country. The second chief was Michael Sheehan, a seasoned
soldier-diplomat, with stints as a Special Forces officer and Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the State Department. The present chief is Richard Falkenrath, a former national security professor at Harvard and former Deputy White House Homeland Security Adviser.

Among the Division’s innovative programs is “Operation Nexus.” NYPD works with businesses in New York and throughout the country to help them identify customers whose purchases (say, certain chemicals that, in sufficient quantities or concentrations, can be used to make explosives) should arouse suspicion of terrorist intent. Likewise, relevant businesses are trained to be alert to customers who are seeking to learn certain skills (like, Zacarias Moussaoui’s interest in learning how to fly an airplane, but not to land one) or acquire certain licenses (to carry hazardous materials, for example) that can be instrumental in carrying out a terror attack. To date, bureau officers have visited more than 25,000 businesses, and attended scores of conventions (from pesticide sellers to owners of storage facilities to scuba diving teachers) to provide the training necessary to spot indicators of terrorist intent and to encourage business people to report their suspicions to NYPD.

Another such “public-private” partnership program is “SHIELD.” More than 3,000 security directors for New York companies are given occasional counterterrorism training and regular briefings by NYPD on the latest threat information and advice as to how to counter such threats. Members also have access to a password-protected website so as to obtain and provide information online. Through this program, the police department and corporate security directors not only share threat information; they also share best practices and “lessons learned.” At least some information is exchanged daily by instant messaging.

Under an umbrella program called “Operation Atlas,” NYPD deploys officers in various configurations throughout the city periodically in an effort to deter terrorism. “Hercules” teams of as many as 100 heavily armed officers stream in convoys of 8-15 vehicles, with lights flashing and sirens blaring, and then mass at iconic locations like Times Square, Grand Central and Penn Station, the Empire State Building, the New York Stock Exchange, and Rockefeller Center. Terrorists who might be casing such potential targets are intended to conclude that these sites (and others like them) are better protected than they might think because Hercules teams could appear anytime anyplace.
Another effort to detect terrorist surveillance and to disrupt terrorist planning is a “Critical Response Vehicle Surge.” These surges occur when patrol cars from each of the city’s 76 precincts converge on a single location (not just landmarks and tourist attractions, but also “regular” hotels and restaurants).

“Transit Order Maintenance Sweeps” or “TOMS” occur when teams of uniformed officers periodically board subway trains and scour them for potential terrorists or terrorist weapons. These sweeps sometimes occur at subway stations where “Explosive Trace Detection” checkpoints are set up to swab consenting passengers’ bags for explosive residue.

In addition to SHIELD, the Division has six other operational components:

“The Terrorism Threat Analysis Group” gathers and disseminates both classified and “open source” intelligence to the rest of the department and its various governmental and private sector partners.

A “Training Section” provides counterterrorism training to officers throughout the department and its various governmental (including, interestingly enough, federal partners like the Federal Protective Service, the Park Police, and the Coast Guard) and private sector partners. The “SENTRI” program provides counterterrorism training to fifty law enforcement agencies within 100 miles of New York City, in recognition that terror plots targeting the city can be planned from neighboring locations. NYPD also periodically conducts counterterrorism drills and tabletop exercises. This section also assesses and evaluates the various devices and technologies that legions of counterterrorism vendors clamor to sell to the department.

The “Critical Infrastructure Protection Section” works with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure facilities to provide them with threat information, vulnerability assessments, and advice as to how to counter their vulnerabilities.

The “CBRNE” Policy and Planning Section” tests and deploys technologies and devices to detect chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons.

The “Special Projects Unit” devises and fields protective measures for special events like the New Year’s Eve celebration, the UN General
Assembly, political conventions, and other large gatherings. It also undertakes “red cell” covert investigations to find vulnerabilities that terrorists might exploit at potential target sites.

The “Emergency Response and Planning Section” works with the city’s Office of Emergency Management to plan for terror attacks and to respond to them.

In each patrol borough, there is a “Counterterrorism Inspector,” the equivalent, in the military context, of a Brigadier General, who commands that bureau’s counterterrorism officers and oversees their activities.

The “Lower Manhattan Security Initiative” will install 1000 cameras in the city’s financial district by July, 2010. Those cameras will be linked to 2000 private sector cameras in the area, as well as 120 license plate readers covering the 17 tunnels and bridges into and out of lower Manhattan. The cameras will be monitored from a command center that will be operational on a 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a-week basis. According to Kelly, the undertaking is more ambitious than London’s renowned “Ring of Steel.” The system incorporates “predictive” software that will use facial recognition technology and analyzes suspicious driving patterns and the like. Several hundred officers will be deployed from the command center to respond to incidents.

Through its “International Liaison” program, the department has deployed ten officers to eight foreign countries – Canada; the United Kingdom; France; Spain; Jordan; Israel; Singapore; and the Dominican Republic. The officers establish a relationship with the counterterrorism and intelligence community in the host country so as to facilitate the sharing of information that can protect New York from another attack. Specifically, the officers are constantly on the lookout for intelligence indicating plots to attack New York; known or suspected terrorists in New York or those with connections in New York; and targets attacked or surveilled abroad, or weapons or attack scenarios used abroad, that might be attacked, surveilled, or used, respectively, in New York. The program proved its worth after the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005 when, instead of having to wait for information from Washington, NYPD received up-to-the minute news and analysis from its own liaison officers on the ground.
Through its “Securing the Cities” initiative, the department is creating a ring of radiological detection machines 50 miles out from New York City, in a first of its kind effort to secure a city and region from nuclear attack. The effort was launched thanks to a $40 million grant from the Department of Homeland Security, and some 200 area agencies are now involved.

Regarding the city’s ethnic and racial diversity as a strength rather than a weakness, the Commissioner proudly notes that some 52 countries are represented among NYPD’s ranks. The force includes some 100 Arabic speakers, including a number of dialects, as well as officers who speak other languages that are critically important in the field of counterterrorism like Pashto, Urdu, Bengali, Hindi, and Farsi. In all, some 700 officers speak another language. NYPD sends these “linguists” to Berlitz so that their purported foreign language competence can be assessed and confirmed by trained professionals. Some 200 officers are certified as “master linguists,” meaning that they scored perfectly in either reading, writing, or speaking ability. The department’s language ability is so extraordinary and enviable that even the Pentagon has turned to NYPD for help. To illustrate the point, David Cohen, the department’s intelligence chief (about whom more below), related the story of an Iranian who was spotted taking photos at 2:00 a.m. at a sensitive location. The Iranian claimed not to speak English when questioned by the officer who spotted him. Within half an hour, the department had a Farsi-speaking officer on the scene, whereupon the startled Iranian began to speak perfect English. The Iranian was subsequently deported by the FBI.

To complement the Counterterrorism Division, the Commissioner has transformed a backwater “intelligence” unit that used to focus only on protecting dignitaries into a crackerjack intelligence operation that is the envy of the federal government. Led by David Cohen, a storied 35-year CIA veteran spymaster and analyst, the unit boasts a team of two dozen analysts recruited from elite schools like Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, the London School of Economics, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy who pore over reams of classified and unclassified intelligence in search of information potentially relevant to possible terror attacks in New York City. Cohen’s analysts work “seamlessly” with police officers, whom he calls intelligence “collectors” in a manner he
says “the CIA can only dream of.” As an example of “CIA-level” work, Cohen cites the department’s 2007 report on “homegrown terrorism,” produced in response to analysis of recent trends indicating that the next attack is likely to come from foreigners already in the country or American citizens who become radicalized here on U.S. soil. That such high-quality work would be conceived, produced, and then published by a local police force is nothing short of “extraordinary,” he insists.

Cohen stresses that the threat of a terror attack in New York City is a “ticking time bomb.” On the one hand, Al Qaeda wants to carry out another attack on American soil, preferably a nuclear one, before bin Laden dies; on the other, they would prefer to wait to carry out another attack until they are capable of “outdoing” 9/11. So, Cohen sees a race between our predictive ability, on our side of the ledger, and one between Al Qaeda’s capabilities and bin Laden’s health on theirs.

Tipping the scales in the terrorists’ favor is Al Qaeda’s having reconstituted itself as an “operational” entity (as opposed to a merely “inspirational” one) in its safe haven along the Pakistani-Afghan border, thanks to a feckless Pakistani government and a hapless Afghan one. Its “command structure” has been rebuilt, and key positions left vacant by the U.S. government’s successful attempts in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to kill or capture as many top bin Laden lieutenants as possible have been filled. Complementing their use of the Internet as a virtual training camp, “Al Qaeda Central” now has access to a large number of small, mobile training facilities. Intelligence reports point to an increase in the flow of recruits to these camps, mostly ones from North Africa, the Persian Gulf, and, ominously, Western Europe, since those traveling to the U.S. on Western European passports are subjected to much less scrutiny than those with passports from the Arab-Muslim world.

Cohen stresses that the renewed threat of foreign terrorists’ sent by Al Qaeda to attack the United States is now accompanied by the post-9/11 threat of homegrown terrorism, hence his unit’s intensive focus on the matter in its seminal 2007 report. He challenges the conventional wisdom that terrorists tend to become radicalized in some madrasa in Pakistan. The perpetrators of the Madrid bombing in 2004, the London bombings in 2005, the alleged bombing plot in Denmark in 2007, the “Toronto 18” plot, and the plots to blow up Herald Square and JFK International Airport in New York were all radicalized locally. Even
Mohammed Atta, he notes, was radicalized not in Pakistan or Afghanistan or his native Egypt, but in Hamburg.

Finally, Commissioner Kelly has increased the number of NYPD investigators on the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) from 17 before 9/11 to 120 today. The Commissioner works closely with the top FBI official in the city, Mark Mershon, who boasts that the New York JTTF is 500 people-strong and comprised of 50 agencies in addition to the FBI. Mershon stresses that there has been a sea change in the bureau’s mindset about sharing information with NYPD and its other federal, state, and local partners.

Needless to say, all of these programs, operations, and initiatives are “best practices” that, subject to the degree that they are at risk of a terror attack and within the limits of their resources, other cities around the country should replicate. That said, Kelly is the first to acknowledge that there are still gaps in the city’s security defenses.

First among those he cited is money. As noted above, New York’s counterterrorism program is hugely expensive, and with a dismal economy that shows no sign of rebounding anytime soon, the costs will become harder and harder to maintain. True to its conservative ideological leanings, the Bush Administration and its Republican allies in Congress have generally been averse to allowing cities to use counterrorism grants to fund ongoing operational expenses like salary and overtime for police officers that constitute the lion’s share of New York City’s costs.

The Administration’s position is that it is DHS’ job to provide the start-up, catalytic funding needed to help cities establish baseline counterterrorism capabilities. As a practical matter, this means that federal funding is intended to be used mostly to buy and field equipment and technology. Maintaining and upgrading this equipment and technology, and paying the personnel who use it, is primarily a state and local responsibility.

The Administration’s position makes some sense for cities like, say, Omaha and Mobile that are highly unlikely to be attacked by terrorists. There is some risk of an attack, certainly, and so such cities should have some counterterrorism capability. But, for a variety of reasons mentioned above, New York City in particular, and other large, iconic cities,
are very much at risk of attack, and, therefore, they should have exceptional counterterrorism capability. And, because another attack “in the United States” is likely as a practical matter to mean another attack in New York City, it follows that the entire country should go to considerable lengths to help the city bear the burden of protecting what is essentially the nation as a whole.9

A second gap is the city’s continued vulnerability to improvised explosive devices, particularly vehicle-borne ones. This vulnerability is not unique to New York; DHS Secretary Chertoff has often cited it as a continuing worry for the country as a whole. There is particular concern that bomb making and bomb planting techniques perfected by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan will be employed here at home someday soon to deadly effect.

A third gap that Kelly readily acknowledged is the lack of a plan to secure New York City’s food supply against the possibility of terrorist contamination. The Hunts Point Cooperative Market in the Bronx is the largest fruit and vegetable distributor in the world. Yet, a spokesman for the market says that “There is no money forthcoming. Whatever we have done here to protect the food supply…has literally come out of the pocket of the merchants.”10 More than anything, this particular preparedness gap serves to underscore the fact that terror risks are as infinite as the imagination. Because even the best prepared city can only do so much, such a vulnerability highlights, as if highlighting were necessary, the importance of accurate, real-time, “actionable” intelligence. The city’s own unrivalled intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, complemented by its close partnership with the federal intelligence community, at least serves to reduce this vulnerability and others like it.

Perhaps the biggest gap the Commissioner acknowledged is the lack of a set of metrics by which to determine how safe the city is versus how safe the city should be. He points to the absence of a successful attack since 9/11, despite terrorists’ concerted efforts to strike again, as an indisputable measure of success. But, when pressed during the question and answer period, he seemed to concede that this answer is ultimately unsatisfactory because it provides no basis for prioritizing in the face of limited resources on the one hand, and unlimited vulnerabilities on the other.
If NYPD is the city’s lead counterterrorism agency, it is not alone in the fight. It has a number of other partners besides the FBI and the JTTF, each of which plays a critical, complementary role in securing the city against the threat of terrorism.

**New York City Office of Emergency Management**

The City’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), represented at the roundtable by Deputy Commissioner for Planning and Preparedness Kelly McKinney, has worked hard to ensure that New York has the resources that it needs readily at hand to respond to and recover from a catastrophic event. The office has focused particularly on logistics management, ensuring that the city has the right “stuff” to respond to a catastrophe, in the right amounts, in the right place, at the right time. Seeking to answer four critical questions – (1) What resources does the city have at hand; (2) What additional resources will it need; (3) How can the city request the additional resources it needs; and (4) How will these resources be used?

OEM created the State and Local Integration Program (SLIP). SLIP encompasses a database listing the resources available to the city and state in the event of a catastrophe. Consequence models are used to determine the impact of particular events and the kind and quantity of resources needed to respond to them. A Template Request System is used to simplify and standardize the process by which needed resources are requested. And, operational plans are devised and drilled to ensure that people know how to obtain and use the necessary resources when a catastrophe occurs. Drawing on the example of private sector companies that excel in this field, OEM has a state-of-the-art logistics management system in place that allows it to track the exact location of resources at any point in time.

OEM’s state of the art shelter stockpile can sustain 90 shelters for a week. Over 5000 pallets of supplies are stored in three warehouses within 50 miles of the city. OEM’s Commodity Distribution Plan provides food, water, medicine, ice, tarps, and the like to 200 commodity distribution points around the city.

The former head of OEM in New York, Jerry Hauer, insists that a key problem remains the pre-9/11 “cultural” conflict between the police and
fire departments (FDNY). According to him, FDNY resents the police department’s designation as the city’s lead counterterrorism agency. One key operational consequence is that, though NYPD and FDNY now have interoperable radio systems (a key deficiency during 9/11 that doubtless led to some preventable deaths), neither department will use them.

Hauer went on to lament what he calls “redundancies” between the police and fire departments in terms of not just equipment, but also missions and activities. For example, in his view the police should have nothing to do with rescuing people from collapsed buildings. But, if there is a real, apparent, or, even, arguable terrorism nexus, NYPD will take the lead on this mission, too, in addition to the criminal investigative work that typifies policing.

Hauer’s other major concern is that though the city is better prepared than any other for a wide range of terror scenarios, no city, including NYC, is prepared for a 10-kiloton nuclear attack, and unlike David Cohen, he believes that it would be easy for terrorists to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the country. And Hauer contended that despite official’s protestations to the contrary, a city like New York could not under any circumstances be fully evacuated (assuming that evacuation, in any given disaster, makes sense).

**New York City Department of Environmental Protection-Emergency response and Technical Assessment**

The Director of Emergency Response and Technical Assessment in the city’s Department of Environmental Protection, Moustafa Fawzy, worries that terrorists seeking to do catastrophic harm to the United States can and will find the tools they need to do so here. The office has scientific and technical expertise that is unique in the country to identify potentially hazardous substances quickly. There is a city-wide early detection system encompassing scores of chemical, biological, and radiological sensors around town with real-time analytical capability. Fawzy’s office responds to about 2500 incidents each year, ranging from explosives (the greatest threat, in his judgment) to spills. Interestingly, he worries as much about how to limit the economic impact of incidents as anything, stressing the terrorist’s desire to maximize the economic as well as human cost of attacks. The quicker potentially hazardous substances are identified the less their economic impact, he argues.
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

Dr. Isaac Weisfuse, the Deputy Commissioner, Division of Disease Control in the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene notes that there was no “playbook” before 9/11 to teach city health departments how to prepare for and respond to terror attacks. Learning as it goes, the department has focused on “surveillance,” meaning city-wide signs pointing to a potential bio-terror event. The department receives daily data feeds from hospital emergency rooms, clinics, ambulance dispatchers, schools, and pharmacies. If there is spike in, say, people ordering particular medications from pharmacies, or emergency rooms or schools reporting certain illnesses, the department follows up to see whether these potential indicators point to terrorism.

Working closely with DHS, the department has developed an “automated pathogen detection system,” that gives the city a read out every two hours as to potential bio-terror threats, as opposed to the once a day samples taken by Bio-Watch filters elsewhere in the country.

Since 9/11, the city has developed a robust lab surge capacity. Lab workers are cross-trained, so they can back-up each other in the event of incidents.

The department can place 250-300 workers in the field to do vaccinations and other necessary health-related tasks during emergencies.

Recognizing that some 170 languages are spoken in New York City, the department works with media outlets targeting a wide variety of ethnic communities to communicate information focused on preparing for and responding to the health effects of terror attacks.

The department has a protocol with NYPD enabling police officers to augment the health department in the event of a bio-terror attack in a manner that respects patient privacy.

And, the department is part of an environmental data exchange network, which enables it to get air monitoring data from a number of different agencies, standardize it, and then disseminate necessary information.

In terms of gaps, Weisfuse stresses that there is not enough money to go around. Though the department has a budget in excess of $1 billion, and some 6,000 employees, dwarfing most other cities’ health depart-
ments, it can afford to give the city’s 65 acute care hospitals only about $60,000 annually for planning and training. Many of these hospitals are on the edge financially, so they can ill afford to supplement $60,000. And, in a city like New York, $60,000 goes only so far. Weisfuse notes, too, that the city has yet to leverage the full range of federal resources available to plan for pandemic flu fully.

Further, echoing Ray Kelly, he points to the lack of metrics to determine how prepared the health department is for terror attacks and how much more prepared it should be.

Third, the public health system has not tapped into and integrated with the nation-wide Veterans Administration hospital system to the degree that it should.

And, the agreement with the U.S. Postal Service enabling mail carriers to deliver antibiotics is not effective.

Finally, Weisfuse sees a need for federal regulation of bio-terrorism detection devices.

As an aside, it is noteworthy that he, like Kelly and Fawzy, worries most about explosive events.

National Preparedness at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health

Complementing Weisfuse’s presentation, Dr. Irwin Redlener, the Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health, stressed that even New York City, the best prepared city in the nation to handle a terror attack or natural disaster, is not fully prepared for a “mega-disaster,” which he defines as “a catastrophic, high-consequence event, irrespective of etiology [cause] that overwhelms, or threatens to overwhelm, local and regional response capacity.” The indicators of a mega-disaster include: the inability to manage immediate rescue of endangered survivors; a significant backlog of victims unable to get appropriate medical care or other essential support; the inability to protect vital infrastructure or to prevent significant property destruction; and an uncontrolled societal breakdown.
Redlener cites what he calls “seven critical barriers to readiness.” First, we have not defined what “prepared” means. Without defining prepared, we cannot establish goals and set benchmarks. In the absence of such a definition, we wind up assessing progress by measuring process.

Second, preparedness policy, at least with regard to public health, is “insufficiently driven by evidence, or even expert consensus.” (He cited a February, 2007 study of 303 articles in public health disaster literature, showing that only 19% were “scientific.” The rest were “commentaries” or anecdotal “lessons learned” pieces.)

Third, the scale and scope of planning is often inadequate. For example, there is no plan for a nuclear attack, he says, echoing Jerry Hauer. There is also a tendency not to plan for “special populations,” namely, the very young, the very old, and disabled, and the very ill, as was demonstrated clearly in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Cities tend not to consider the potential need to evacuate even hospitals during disasters. And, there is a tendency to under-appreciate the role of the private sector and key public sector organizations like the Red Cross.

Fourth, there is a lack of adequate “horizontal and regional coordination.” Hospitals tend to plan in isolation. Insufficient funding is available for significant regional planning. And, there is insufficient coordination among federal agencies.

Fifth, there is a failure to appreciate hospitals’ priorities and circumstances. One-third of hospitals are losing money; another third are barely breaking even. Emergency rooms are overrun with the uninsured; surge capacity is inadequate. There is an acute nursing shortage. There is an urgent need to establish electronic health records. Sixty thousand dollars is not enough to make New York City’s hospitals ready for anything, as Weisfuse also stressed.

Sixth, there is a dis-connect between the federal government’s rhetoric about the criticality of preparedness and the resources put into it. The federal government provided $415 million in 2007 for general hospital preparedness, which is down from nearly $500 million. There is a need for $5 billion initially, and then $1 billion each year after that.

Finally, there is insufficient attention to post-incident “recovery,” which he defines as: the restoration of critical infrastructure, supply sys-
tems, and social order; housing challenges; psychological recovery; and economic redevelopment.

**New York State Deputy Secretary of Public Safety**

Michael Balboni, the State of New York’s Deputy Secretary for Public Safety, reported that his office has a budget of $5 billion and 63,000 employees. The office combines, among other things, the state’s counterterrorism, anti-crime, and emergency management functions. Balboni sees his role as being a “force multiplier” for New York localities by coordinating and leveraging all resources available to the state.

For example, for the first time anywhere in the country, under his leadership, all the area transit agencies were brought together into a “Regional Transit Working Group” to prioritize needs among transit systems in the state. Beforehand, there was waste and duplication as different systems competed for federal grant money without overall statewide consideration for where needs were greatest. And, NYPD had never been “at the table” in terms of transit security funding, even though the department plays a huge role in helping to protect the transit system. Balboni convened key agencies – NYPD, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, all other state transit agencies, the FBI field office in New York City- and brought in Kip Hawley, the head of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), for a day-long full vulnerability assessment of all transit agencies to align resource allocation with threat and vulnerability. Some $95 million of transit grants were awarded to New York in fiscal year 2007.

Among the programs and initiatives Balboni touts is the “Empire Shield Task Force.” This program deploys National Guard patrols to New York airports, subway and train stations, and nuclear power plants, making New York the only state among many that deployed the National Guard in this fashion after the 2001 attacks still to do so. But, he worries that the Guard is presently deployed in a static fashion, such that they have become “part of the furniture.” They were intended to provide reassurance to the public, but the average citizen tends not to notice them anymore. The Guards troops themselves spend much of their time talking to each other, rather than patrolling. Indeed, he wonders whether they are even capable of patrolling, noting that they have
not been trained to do so. Balboni is pushing to deploy, along with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey police, Guard troops in a “surge” capacity throughout the mass transit system and not simply on PATH trains, the heavy rail transit system linking Manhattan and neighboring urban areas in New Jersey, stressing that randomness in the use of counter-measures is known to disrupt terrorist planning.

In another effort to make the Guard more effective in patrolling in New York City and responding to any attacks there, he is pushing to make the full range of the State’s assets – 11 fast attack boats in its “naval militia; the 106 air wing made famous in the movie, Perfect Storm, which has airlift capacity; a chemical company; and the Guard’s “civil support teams,” its weapons of mass destruction detection and modeling capability-available. These assets are presently housed in a center in Schenectady, and he is pushing for another one at Fort Hamilton.

Balboni expressed concern about a suicide bomber with a backpack on a New York City subway train. There is no way to prevent such an attack other than good intelligence, he says. He has, then, made a priority of making the State’s existing intelligence collection and analysis efforts more effective.

Balboni mentioned that when, early on in his tenure, he queried the State’s intelligence office about how it used the information reported to him each morning in his daily threat briefing, he was told that it was merely stored. He reasoned that, in addition to general post-9/11 complacency, part of the reason that the number of tips reported to the State’s terrorist hotline had declined is the public’s sense that the authorities were not making use of the information.

He insisted that the incidents reported through the hotline be overlaid on a map of the State’s critical infrastructure and other high profile sites that are potential targets for terror attacks, to see whether there might be patterns with regard to a particular sector or site. For example, on August 29 of 2006, 12-14 men who appeared to be Middle Eastern (it turned out that one was from Mexico) in three different locations around the State – Long Island, the Mid-Hudson area, and Buffalo-entered houses carrying computers and prayer rugs, stayed for 12-24 hours, and then left. Balboni then called DHS’ intelligence unit to see whether like incidents had been reported anywhere else in the coun-
try. It turns out that the department was aware of seven other similar incidents elsewhere in the Northeast. Balboni acknowledges that there could be any number of legitimate explanations for these incidents, but he emphasizes that this is precisely the kind of information that should be reported, analyzed, and cross-checked around the country that could prevent the next 9/11. The goal should always be, as here, to connect the cop on the beat with the intelligence analyst at the DHS or the CIA.

Balboni wants to augment transit security, a particular concern, with force multiplier software that can alert law enforcement officers’ to each others’ presence on trains (i.e., the occasional FBI or Secret Service agent on a train, who can be pressed into service in an emergency to augment the transit police of NYPD). He also supports counter-terrorism training for non-law enforcement personnel like train conductors and engineers.

**New York State Office of Homeland Security**

Reporting to Balboni is the head of the state’s homeland security office, Brigadier General David Sheppard. Sheppard is the state’s “executive agent” for federal homeland security grants, and it is his office that disburses the money to localities that comes to the state from the federal government. He has been repeatedly told by Washington that federal counterterrorism funds will eventually be decreased significantly or done away with altogether, so he says that he has made a priority of using each federal dollar wisely. Sheppard’s office reviews each grant application and then issues guidance as to how allocated money can be spent. If a locality or agency disagrees, it can ask his office for an exception, and exceptions are sometimes granted. In any event, Sheppard’s office follows up to ensure that grant money is spent as intended. His funding priorities are interoperable communications; training; the national incident management system; and weapons of mass destruction. The State received approximately $208 million in fiscal year 2007, with New York City getting about 85 cents of every federal dollar.

Sheppard believes that the next attack is likely to be on New York City’s mass transit system. Its approximately 6.5 million passengers make it an appealing terror target. The likely method of attack, he believes, would be an improvised explosive device.
Like Balboni, he believes that the key to preventing an attack is good intelligence. Threats from anywhere in the State are supposed to be reported to the New York State Intelligence Fusion Center. There are four intelligence fusion centers in various parts of the State – New York City, Albany, Suffolk, and Rockland County. Sheppard looks for links between ordinary crime and terrorism, and, as Balboni mentioned, he looks for links between intelligence reports and the 17 critical infrastructure sectors.

Some 5,000 tips are reported annually through the State’s “see something/say something” “Operation Safeguard” terrorism tip hotline. New Yorkers are trained on what they should regard as suspicious and how to report it. Every tip is investigated, and if a tipster so requests, he/she is informed of the outcome.

With so many intelligence collection/analysis/dissemination agencies in the State, part of the challenge is ensuring that each knows what the other is doing and benefits from it. Coincidentally, he made his own point during his presentation by noting that there would be the first ever New York State Intelligence summit the very next day in Albany, hosted by the Governor, bringing all of the key players together. The top FBI agent in New York City, and the head of the Joint Terrorism Task Force there, Mark Mershon, then whispered to me that he had not been invited to the summit and he was hearing of it for the first time.

Sheppard boasts that the State is a model for pipeline security. New York works closely with the pipeline industry to ensure that it uses best practices, including vulnerability assessment teams, to secure itself against potential terror attacks. Other states, including Arizona, have expressed an interest in replicating it.

Like Balboni, Sheppard worries about post-9/11 complacency.

Of course, the private sector has a critical role to play with regard to counterterrorism preparedness. The perspective of business was represented at the roundtable by the security directors of several New York-based corporations, critical infrastructure facilities, and iconic sites.
Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant

Chris Kelly, the Director of Nuclear Security at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant in Buchanan, New York, 50 miles from Manhattan, was relatively sanguine about the threat to his facility. He pointed to a $100 million security budget, with 1600 employees who focus on security matters. Every security feature in the plant is redundant, to ensure resilience in the event of an attack. The plant is designed and maintained with the “design basis threat” in mind, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines as “a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary” particularly with regard to “acts of radiological sabotage” and the theft of nuclear material. A series of drills and exercises are conducted quarterly to ensure preparedness.

Consolidated Edison

Con Edison’s Rick Mosquera notes that, before 9/11, a public street ran through their facility. After the attacks, NYPD closed down the street, and $10 million was invested in physical barriers and various technological security measures. As at Indian Point, there is considerable redundancy in Con Edison’s systems. Still, citing the lack of setback for Manhattan buildings (1000 feet is ideal, he says), he worries about a “strategically placed” truck bomb, continuing the string of participants who expressed concern about improvised explosive devices. He worries, too, about cyber threats; the lack of coordination among federal agencies; and satellite imagery of sensitive sites available through Google Earth. He approves of government security mandates because they help him make the “business case” for security improvements that would otherwise not be funded.

Nuclear Energy Institute

Representing the nuclear power industry as a whole as the Senior Security Director for the Nuclear Energy Institute, Doug Walters stresses that those who access “vital areas” within nuclear power plants are subjected to background checks, “fitness for duty” checks, and random drug testing. Since 9/11, industry-wide, there has been a 60% increase in the number of security officers, numbering 5,000-8,000. There have
been expenditures in excess of $1.2 billion. Additional measures have been put in place to protect against vehicle-borne explosives. “Operational readiness” has been improved; armaments have been added and enhanced; emergency plans have been updated and better integrated with those of government emergency management personnel; and security training has been improved.

Walters has examined the threat of an attack on a nuclear power plant by means of aircraft, as on 9/11. He argues that the risk of contamination is small because the containment vessel around plants’ radioactive core is so thick – 3 feet of reinforced concrete.

In terms of gaps, Walters says that getting counterterrorism grants from DHS is a “challenge.” And, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should do a better job of communicating with the industry about the nature and extent of terror threats.

**Times Square Alliance**

Ron Shindle, the Director of Security for the consortium of businesses and sites constituting the “Times Square Alliance,” points to why Times Square is such an attractive potential terror target. It has 23 skyscrapers, with a combined 1,082 floors. It hosts 579,000 visitors each day, more people than the populations of Boston, Denver, Seattle, or Milwaukee, and twice the population of Buffalo, the State’s second largest city. There are 15,000 hotel rooms, more than the city of Philadelphia. The area’s annual economic output is $53 billion. Among the trademark businesses in the area are The New York Times; Ernst & Young; NASDAQ; MTV; and ABC’s *Good Morning America* show studio. The Times Square website had 34 million Google hits on a single day in 2007.

Shindle says that NYPD’s Hercules and ATLAS surges are a daily occurrence somewhere in the Square, and they certainly can have a deterrent effect. He encourages Times Square businesses to have regular drills, evacuation plans, and preparedness kits, but he stresses that each business has to have a “culture” of preparedness. Some businesses do; most do not. Like others, he worries that post-9/11 complacency is sinking in.
Siemens

Mark Codd, the Security Director for Siemens, believes that the interoperability problem among first responders will never be resolved because each agency wants its own “privacy.” To his mind, the nation’s security’s apparatus is as stove-piped today as it was on 9/11. He also cites as a gap the inability of the private sector to provide goods and services needed in an emergency in an efficient manner during a crisis due to government red tape.

United Nations

Mike McCann, the former Security Director of the United Nations and now a private security consultant, believes that the threat of homegrown terrorism is growing. The attack scenarios he worries most about are ones involving vehicle-borne explosive devices; suicide bombings; cyber-threats, and what he calls the “wide open” general aviation (i.e. private planes) industry. Like others, he worries about post-9/11 complacency.

In terms of best practices, McCann touts surveillance; “red teaming” (i.e. undercover exercises to simulate terrorist plotting and planning); training; and involving the media. He, too, worries about post-9/11 complacency. McCann added that, on the well-known principle, “you get what you pay for,” we should not be surprised that security officers paid $8-9 dollars an hour working 11-hour shifts are not an effective counterterrorism force.

That said, McCann believes that terror attacks can be prevented in New York by the aggressive steps that have been taken in the city. He thinks that the practical effect of these steps might be to “displace” terrorism from New York to some other less prepared city.

The Bank of New York Mellon

The Bank of New York Mellon’s Chip Smith is convinced that Wall Street remains an attractive potential terror target. He notes that the New York Stock Exchange was shut down for four days after 9/11, the first time since the Crash of 1929. 9/11 resulted in the displacement of 377,000 from the financial district, and property loss totaling $60 billion.
Unlike Codd, he believes that information sharing within government and between government and the private sector is much better than it was pre-9/11, but he still thinks that more improvement is needed.

Smith believes that the threat of another terror attack is growing, though the public tends to think otherwise. He says of Al Qaeda, “we do not understand their patience.”

He touts the value of “red team” exercises and vulnerability assessments. He also believes that counter-surveillance programs (i.e., making note of people who photograph buildings or of the tag numbers of cars that repeatedly circle the block) are valuable counter-terrorism tools.

Another best practice is the “Bankers and Brokers” roundtable, a forum for security directors in the financial industry to meet periodically among themselves and with NYPD and other counterterrorism focused law enforcement officials to share information.

In terms of obstacles or gaps, he cites money. It gets tougher and tougher to make a “business case” for security expenditures and security measures the further we get from 9/11.

He also believes that those who leave government with top secret clearances who go into private security work should be allowed to keep those clearances.

Another particular challenge for private sector security directors is that “everybody” (i.e., their corporate bosses) is a security expert, while the security professionals would not presume to tell, say, Wall Street bond traders how to trade bonds.

**Prudential Center in Newark**

Les Wiser, the Security Director for the Prudential sports area in nearby Newark, New Jersey notes that the Prudential Center in Manhattan was surveilled by Al Qaeda terrorists at a nearby Starbucks. Wiser has a hard time convincing the owner to put up bollards and other such security devices at his own expense. He has to balance his focus on preventing an attack on the facility with the owner’s interest in the public’s using the facility. He is convinced that there will be another attack, arguing that the American people have come to have a “deficit of belief,” remi-
niscent of the “failure of imagination” phrase the 9/11 Commission used to describe the pre-/9/11 mindset. He laments that he lost his security clearance when he left the FBI. He says that security directors need only a secret-level clearance and obtaining it should be cheap and quick.

**AXA Equitable**

Pete Dowling, the Security Director of AXA Equitable, touts the value of the security directors’ network. He cited as an example the 2006 crash into a Manhattan building of an airplane piloted by New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle. Within minutes, the directors had, in communications among themselves, concluded that the crash was not terrorist-related, enabling them to reassure their companies long before the media reached the same conclusion.

AXA Equitable is near iconic Rockefeller Center, so it is a potential terror target. Recognizing this, he convinced the CEO to put into place the business continuity plan and have people work out of the company’s Recovery Center for a short period. The exercise went so well that the company now does it regularly. The company does “a couple” of evacuation drills a year. He has developed a crisis management plan, and a handbook outlining 12-15 scenarios to prepare for.

Like Wiser, he laments that it is so difficult to keep security clearances for security directors who used to be in government or law enforcement.

Dowling is now part of a Treasury Department group that focuses on cyber-crimes, and he conducts assessments of the terror risk posed by the company’s various business partners and vendors.

Finally, Dowling says that security directors should be in on the design phase of new buildings, as was the case with the new Goldman Sachs and New York Times buildings.

**Partnership for New York City**

Kathryn Wilde from the Partnership for New York City, a private sector consortium of leading corporations that work to promote the economic health of the city, stressed the need for businesses to have the cell phone numbers of their employees and of their next of kin.
The Partnership’s Security and Risk Management committee brings together security directors and others at New York City corporations with high-level security clearances. Committee members work with NYPD, State authorities, the FBI, the JTTF, the Office of Emergency Management, and other agencies to exchange information. It is worth noting that many New York corporations are global in scope, enabling them to be counter-terror officials’ additional “eyes and ears” around the world.

The Partnership’s Private Asset Logistics Management system works to identify people and equipment among partner members who can be helpful in an emergency and made available to OEM.

A big problem on 9/11 was the inability of key people to get back into their buildings. The Partnership has spurred an effort to get “essential” people identification that they can use to get back into restricted buildings during emergencies. It is also working with building managers to upgrade the counterterrorism skills of security guards and janitorial staff.

On behalf of the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Partnership sent a message to all member employees the London bombings in 2005 as part of the “see something/say something campaign.”

Finally, the Partnership lobbies Washington on key issues like risk-based funding and terrorism risk insurance.

The Red Cross

Terry Bischoff from the American Red Cross laments that preparedness is not a community or individual focus. One of the reasons preparedness is important is that the more people who are prepared in a disaster the fewer the number of people who will need outside help, and the more resilient a community or society is. As she puts it, “if 10% of the people in Queens have water and food for an emergency, we would be lucky.” The Red Cross is working with the Ad Council to develop a “high-impact” campaign to encourage people to prepare for a disaster. Such a campaign is critical because “we have yet to find the ‘Angelina Jolie’ of preparedness,” and the even the presidential candidates do not
talk about this issue. Federal money has been episodic, and both the private sector and individuals have been reluctant to contribute pre-disaster. According to her, it is “almost impossible” to get money for coordination, collaboration, planning, and exercising.

While the Red Cross needs more “stuff” — food, water, vehicles, there is also a need for trained volunteers. At present, there are 2500 such volunteers; 10,000 are needed to help guide the legions of “spontaneous” volunteers who show up when disaster strikes.

Among the Red Cross’ initiatives in New York is the “Centennial Circle.” Positing that women are likely to be community leaders when it comes to preparedness, this program reaches out to influential women in Harlem who are tapped to encourage their community to prepare for disasters. There is outreach, too, to the faith-based community, including the Islamic Circle. “Ready When the Time Comes” is a partnership with businesses whereby volunteers are trained and response capacity is built. Companies like Credit Suisse and Bloomberg News contribute $250,000 a year to the effort and involve their employees.

Taking advantage of New York State’s leave law, the Red Cross is encouraging employees to avail themselves of it by taking up to 20 days a year to volunteer.

Coordinated Assistance Network

Noah Simon from the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN) touted an effort which does promote coordination and collaboration among non-profit groups, to the benefit of people affected by disasters. Before 9/11 sharing client data among NGOs was not a priority; today, it is. CAN, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and other such groups collaborated to develop a technology platform that allows them, with a client’s consent, to share that client’s intake information (biographical details, needs, etc.), as well as services availability, among themselves. As of the roundtable, there were 1.9 million client records; 29,000 available resources; and 5,000 users. CAN also works to ensure that post-disasters start-ups know that there are systems and services already in place, so wasteful duplication can be avoided.
Infragard

Infragard, represented at the conference by its New York Executive Vice President and Local Membership Coordinator, John Tierney, is a nationwide partnership between the FBI and the private sector owners/operators of critical infrastructure sectors and facilities. There are some 20,000 members across the country. There is a full-time FBI coordinator in New York City who helps critical infrastructure owners/operators understand the potential terror threat to their sector/facility and better secure them. Tierney describes the Infragard website as a “My Space” for security professionals. To access it, a security director must first pass an FBI background check, after which access is free. There are periodic meetings that focus on specific topics like, for example, the threat of IEDs. One can sign up for weekly updates.

Like Bischoff, Tierney lamented that none of the presidential candidates have talked about preparedness.

He also bemoaned the lack of standards for building security, noting the wide variation among them.

TARGETS

Aviation

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Any discussion of terror targets in New York City, or elsewhere for that matter, must start with aviation. Aviation security consultant Charles Slepian is among many who believe that this sector remains at the top of the terror target list because of the potentially huge toll in death, injury, economic damage, and “shock value.”

Slepian argues that there are not enough screeners. He contends that the force should be supplemented by retired police officers and military veterans, people who are already trained and vetted.

He also pointed to the problem of the large number of foreigners in airports, and the large number of airport employees nationwide – 900,000 or so – who are not screened at checkpoints.
Jeanne Olivier, the General Manager of Aviation Security and Technology at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, stressed that “New York is wearing a bull’s eye.” The terror scenarios she worries most about, in no particular order, are: (1) the hijacking of an airplane and the use of it as a flying missile, as on 9/11; (2) secretly infecting everyone on board an aircraft with a biological pathogen and then having the passengers disperse, unawares, throughout the country infecting others; (3) an attack on a plane using a shoulder-fired missile or “MANPAD” (4) the planting of bombs on a person, in baggage, or in cargo; (5) tampering with an aircraft parked at a hangar or on the tarmac; (6) a vehicle-borne explosive device directed at an airport terminal; (7) the introduction of a bomb (non-vehicle-borne) or a suicide bomber before the screening checkpoint; and (8) kidnapping prominent people at a general aviation airport.

Responsible for JFK, La Guardia, Stewart, and Teterboro airports (the latter for general aviation or private planes), and the Manhattan heliports, Olivier says that the Port Authority continually probes and tests the aviation system, using consultants, for weaknesses that terrorists might exploit. TSA undercover audit teams, or “red teams,” as well as Government Accountability Office and Inspector General audit teams, also regularly assess the system, recommending corrective actions where weaknesses are found. Some $125 million is being spent over five years to make capital improvements in terms of physically hardening airports and installing various security technologies. Security training is provided for all employees.

Olivier acknowledges that the fact that so many airport workers are foreigners is a concern, but she regards an “American-only” policy for aviation workers as “xenophobic.” She cannot say for sure how many employees are foreign, because data is not kept on national origin. Many of the workers, she concedes, “don’t speak much English,” and there are certainly workers from the Middle East. Foreign workers’ airport jobs range from engineers and systems administrators to baggage handlers, janitors, security guards, and concession stand operators. Olivier says that it is tough to get background information on foreign workers. Their fingerprints are run against the FBI’s IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System) database of known and suspected terrorists and criminals, and TSA runs them against various other terror
watch lists. Checks may be re-run on a monthly basis. But, then, those known to the terrorists, or even widely suspected of being terrorists, would be unlikely to apply. Checks to determine whether workers are illegal aliens are spotty at best, as occasional law enforcement raids confirm. When asked about polygraphing, she expressed concerns about the violation of civil liberties and reliability. When asked about interviewing airport workers to try to ensure that they are not security risks, she said that the airports would likely insist that the government undertake this function and assume the associated liability. Further, airports and airlines are always pushing to expedite things, so they would surely complain about the time it would take to interview employees. Olivier added that there is a high turnover of airport/airline employees, which further militates against interviews.

The conversion to a biometrics-based identification system at airports is “going slowly.” TSA has funded and developed specifications, but problems have been found with the card readers. (The readers tend not to work outdoors in bad weather, for example). TSA now says that the biometric card intended for the maritime sector, TWIC (Transportation Workers Identification Card), will not be “imposed upon” the aviation sector. Other models are being made available for airports to review. The New York City area airports will participate in various pilot tests as to these different models. Once the biometric system is in place, airports should be able to ensure that the person using the card is the same person who was initially fingerprinted.

In the absence of biometrics, the New York City-area airports rely on a “badge challenge system.” Employees are required to challenge anyone in a sensitive or “sterile” area beyond checkpoints without the appropriate “SIDA” (Secure Identification Display Area) badging. There are random checks to ensure that employees are properly badged.

Olivier noted in passing that under certain circumstances airline crews and airline personnel traveling on business can bypass the screening checkpoint if they access the sterile area from a door not accessible to the public.

As for the screening of air cargo for explosives, Olivier does not know what percentage is presently screened at the airports for which she as responsibility. She notes that TSA’s plan is to implement the law requir-
ing 100% screening by 2010 by allowing third-party, private sector “trusted agents” to screen cargo for it. Such agents will undergo background checks and be subject to inspection and regulation. In her view, more research is needed before screening begins to ensure that the screening is done efficiently and thoroughly. A major challenge is screening palletized cargo which is pre-packaged in bulk.

As for federal air marshals (FAMs), Olivier does not know whether there are enough to cover flights into and out of New York City-area airports. TSA relies, she says, on intelligence and randomization to maximize the effectiveness of the air marshals it has. When asked whether the ease with which many people can identify air marshals among airplane passengers, she replied that this might be less a security risk than a reassurance to passengers that they are being protected.

When asked whether screeners at her airports are improving in their ability to spot concealed weapons during undercover tests, she replied that she was unsure.

There will be regulations before the end of 2008 to better secure the general aviation (i.e. private planes) sector. As of now, certain best practices are touted – like eight foot-high fences; lighting; county watch programs; locking of aircraft; badge challenging; and perimeter intrusion detection systems, but these measures are all too expensive for most private airports.

Perimeter security measures at all four New York City-area airports cost $124 million. Several million dollars a year is required to maintain surveillance cameras that are web-enabled.

With regard to the threat of vehicle-borne explosives at airport terminals, TSA has sent teams to each airport to discuss the airports’ plans. If there is a specific threat, terminal-bound traffic is halted and searched, either randomly or each vehicle. The Port Authority manages only some of the terminals at New York City-area airports; the rest are managed by their lessees, the airlines. The Port Authority is spending $40 million to install bollards at the terminals it manages. The airlines are balking at the expense to do likewise at their terminals.

In terms of intelligence, she relies on TSA, the FBI, the CIA, and NYPD. She is getting more intelligence now from TSA than before,
specifically a daily “feed.” A briefer for the Federal Security Director at JFK will brief her if she requests it, a change from two years ago.

Some airports are training their employees to be on the lookout for suspicious people and things and to report it (the “see something/say something” campaign). Employees are also being trained in behavior detection techniques, about which more later.

In terms of several of the various terror scenarios mentioned above, Olivier believes that the 9/11 scenario – hijacking a plane and turning it into a flying missile – has been made much harder to repeat. The public is aware of this threat and likely to fight back. The door to the “flight deck” where the pilots sit as they fly the plane has been hardened. Some pilots are armed.

The use of aircraft to disperse bio-weapons has lately been de-emphasized as a real threat in intelligence reporting, she notes.

Research is underway at Newark International Airport to jam MANPADs so their homing mechanism is disrupted.

Walk-in suicide bombers are very tough to counter, she contends. If we were to move screening from the interior of airports to the front door, people would still be massed, providing an attractive target for terrorists. (In Iraq, there are multiple screening points along the highway leading to the airport, she noted in passing. Among other things, such a system reduces the opportunity for co-conspirators to facilitate terrorist entry through checkpoints.)

Asked to speculate on why we have not been attacked since 9/11, Olivier cites as enhanced security measures and a stronger intelligence network. That said, she insisted that, despite the millions that have been spent, “determined ‘black ops’ [terrorists] could still defeat counterterrorism measures at New York City-area airports.” Still more pithily, she adds that “God has smiled on us.” She says that, fortunately, those who have tried to attack since 9/11, for example, those who plotted to blow up the underground fuel storage tanks at JFK in 2007, were not “black ops” types. She says that “nimbleness” is vital. We have to be able to adapt as we come to understand different threats. Finally, she touted community suggestions as to ways to improve airport security. One advantage, of course, is that some ideas may be good ones. Another advantage is
that the public is reassured that efforts are being made to further secure the aviation sector, and that average citizens’ input is valued.

**JFK International**

Joe Morris, the Federal Security Director at John F. Kennedy International Airport, noted, when asked about the percentage of foreigners in airport positions, that the workforce is drawn from the surrounding community. Queens is one of the more diverse communities in the country, with approximately 167 languages spoken. There is a large percentage of people from the Middle East, South Asia, and the West Indies in the community, and this is reflected in the JFK workforce.

Employee applicants must undergo a ten-year criminal background check. Certain crimes, like serious felonies, are disqualifying. There are terrorist background checks and “constant” updates. Vendors are checked against terror watch lists.

JFK does random screening of badged workers, and Morris added that Congress will probably mandate 100% screening.

In terms of screeners, JFK has between 2,000 and 2100, which Morris deems to be sufficient. There are 18 checkpoints, and 67 lanes. Screeners are given one week of classroom training and two weeks of on-the-job training. Morris believes that screener pay should be raised.

In terms of air cargo screening, JFK relies on the “known vendor” program, meaning that cargo is accepted only from shipping companies with a clean record as to terrorism ties. The airport also has ten dogs to do screening; there are some 85 dogs nationwide.

He conceded that the percentage of cargo screened now is “not what it should be,” but was convinced that the mandate to screen 100% of cargo by 2010 will be met. As of now, the technology to screen cargo efficiently does not exist, he says.

Like Olivier, Morris notes that the Port Authority operates only some of the eight terminals at JFK. Port Authority terminals are protected by higher fencing, and they are installing networked sensors around the perimeter tied to cameras that are watched on a 24/7 basis at a cost of more than $300 million.
JFK has six Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs), about which more later, and 43 Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) who are trained to spot passenger behavior that might indicate terrorist intent.

JFK has installed the Rapid Scan multi-view x-ray technology that rotates carry-on baggage on conveyor belts at the checkpoint in a three-dimensional fashion to enable screeners to spot artfully concealed weapons and to detect hard to detect explosives.

Bollards will be installed by December, 2009 to protect the terminal.

JFK also participates in the “Black Diamond” program that provides a separate screening lane for business travelers who are very familiar with screening procedures. This expedites the screening process for them, and it allows more time for inexperienced travelers and families with children. The security benefit is that anything that makes the screening process less chaotic serves to deter terrorism by minimizing distractions that can take screeners’ eyes off would-be terrorists and weapons.

Ultimately, Morris wants to have all delivery trucks routed to a central location away from the airport and then checked for explosives.

The Port Authority has gotten a $400 million grant to install in-line baggage screening. Such screening is integrated in the baggage conveyor belt system behind the scenes, facilitating baggage handling and freeing up terminal space.

Newark International

There are 1300 screeners at Newark International Airport, the fifth largest screener contingent in the nation, according to the Federal Security Director there, Ross McCafferty. In terms of screener testing, there is an annual re-certification process. In the past, if screeners fail tests designed to spot their ability to spot concealed weapons, they could not screen passengers, but they could continue to screen bags. Now, if they fail tests three times, they are subject to removal. If a screener fails one of these tests, he has to undergo another test within 14 days. A screener is pulled off active duty until he passes. It is expensive to hire and train screeners, so it is difficult to lose them after they
fail tests. But, security concerns require this. The traditionally high screener attrition rate is going down because the economy is softening, making other jobs harder to come by.

The DHS Inspector General conducted covert tests at Newark in 2006, and screeners there failed 20 out of 22 of the tests. McCaffrey is trying to replicate these tests, and the screeners are continuing to fail them.

Newark has two machines designed to test liquid explosives, and four explosive trace portal machines, which can detect the presence of explosives on passengers by analyzing puffs of air blown at them. Eventually, Newark, like JFK, will have “millimeter wave” technology as a voluntary alternative to a pat-down during secondary screening. Such technology can, within seconds and without physical contact, detect weapons, explosives, and other threat items concealed under clothing. The airport presently has one Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO). Newark is authorized to hire up to 6; 3 are in the process of being hired. The airport is scheduled to have multi-view x-ray technology soon.

McCaffrey says that there is a limit to what human beings can do in terms of detecting concealed weapons, so the ultimate solution is technology. We can never catch 100% of threat items, he says, but technology will enable us to come as close to 100% detection as possible. But, one problem is that there is hardly any room to put the new technologies that are being deployed to the airport.

Like Joe Morris, he is unsure of the exact percentage of foreign workers at his airport, but he knows that the number is high, especially in low-paying support jobs (janitors, concession workers, baggage handlers). He adds that every worker who needs to access the ramp, tarmac, and aircraft has a SIDA badge, and everyone who has a SIDA badge undergoes a criminal background check and a terrorist watch list check. While, likewise, those who work in the sterile part of the airport are checked for criminal history and terrorist connections, there is no check for those who work in the pre-checkpoint part of the airport. There is talk of eventually badging everyone, but this is not done presently.

In some airports, as noted above, the crew can easily bypass the screening checkpoint. That is not the case at Newark. Unlike LAX or O’Hare, the main airports in airports in Los Angeles and Chicago,
respectively, there are only a few doors that permit access past the checkpoint, namely, four, and each is manned by a guard. There are also cameras, and one is required to punch in a code to enter.

At Newark, some airlines – Israel’s El Al and Air India- do some secondary screening of passengers at the gate.

In terms of air cargo screening at Newark for explosives, the degree of screening varies from airline to airline. Continental is conducting a pilot test with equipment provided by McCaffrey. Soon, the airport will have bomb sniffing dogs and three TSA dog handlers. Noting that San Francisco’s airport is pilot testing 100% screening, and that TSA is planning even after the new law mandating such screening by 2010 to rely to some degree on “certified shippers” to screen themselves, McCaffrey says that he would prefer that TSA do its own screening.

McCaffrey is happy with the value and timeliness of the intelligence he receives. TSA provides him with intelligence, as well as two FBI agents who are assigned to Newark full-time.

As for air marshals, like Joe Morris, he relies on the FAM director and “does not have a lot of visibility into” the program. He adds that when FAMs do not fly, they provide helpful services on the ground. They are an “extra pair of eyes,” looking for illegal cash and those with outstanding arrest warrants.

He has “a number” of BDOs.

McCaffrey does not support a requirement that all airport workers be U.S. citizens, adding that it takes “only five years” to acquire American citizenship.

There are a number of best practices at Newark. Among them, as noted above, is the limited number of access points past the checkpoint, an accident of the airport’s initial design and layout.

In terms of gaps, McCaffrey worries about “the insider threat.” He notes that a number of European airports are screening 100% of their employees (Frankfurt, for example), and he thinks U.S. airports should do likewise. In his case, he would have to get the airport to agree.
He worries, too, about the low pay for screeners, about $26,000 a year, vs. $40,000 for a police officer. Implicitly, McCaffrey makes the point that screeners are likewise front-line counterterrorism fighters, and they should be paid accordingly.

He says that perimeter security is a good news story. A limited number of gates provide vehicle access to the air field. All are manned by guards. There are delta barriers outside the gates like at embassies. Airport police patrol the fence several times a day. He is getting a perimeter intrusion system like Joe Morris has at JFK.

Like others, he believes that there will be another attack – “something will happen.” We have not been attacked in his view due to hardening of targets and “luck.”

LaGuardia

Doug Hofsass has five Bomb Appraisal Officers, and he has authority to hire one more. He expects to be fully staffed before the end of 2008. BAOs, he says, are intended not to test screeners’ ability to spot bombs, but to train them to do so. Screeners are encouraged to call in a BAO if, say, a given cell phone “doesn’t look like the last cell phone,” and the passenger does not have an adequate explanation. If a BAO cannot resolve an issue (i.e., definitively determine whether an item is a bomb), screeners are to call in a law enforcement officer on the grounds of the airport. If that fails, the local bomb squad is called in. It generally takes about half an hour for the squad to arrive, the average response time around the nation. The bomb squad is called, on average, 3-4 times per month at Newark.

The Behavior Detection Program is active at LaGuardia. There are “enough” for all four terminals. Explaining the effectiveness of the program, the head of the program at LaGuardia says, “the body “can’t hide a lie. It has to react in some way to remove stress.” BDOs look for the person in the crowd behaving differently from the rest. A point value system assigns points to noted stress indicators. BDOs have confronted suspicious acting passengers 3000 or so times during 12 months. Ten percent of these interactions result in law enforcement personnel’s being called; another 10% results in arrests for illegal drugs or illegal
amounts of cash; weapons; or illegal aliens. The BDO program at LaGuardia has improved screeners’ performance on covert tests, he says. LaGuardia is improving, but the airport in this regard is not “where we should be.” BDOs are trained by the FBI and the JTTF in deception and counter-surveillance.

There is no Customs and Border Control (CBP) presence at LaGuardia; it takes these officers about 30-40 minutes to arrive.

At LaGuardia, there are NYPD officers; the National Guard (like at JFK, deployed there indefinitely); Port Authority officers comprising the “Emergency Services Unit;” and dogs. There are also “TDCs,” screeners who double as travel document checkers.

LaGuardia has an aggressive employee screening program. Up to four teams of checkers circulate within the secure area at any one time, checking TSA employees and passengers from the gate to the ramp. “Constantly” roaming, the teams are never in the same place twice. Sometimes all doors from outside the terminal are locked but one, forcing employees to enter through a single door at which their identification is checked. If someone refuses to be screened, he is referred to the Port Authority for further action. The Port Authority supplements this screening with screening by a contract company, Interpass. Interpass does spot checks on airport employees, looking for people without identification, or expired identification, or those otherwise not following the rules. (He believes all New York City airports have an Interpass presence.)

Hofsass is opposed to 100% employee screening, noting that it is being piloted at a number of airports around the country. He believes that there is inherent security value in randomness. “If you do 100% of anything, there are holes,” he contends.

Hofsass is more confident of employee screening now that, for more than a year, employees have been screened against criminal history databases, the no-fly list, and the full terrorist watch list, including the “silent” watch list, collectively known as a “strategic threat assessment.” (The silent watch list is a list of people the FBI suspects of terror ties but does not want to alert to such suspicions.)
There is no backscatter or millimeter wave technology at LaGuardia, but the airport is “on the list” for it. There are multi-view x-ray machines, however.

One simply best practice at LaGuardia is the use of clear trash cans, to make the planting of bombs more conspicuous.

At LaGuardia, the Port Authority does vehicle access screening.

To detect liquid explosives, LaGuardia has FIDO and SABRE machines.

TSA provides security at the Wall Street heliport because it makes flights to Newark and JFK.

LaGuardia has an operations center where all security programs are coordinated.

Hofsass concedes that there are many foreign workers, but he is not concerned about this because of the background check process.

In terms of screener training, there is a four hour weekly minimum and an annual certification process. There are training terminals at some checkpoints at all the NYC-area airports. There are approximately 1000 screeners at La Guardia. The majority screen both passengers and checked bags.

Unlike the case at JFK and Newark, there is no in-line baggage screening system at LaGuardia, but one is on the drawing board for the Delta and American airlines terminals. Such systems integrate the bulky explosive detection machines with airports’ baggage handling conveyor system, expediting the screening process and freeing up space in crowded airport terminals. This will be part of the ten-year modernization plan for the airport. The costs are shared between the airlines and TSA.

Hofsass is happy with the timeliness and value of the intelligence he receives. TSA’s intelligence office has improved. He receives 6-7 pages of daily intelligence. Recurring incidents are highlighted, as well as “significant” ones. A number of themes and patterns have “drawn added attention.”
**Maritime**

**Port of New York and New Jersey**

Beth Ann Rooney, the Security Manager for the Port of New York and New Jersey, argues that New York City is the single highest risk port in the United States because of its economic and strategic importance to the city, the region, and the nation. The port includes 196 commercial maritime facilities (though she has control over only 13, contrary to what the general public, and even Washington policymakers, think). There are another 150 critical infrastructure assets, including the water side of JFK airport; LaGuardia; Ellis Island; and the United Nations. There are three cruise terminals and 54 petrochemical facilities (each with its own risk profile). Six thousand people travel on the Staten Island ferry each day. There are 360,000 vessel movements each year, and 5500 large foreign vessels come to call. The port is the third largest container port in the United States, and the 15th largest in the world. It handles three million containers each year, about a quarter of the annual nationwide total. The Port of New York/New Jersey, not the Port of Houston, is the largest port in the nation for refined petroleum. It is the largest port in the nation as well for the handling of new autos, both imports and exports. It handles 55% of the maritime market for the Atlantic Coast, some $150 billion worth of cargo. It provides $25 billion in annual taxes to the federal government. The port supports 238,000 jobs. It serves 18 million people in New York and New Jersey, the largest consumer region in the nation, providing food, electronics, autos, clothing, and flowers, among other things. The public tends to focus on aviation because they travel on airplanes and access airports regularly. People tend not to understand the importance of ports because they have no direct connection to them.

Rooney does not think that the port itself is likely to be target, but is more likely to be an entry point for terrorists and terror weapons. That said, a likely attack in the port would be a small vessel attack on the Staten Island Ferry or a cruise ship, like the attack on the Cole.

Rooney notes that there have been few “risk” assessments of the port. When talking about assessments, people tend to confuse “security,” “risk,” and “vulnerability.” “Risk,” she says, is a function of threat and vulnerability. The port has undergone a “bona fide” risk assessment, though the port is required only to comply with security regulations.
Because the nation gets 95% of its goods through the maritime sector, and because of the “just-in-time” nature of the global supply chain, an attack or closure would have huge economic consequences, as we learned from the West Coast labor strike a few years ago. A port closure for one day would have a $1 billion impact.

Rooney called attention to three areas of focus—cargo and supply chain security; vessel and waterway security; and facility security.

There are 23 federal agencies involved with maritime security at the port; some 27 state and local agencies; 196 private facilities; and 150 owners/operators of critical infrastructure.

Among best practices at the port are various “outreach activities.” The Port Authority Transit Security Working Group shares intelligence and best practices monthly. Among other things, gaps and overlaps in manpower, equipment, and financial resources are discussed. The Port Authority Law Enforcement Working Group helps tenants understand existing and forthcoming security regulations.

Before 9/11, cargo security largely focused on the threat of theft. Today, of course, the number one security concern is terrorism. She does not believe in “balancing” security and cost. Rooney thinks that the security costs should be integrated into the costs of doing business. Nobody thinks now about double hulls on tankers after the Exxon Valdez disaster. The cost of double hulling is now factored into business models. This is “where we need to go” in terms of maritime security.

Rooney chairs an Area Maritime Security Committee, another best practice which every port should have, she says. The committee writes a security plan, exercises it, and then communicates changes in the threat level. There are 500 members of the committee. In other ports where there is such a committee, the Coast Guard chairs it.

There have been lots of exercises on evacuation planning, continuity planning, and recovery.

In Rooney’s view, DHS has not taken a “systematic approach” to port security. The department has affected port security in “drips and drabs.” DHS focuses on securing individual “nodes” within the maritime sector, as opposed to focusing on the interdependencies in the supply chain.
Rooney says that some $100 million has been spent by the Port Authority on security since 9/11, 70% on operating costs. Thirty million dollars have been spent on physical security. She and her staff were named to their posts after 9/11.

One billion dollars has been spent nationwide on maritime security, with about 10% going to New York City (including NYPD).

Among Rooney’s concerns that she sees as preparedness gaps are voluntary security programs instituted by DHS’ Customs and Border Protection unit like C-TPAT (the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). In exchange for asserting that their companies have rigorous security programs in place, CBP gives those companies the benefit of reducing their odds of being inspected. CBP sometimes audits these companies after the fact, but, even then, CBP verifies only those features of a security program a company allows CBP to verify.

Rooney believes in making certain minimum security standards mandatory and then providing benefits to companies that go above and beyond the minimum commensurate with the additional security measures that such companies are willing to adopt.

Another concern is the government’s heavy focus on radiation detection. As of the time of her presentation, about 98% of incoming containers into the Port of New York and New Jersey were being screened for radiation. The concern is with the efficacy of the radiation portal monitors that do the screening. These machines cannot detect certain radiological materials and cannot detect “shielded” radioactive materials at all. Even so, she says, we spend billions to scan containers for radiation.

A related concern is whether foreign nations start insisting upon our scanning 100% of containers bound for their ports. If they were to do so, Rooney says it would bring the Port of New York and New Jersey to a halt. Ports are simply not designed to screen outbound cargo.

Furthermore, we put “all of our eggs” on containers, while paying no attention at all to non-containerized cargo. For example, some 850,000 cars “roll onto” ships and “roll off” them – so called “roro” cargo – with no scanning/inspection whatsoever. Her fear is that, say, 1000 cars bound for a U.S. port are outfitted with C-4 explosive set to detonate when the cars’ odometer reaches 1000 miles. There would be explo-
sions, and therefore, deaths, all over the United States, terrorizing the entire nation. If we are concerned about vehicle-borne explosives, we need to screen non-containerized cargo, she says.

Another concern is that the research and development efforts are not centralized within DHS. Several components – CBP and the Coast Guard, for example – and several other agencies – the Department of Energy and the Department of Transportation – have their own r & d units that affect maritime security. The same is true for maritime policy development.

An additional concern is insufficient federal resources, given the critical homeland security mission. CBP’s 2008 budget is 10% less, she said, that its budget for 2007, even though there was to be a 7½ % increase in cargo. The Coast Guard is at 1996 staffing levels, even though there has been a 238% increase in ship traffic since then.

A related gap is the fact that cargo can sit at a port for up to three weeks before being scanned for radiation because of this lack of resources.

If there is a dirty bomb offshore, we presently do not have a plan to “mitigate” that container. No Governor will allow a ship to enter a port in that state with a confirmed dirty bomb. Perhaps the container should be taken to an island or placed on a barge and sunk somewhere, but there is no plan today.

The threat of a terror attack from a small boat, a la the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, is “huge.” We know nothing about the hundreds of thousands of recreational craft in our waterways.

We also know nothing about those who service ships. Rooney says that a ship at anchor for bunker fuel will also take on provisions. There is no scanning of those provisions, and no validation of the companies that supply the provisions. If this happens at a dock, there is validation of the people and scanning of the provisions.

Similarly, vessel or “steamship” agents board arriving ships, take off the bill of lading and manifest, and deliver these documents to CBP. The agent is also given a list of people who are entitled to service the ship. These are the documents that CBP uses to do a risk assessment. Customs has “no idea” who these vessel agents are. They are unlicensed,
unregulated, and untrained. Other key players are all licensed by the Federal Maritime Commission. In other countries, these agents are licensed.

**Manhattan Cruise Terminal**

The Manhattan Cruise Terminal (MCT), located on the West Side of Manhattan, consists of three piers. Each pier is approximately 1000 feet long and 350-400 feet apart. It is, then, basically a skyscraper, turned on its side, surrounded by water. Owned by the New York Economic Development Corporation, the MCT is operated by a private company, Ports America. In the aftermath of 9/11, MCT served as the base of operations for city, state, and federal resources. It also served as a temporary morgue and distribution point for supplies to Ground Zero. In addition to serving as the launching and return point for pleasure cruises, the terminal also hosts high profile events like the annual New York City “Fleet Week” celebration; foreign naval visits; political fundraisers, and trade shows. Approximately 1.5 million people use the facility annually. The facility is also part of the NYC Area evacuation plan, in the event of a disaster. Within the evacuation zone, there are almost 100,000 residents, and a daytime population of nearly a quarter million people. For all these reasons, including the proximity (just blocks away) of Midtown Manhattan, the area is a top potential terror target according to Ken Winkler, the top security official for the MCT. There is now a plan in place, with NYPD and the Coast Guard, to press cruise ships, tug boats, and other private vessels into service to help evacuate Manhattan, should that someday prove to be necessary.

In terms of terror scenarios, a suicide bomb may cause more death and injuries than a waterborne attack, but less structural damage. Attacking a ship in transit to the berth would be more deadly and damaging than attacking a ship at berth. A dirty bomb would cause limited deaths, but significant psychological and economic damage. A vehicle-borne bomb could both maximize deaths and economic, structural, and environmental damage. Attacks from underwater swimmers planting mines are possible, but not likely given the water current and limited visibility. Another possibility is hijacking a vessel. Any attack would have maximum media coverage and a substantial psychic effect on the entire industry.
MCT operates on the “100% theory,” meaning that everything that goes on board a vessel – people, luggage, provisions – is screened for bombs using canines, X-Rays, and magnetometers. The cruise lines provide a vendor list, 24 hours in advance of arrival, that is used by CBP to vet vendors and delivery drivers.

Noting that a number of terror plots have been foiled since 9/11, Winkler says that there have been plans for attacks on maritime targets, including military vessels, tankers, ferries, and cruise ships. Intelligence reports from NYPD and the Coast Guard indicate “activity consistent with pre-operational” terrorist planning. Tips to New York City’s SAFE hotline continue to report unusual activity at various bridges and ferries, including surveillance.

Winkler notes that cruise ship crews tend to be made up entirely of foreigners – Indonesians, Filipinos, and Pakistanis, in particular, and all of the ships are foreign-flagged. While TWIC cards, once fully deployed, will help to lessen the risk of terrorists among port workers, TWIC will not apply to crews working on foreign ships. So, we really know nothing about the security bona fides of these crew members. The Coast Guard, for some reason, does not accept the Interpol records-based International Seafaring background certification process.

Pointing to the NYPD study on radicalization mentioned earlier, Winkler says that he and his team are constantly alert for signs that terminal workers, many of whom are of Middle Eastern descent, have changed their behavior or habits in ways that might indicate terrorist leanings. The SPOT (Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques) behavior detection program used by TSA at airports is used in the maritime sector, too. Such a program, by focusing on behavior rather than ethnicity, avoids profiling while providing greater security assurance.

In terms of best practices, MCT uses dogs; closed circuit surveillance cameras; personal radiation pagers; and exercises. Maintaining a good working relationship with various law enforcement partners is also important. Millimeter wave technology has also been piloted there.

In terms of gaps, Winkler is concerned about being surrounded on three sides by water. MCT is totally dependent upon NYPD and the Coast Guard for protection on the water side. Other gaps are the high
cost of screening equipment; training; maintenance; recruitment; and the lack of certification for screening and bomb detection dogs.

A final gap is intelligence. Winkler mentioned an incident in January 2007 prior to the Super Bowl that indicated a threat to cruise ships nationwide. NYPD arrived to brief him, at a time when a cruise ship was anchored at MCT. The alert level was duly raised and appropriate additional security measures were taken. The Coast Guard never passed this information on to him.

**Transit Security**

**NYPD Transit Bureau**

Approximately 2600 NYPD officers police the transit system – the subways and commuter rail – according to Owen Monaghan, NYPD’s Deputy Chief of Transit.

New York City has, of course, the largest transit system in the country. There are 659 miles of track; 468 subway stations; 28 subway lines; 14 underwater tunnels; and 5 million passengers a day. Each train has 10 cars with between 1100-1400 passengers per train. At peak times, some 568 trains are moving about the system. The Metropolitan Transit Authority owns and operates the system, and NYPD polices.

The transit bureau has a counterterrorism coordinator and its own intelligence bureau.

If an event occurs, the transit system can be shut down. A sergeant is on duty 24/7 in case such a determination needs to be made.

Two were convicted in the plot to blow up the Herald Square subway station in 2004. A suicide plot was foiled in Brooklyn in 1997. A suicide bomber, or a bomber who leaves a bomb in a bag, are the most likely terror scenarios. Seventy-seven percent of recent terror attacks have involved the use of bombs, according to Monaghan. That said, synchronized shootings would engender widespread panic, judging from the reaction to incidents like Columbine and the Colin Ferguson shootings on the Long Island Railroad years ago.
In terms of best practices, unpredictability and randomness are critical to effective counterterrorism measures, he says. The transit bureau’s bag inspection program, which survived an American Civil Liberties Union legal challenge, focuses on every 20th or 25th bag at a given subway station. Passengers can refuse an inspection, but they must then leave the station. Failure to leave will result in arrest. A team of officers carries out the inspection, with one looking for suspicious behavior, and another looking through the bag. Explosive Trace Detection devices are used to swab bags for explosives, taking only a few seconds to do so.

Some 27 bomb-sniffing dogs make up the bureau’s Canine Unit.

As mentioned earlier, Train Order Maintenance Sweeps are highly visible surges of officers into and out of trains for a two minute inspection of a given subway car.

Officers conduct inspections of the city’s 14 underwater tunnels daily, supplemented by monitoring of closed circuit television.

The Hercules surges mentioned by Commissioner Kelly frequent occur at subway stations.

Transit officers carry portable radiological detectors. There are bio-watch detectors throughout the system also to detect the release of radiation. Filters are tested once daily; it takes 24 hours to analyze the results.

Every officer is assigned to a particular platform at a subway station during rush hour.

There are frequent tabletop and field exercises.

And, Monaghan praised NYPD’s intelligence unit for providing the transit bureau with more intelligence more quickly than any other agency in the nation.

In terms of gaps, the 24 hours it takes to analyze bio-watch results is too long.

Another gap is the lengthy and complex procurement process. It has taken years to get the MTA’s closed circuit t.v. system, supplied by Lockheed Martin, in place.
Finally, as noted by Secretary Balboni, transit security awards are made to the MTA, though it is NYPD that polices the system. The police department should be “at the table” as to transit counterterrorism funding.

**Amtrak**

Bill Rooney, Amtrak Security Chief, stressed that it is not a question of whether there will be another attack, but when. Mass transit is likely to be targeted in part because the aviation sector has been significantly hardened since 9/11. Mass transit is “vast, open, and vulnerable.” Amtrak trains would likely be attractive targets because of the volume of passengers (25 million a year), and the number of iconic stations it serves like, for example, Penn Station in New York and Union Station in Washington, DC.

Accordingly, focusing on the potential number of deaths and the iconic nature of potential targets, Amtrak has focused its security plan on ten major priority stations, including Penn Station and Union Station. There is a “Station Action Team” for each station, comprised of the stakeholders in each station who own or operate retail stores and other critical facilities like private parking lots. There is a “Coordinator” for each Station Action Team.

Amtrak calls in scientists to assess each of these station’s vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are then briefed to the Station Action Team, with the implicit question, “Knowing these vulnerabilities, what are you going to do to mitigate them?” A security plan is given to each stakeholder.

In addition, each station is digitally mapped to give first responders a virtual tour of critical nodes like HVAC systems, lights, and water supply to enable them to respond quickly and effectively during a crisis.

Another “tool” given to stakeholders is help with passenger flow modeling to facilitate the movement of passengers during a crisis.

Amtrak has brought in the National Guard, Special Forces veterans, distinguished retired police officers, and subject matter experts in trains and train stations to work alongside Amtrak police to implement a random security program modeled on certain NYPD initiatives. For example, Amtrak is now randomly inspecting passengers’ bags for explosives
along the Northeast Corridor. The screening, done with SABRE devices, takes seconds. As in New York, the screening is done in teams, with one officer swabbing the bag and another, a Behavior Detection Officer, observing demeanor and checking travel documents. There are 35 mobile teams along the East Coast, with plans to duplicate them on the West Coast (which would include Chicago). These teams engage in periodic “Hercules-type” surges of “game faced,” gun-toting officers to stations and aboard trains to create an “optic” that can disrupt terrorist planning and reassure the public that everything possible is being done to protect them. All team members are trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center run by DHS. The Amtrak canine unit randomly patrols trains, before boarding and once a train is underway. Surveillance and counter-surveillance teams, dressed in civilian clothes, roam about stations looking for people acting suspiciously and suspicious items. Amtrak is establishing its own intelligence unit and demanding that federal, state, and local partners share threat information potentially affecting trains and mass transit. In the meantime, Amtrak has placed its own people in key existing intelligence units, including the National Counterterrorism Center; NYPD; JTTF; and TSA.

**SUMMARY OF BEST PRACTICES; PREPAREDNESS GAPS; RECOMMENDATIONS TO CLOSE SUCH GAPS; AND GENERAL “CONCERNS” NOTED BY PARTICIPANTS**

**Best Practices:**

1. A dedicated cadre of counterterrorism-focused police officers and intelligence analysts

   This is not for every city, certainly. The bad news is that most cannot afford it; the good news is that most probably do not need it.

   But, it does make sense for the nation’s number one terror target – New York City – and other large and/or iconic cities - to devote as many officers full-time to countering terrorism as they can spare. And, likewise, it makes sense for cities that are likely terror targets, which tend to be multi-lingual and multi-
ethnic, to develop their own intelligence units and to make a strength of their diversity by tapping into it to develop in-house linguistic and cultural expertise that can aid in the collection and analysis of such intelligence.

But, even those cities without the need or resources for dedicated counterterrorism officers should incorporate counterterrorism training into their classroom and on-the-job police training regime. There is often a nexus between terrorism and ordinary crime. The more aware police officers are of these potential connections, the likelier they are to spot terrorism indicators when going about their regular beats.

Further, even cities unlikely to be targeted by terrorists should consider implementing those of the NYPD’s various counterterrorism programs (i.e., NEXUS, SHIELD, Hercules, Atlas, Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, etc.) that make sense for them and that they can afford.

2. A robust local Joint Terrorism Task Force

Similarly, at least in major cities like New York, there should be a robust local Joint Terrorism Task Force, providing a formal mechanism and forum for federal, state, and local counterterrorism players to address issues and to exchange information. Turf wars and culture clashes are, needless to say, themselves security gaps that terrorists can exploit (and have exploited in the past) to deadly effect. When working properly, a JTTF can break down walls between counterterrorism agencies and make the whole greater than the sum of its parts.

3. The use of gap analysis to identify needs and to establish priorities, so as to respond to disasters effectively and efficiently

4. A state-of-the Art Shelter Stockpile that can sustain multiple shelters with food, water, medicine, and other vital supplies for a significant period of time, coupled with a model logistics management system to keep track of supplies
5. A city-wide Early Detection System, with real-time analytical capability, encompassing scores of chemical, biological, and radiological sensors in different parts of a city

6. A city-wide “surveillance system” feeding into the health department data potentially indicating bio-terrorism

7. An automated “pathogen detection system” that gives a read out every two hours of potential bio-terror threats

8. A robust surge lab capacity, with workers cross-trained to back each other up in an emergency

9. The ability to place 250-300 health department workers in the field to do vaccinations and other health-related tasks during emergencies

10. Targeting ethnic communities with bio-terror preparedness information in their own languages

11. Supplementing health department workers, during a bio-terror emergency, with trained police officers

12. Establishing an environmental data exchange network so as to get air monitoring data from a number of different agencies, standardize it, and then disseminate it

13. Bringing all the key counterterrorism players in a state together to prioritize requests for federal help according to threat and vulnerability (i.e., the “Regional Transit Working Group” in New York State)

14. Deploying the National Guard to patrol airports, subway and trains stations, nuclear power plants, and similar critical facilities (i.e., the “Empire Shield Task Force” in New York State)

15. Using the full range of a state’s military and para-military assets for counterterrorism purposes
16. Mapping suspicious incidents around a state (or other geographical region) against critical infrastructure and other sensitive sites to determine whether worrisome patterns emerge that might indicate a connection to terrorism

17. Using “force multiplier” software to alert law enforcement officers’ to each others’ presence on trains to supplement the number of officers on patrol at any given time

18. Providing counter-terrorism training to non-law enforcement mass transit personnel like train conductors and engineers

19. Investigating every tip reported to a terrorism tip hotline, and reported the outcome to each caller, if requested

20. Government’s working with key critical infrastructure sectors, like the pipeline industry, to conduct vulnerability assessments and help them address security gaps

21. Companies’ having regular drills, evacuation plans, and preparedness kits

22. Critical infrastructure and corporate vulnerability assessments and counter-surveillance programs

23. Industry or subject matter-specific counter-terrorism information exchange forums like the “Bankers Roundtable”

24. The use by corporations of “red teaming,” training; and the media to counter terrorists and to educate and engage their employees

25. Corporate security directors’ providing a handbook outlining various terrorism scenarios and outlining the steps to take to respond to them

26. Involving security directors in the design of facilities
27. Ensuring that employees can be accounted for during a crisis and that “essential” employees can be cleared to re-enter facilities when incidents are over

28. Upgrading the counter-terrorism skills of security guards and janitorial staff

29. The use of corporate groups, like the Partnership for New York, to exchange security-related information; maintain a logistics management system to identify and deploy needed goods and services in a crisis; and to lobby the federal government for things like risk-based grants and terrorism risk insurance

30. Reaching out to every ethnic/religious community in an effort to encourage preparedness

31. Taking advantage of leave laws to encourage volunteers to prepare for and respond to emergencies

32. An information exchange network like the Coordinated Action Network so that clients seeking goods and services after an emergency need provide necessary information only once and that information is then provided to all providers, ensuring that goods and services can be provided efficiently

33. A badge challenge program to help ensure that people in sensitive areas in airports and other such facilities are cleared to be there

34. The use of high fencing, 24/7-monitored surveillance cameras, regular guard patrols, perimeter intrusion detection systems, and limited access points, all to inhibit unauthorized access to airfields

35. The use of bollards to inhibit terrorists’ use of vehicle-borne explosives to attack airport terminals

36. Absent biometrics and the screening of 100% of airport workers, random screening
37. Multi-view x-ray technology, so that bags on conveyer belts at airport checkpoints are rotated in a three-dimensional fashion, eventually helping to reveal any concealed weapons

Ideally, such technology should be deployed at every checkpoint at every airport in the country, as quickly as possible. The technology should be deployed in priority order, depending upon airports’ relative terrorism risk.

38. Millimeter wave technology, or, alternatively, “backscatter” technology, deployed at airport checkpoints “in secondary,” so that any weapons concealed under clothing can be detected.

Likewise, this technology should be deployed at every checkpoint at every airport in the country, as quickly as possible. The technology should be deployed in priority order, depending upon airports’ relative terrorism risk.

40. The “Black Diamond” program that separates travelers at checkpoints based upon their familiarity with screening procedures, serving to make the checkpoint less chaotic

41. Routing all delivery trucks to a central location away from airports and then screening for explosives at that off-site location

42. Re-screening passengers at the gate before they board flights

43. Limiting the number of terminal access points past the screening checkpoint

44. Using air marshals, when not flying, to augment airport security

45. The use of Behavior Detection Officers to spot suspicious behavior that might indicate terrorist intent

46. The use of Travel Document Checkers at airports to spot the use of suspicious travel documents that might be used by terrorists to game the system
47. The use of clear trash cans so as to inhibit the planting of explosives

48. Random screening of vehicles accessing airport terminals and parking lots

49. Minimum weekly refresher training for airport screeners

50. The deployment at airports of Bomb Appraisal Officers to determine whether suspicious items are in fact explosives

51. Government mandated security improvements can aid corporate security directors by forcing management to pay for security measures for which security directors are unable to make a compelling “business case”

52. Liquid explosive detection technology

   Ideally, such technology should be deployed at every airport checkpoint in the country. Deployment should be phased in on a priority basis, depending upon airports’ relative terrorism risk.

53. Having a plan in place to press cruise ships, tug boats, and other private vessels into service to help evacuate waterside cities, should that ever prove to be necessary or desirable

54. The use of behavior detection techniques deployed now at airports in the maritime environment as well

55. A counter-terrorism coordinator and an intelligence unit specifically for the mass transit sector

56. A random bag inspection program in mass transit stations

57. Daily inspection of underwater tunnels, supplemented by closed circuit television, monitored on a 24/7 basis

58. Regular “sweeps” and “surges” of uniformed police officers at mass transit stations, and the stationing of an officer at a particular platform at subway stations during rush hour each day
59. Transit officers’ carrying portable radiological detectors

60. The deployment of bio-watch radiation detectors in mass transit stations

61. Frequent tabletop and field exercises for the mass transit sector

62. Establishing “Station Action Teams” at Amtrak stations comprised of key stakeholders for purposes of assessing and addressing vulnerabilities

63. Digitally mapping each Amtrak station so first responders know where critical nodes are in the event of a crisis

64. Helping Amtrak station stakeholders do passenger flow modeling to facilitate the movement of passengers during a crisis

65. Random screening of bags at Amtrak stations

66. Random surges of officers on Amtrak trains and at Amtrak stations

67. The use of canines to randomly patrol Amtrak trains for explosives

68. The use of surveillance and counter-surveillance teams at Amtrak stations

69. Amtrak’s establishing its own intelligence unit and its deploying people to key existing federal intelligence units, like the National Counterterrorism Center and Joint Terrorism Task Forces

Gaps and Recommendations (if any) to Close Them:

1. The insufficiency of federal money for the operational expenses of police department counterterrorism programs

2. The lack of a plan to secure our food supply

   The occasional salmonella scare or outbreak of mad cow dis-
ease or bird flu highlights the vulnerability of our food supply to agro-terrorism. As potential vulnerabilities go, addressing this one has been low on the nation’s priority list. Given the relative ease with which the food supply could be deliberately contaminated, and the widespread terror that would ensue as a result, it is to be hoped that the next Administration will make a greater effort to do something about this threat.

3. The lack of metrics by which to measure how prepared we are

4. Continuing clashes between the Police and Fire Department

Absent another attack, it is difficult to assess the degree to which such clashes, present since time immemorial, endure and their practical effect in terms of counterterrorism preparedness. But, any such clashes, and any redundancies and other inefficiencies, are counter-productive. This is especially so at a time when the threat of another attack is rising, and our resources are dwindling.

5. The lack of preparedness for a 10-kiloton nuclear attack

A major nuclear attack would dwarf 9/11 by comparison. Millions of people could die and be injured, as opposed to thousands. And, hundreds of billions of dollars in economic damage would likely result, rather than tens of billions. On the one hand, the enormity of the challenge of carrying out such an attack makes such an attack relatively unlikely. On the other, the consequences of such an attack, were it to happen, would be so huge that outsize efforts to prepare for it make eminent sense.

6. The lack of preparedness for any “mega-disaster,” including catastrophic natural disasters

7. The limited money available to help hospitals prepare for terrorism

8. The lack of metrics by which to judge whether the health department is prepared for terror attacks
9. The public health system has not tapped into and integrated with the nation-wide VA hospital system to the degree that it should

10. The need for federal regulation of bio-terrorism detection devices

11. Preparedness policy, at least with regard to public health, is insufficiently driven by evidence or, even, expert consensus

12. The scale and scope of hospital planning for disasters is inadequate

13. The lack of adequate “horizontal and regional” coordination among hospitals

14. The failure to appreciate hospitals’ priorities and circumstances

15. Insufficient attention to “post-incident recovery” (i.e., the restoration of critical infrastructure, supply systems, and social order; housing challenges; psychological recovery; and economic development)

16. The continuing difficulty of coordinating a variety of counter-terrorism agencies and ensuring that intelligence is shared between and among them

17. The easy availability of satellite imagery of sensitive sites

18. The lack of grants by the Department of Homeland Security to the nuclear industry

19. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s need to do a better job of communicating security threats to the industry

20. Many, if not most, companies lack a “culture of preparedness”

21. The inability of the private sector to provide needed goods and services in a crisis due to government red tape
22. Paying security guards at critical infrastructure facilities and potential corporate terror targets minimum wage

23. The inability of corporate security professionals who have left government service to keep their security clearances

24. Preparedness is not a focus; the emphasis tends to be on responding once a crisis occurs, as opposed to trying to prevent one or to prepare for one

25. The lack of an “Angelina Jolie of preparedness”, i.e., a prominent person who can make the issue a real and urgent national priority, like Al Gore has done for climate change

26. The need for “trained” volunteers

27. Foreign workers at airports, especially those in sensitive jobs or who work in sensitive parts of the airport

   Certainly, the fact that a given worker is a foreign, or even that a given worker is an illegal alien, is not necessarily a security risk. As Timothy McVeigh, John Walker Lindh, and Adam Gadahn illustrate, even Americans can be terrorists.

   But, in the post-911 world, the same reason that only American citizens, and those legal immigrants who are permanent residents, can serve in our armed forces applies to known terror targets like airports. Nowadays, at least those airport workers who perform sensitive jobs and/or have access to sensitive areas should likewise be American citizens or, at least, legal aliens, so as to minimize the risk they pose to national security. (The same rationale applies to those with access to sensitive areas of other potential terror targets like ports, mass transit systems, critical infrastructure, and iconic sites and entities.)

28. The lack of a biometrics-based identification system for transportation workers and others who work in sensitive sites
29. The fact that airline crews can bypass the screening checkpoint under certain circumstances

30. Minimal screening of air cargo for explosives

It is only a matter of time before terrorists attempt to exploit the gaping hole in aviation security posed by the presently minimal screening of air cargo. Per a law signed last year, the TSA is to screen 100% of air cargo by 2010. But, terrorists may not wait that long before exploiting the loophole. And, Secretary Chertoff has said that he intends to implement the requirement by allowing airlines and/or third party contractors to do at least some of the screening. 9/11 proves that, left to its own devices, the private sector will prioritize profit at the expense of security. All screening should be done by TSA.

31. If New York City is any guide, the fact that at least some federal security directors, and other key partners who share responsibility for aviation security, are unaware of screeners’ performance on undercover tests of their ability to spot concealed weapons

32. If New York City is any guide, the fact that at least some federal security directors, and other key partners who share responsibility for aviation security, are unaware of the degree to which flights are covered by air marshals

33. The ease with which air marshals on flights can be detected

34. Low pay for airport screeners

35. The fact that the control of airport terminals can be dispersed among a number of operators, making mandated and coordinated security measures more difficult

36. Limited time devoted to airport screener training

37. Too few airport screeners nationwide
Though Congress has lifted the 45,000 nationwide cap on the number of airport screeners, there are still too few. Federal Security Directors at airports should have the flexibility to hire as many screeners as they think they need to handle their respective screening workloads. To do otherwise is potentially to imperil aviation security. Retired police officers and military veterans should be favored in recruiting.

38. The tendency to confuse “vulnerability assessments” with “risk assessments,” when what matters most is not risk but a given potential target’s vulnerability to any given risk.

39. Voluntary self-regulation programs like the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program.

Left to their own devices, companies will not regulate themselves, exposing potentially the whole nation to a security risk.

40. The inability of present day and “next generation” radiation scanning technology at seaports to detect shielded radiation and to distinguish between deadly radiation and harmless radiation.

41. No scanning of “roll-on/roll-off” cargo at seaports.

42. Laying aside the efficacy of scanning technology, the fact that cargo can sit at the port un-scanned for weeks.

43. The lack of centralized policy making and research and development at the Department of Homeland Security as regards maritime security.

44. Under-funding the Coast Guard.

45. No plan to mitigate a dirty bomb approaching a port.

46. The threat of an attack from a small boat, a la the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, given that we know nothing about the hundreds of thousands of recreational craft in our waterways.
47. Our lack of knowledge about those who service ships, along with the lack of scanning of provisions and no security validation of the companies that supply the provisions

48. Our lack of knowledge about vessel agents, those who board ships, take off the bill of lading and manifest, and deliver those documents to Customs

49. Our lack of knowledge about the security bona fides of crew members, who tend overwhelmingly to be foreigners

50. The lack of certification for bomb detection dogs

51. The 24 hours it takes to analyze bio-watch results taken from mass transit stations

52. The lengthy and complex procurement process

**General Concerns:**

1. The conviction that another terror attack is inevitable

2. Creeping complacency as regards the possibility of another terror attack

3. The nation’s continued vulnerability to improvised explosive devices

4. The nation’s continued vulnerability to suicide bombers

5. The likely appeal to terrorists of mass transit systems

6. The nation’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks

7. The fear that the better prepared a given city may be for terrorism the more likely terrorists are to bypass that city and to target another, otherwise known as the “displacement effect”

8. Whether randomness or an “absolutist” approach is a more effective counterterrorism strategy
Notes


7. Kelly noted that the mastermind of the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, Mohammed Siddiqui Khan, planned the attack from Leeds.


9. Fortunately, albeit belatedly, the Bush Administration has moved in this direction, authorizing the use of up to 50% of certain fiscal year 2009 homeland security grant program funding to pay for overtime, new employees, and other personal costs.


11. The Office of Management and Budget has recently cleared a TSA proposal that would impose certain security requirements on operators of general aviation aircraft over 12,500 pounds.

EXHIBIT A

The Agenda
New York City’s Preparedness for Terrorism and Catastrophic Natural Disasters

Monday, December 3, 2007

Welcoming Remarks – 9:00 a.m. – 9:15 a.m.

Susan V. Berresford
President, The Ford Foundation

Clark Kent Ervin,
Director, Homeland Security Program, The Aspen Institute

Keynote Address – 9:15 a.m. – 10:15 a.m.

The Honorable Raymond W. Kelly –
Commissioner, New York City Police Department.

Break – 10:15 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

Aviation Security – 10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Jeanne Olivier
General Manager of Aviation Security and Technology
The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

Charles G. Slepian
Foreseeable Risk Analysis Center

Lunch – 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.

Port Security – 1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m.

Beth Ann Rooney
Security Manager
Port of New York and New Jersey

Kenneth E. Winkler
Terminal Manager/Facility Security Officer
Manhattan Cruise Terminal, Ports America
Break – 2:30 p.m. – 2:45 p.m.

Mass Transit Security – 2:45 p.m. – 4:15 p.m.

William Rooney
Vice President, Security Strategy and Special Operations
Amtrak

Owen Monaghan
Deputy Chief for Transit
New York Police Department

Michael Balboni
Deputy Secretary for Public Safety
State of New York

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Critical Infrastructure, Icons, and Soft Targets – 9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

Ron Shindel
Vice President, Public Safety and Quality of Life
Times Square Alliance

Richard Mosquera
Director of Security Services
Con Edison

Christopher L. Kelley
Director, Nuclear Security
Entergy Corporation (Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant)

Doug Walters
Senior Director – Security
The Nuclear Energy Institute

Moustafa Fawzy
Director of Emergency Response and Technical Assessment
New York City Department of Environmental Protection
Break – 10:30 a.m. – 10:45 p.m.

Critical Infrastructure, Icons, and Soft Targets (continued) – 10:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Mark Codd  
*Chief Security Office*  
*Siemens, U.S.*

Leslie G. Wiser, Jr.  
*Director of Security*  
*Prudential Center*

Michael McCann  
*McCann Protective Services, LLC*

Chip Smith  
*Managing Director, Corporate Security*  
*The Bank of New York Mellon*

Pete Dowling  
*Senior Vice President, Operational Risk Management*  
*AXA Equitable*

Lunch – 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.

Preventers and Responders – 1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m.

David Cohen  
*Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence*  
*New York City Police Department*

Michael Puzziferri  
*Acting Chief of Counterterrorism & Emergency Preparedness*  
*New York City Fire Department*

Kelly McKinney  
*Deputy Commissioner for Planning and Preparedness*  
*New York City Office of Emergency Management*
Isaac B. Weisfuse, MD, MPH  
Deputy Commissioner, Division of Disease Control  
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

Jerome M. Hauer  
Former Head of the Office of Emergency Management in New York City

**Break** – 2:30 p.m. –2:45 p.m.

**Preventers and Responders (continued)** – 2:45 p.m. –4:15 p.m.

Mark J. Mershon  
Assistant Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (New York City Office)

Brigadier General F. David Sheppard  
Director, New York State Office of Homeland Security

Matthew Matia  
Deputy Regional Administrator for Region II  
Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) in New York City

R. P. Eddy  
Managing Director, Gerson Lehrmann Group;  
Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism, and Executive Director  
Center for Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute

**Wednesday, December 5, 2007**

**Non–Governmental Organizations** – 9:00 a.m. –10:30 a.m.

Noah Simon  
Red Cross Coordinated Assistance Network

Terry Bischoff  
American Red Cross in Greater New York

Kathryn Wylde  
President & CEO  
Partnership for New York City
Pamela Delaney  
New York City Police Foundation

John J. Tierney  
Executive Vice President, Local Membership Coordinator  
New York Metro InfraGard Alliance

**Break** – 10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.

**Natural Disaster Preparedness** – 10:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Dr. Mitchell Moss  
**Taub Urban Research Center,**  
**Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service**  
**Project on Cities, Communications, and Catastrophes:**  
**Improving Robustness and Resiliency**

Dr. Irwin Redlener  
**Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness**  
**Associate Dean for Public Health Advocacy and Disaster Preparedness**  
**Professor of Clinical Public Health and Pediatrics**  
**Mailman School of Public Health**  
**Columbia University**

David Kaufman  
**Director of the Preparedness Policy, Planning and Analysis Division**  
**National Preparedness Directorate,**  
**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**

Johanna Schneider  
**Executive Director–External Relations**  
**Business Roundtable Partnership for Disaster Response**

Timothy Hall  
**Physical Scientist**  
**NASA Goddard Institute Space Studies**

**Lunch** – 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.
Recovery and Resilience – 1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m.

Stephen E. Flynn

*Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies*
*Council on Foreign Relations*

Matt Statler

*Associate Director*
*International Center for Enterprise Preparedness (InterCEP), New York University*

**Closing Remarks and Adjourn**
EXHIBIT B

The Participants’ Bios
New York City’s Preparedness for Terrorism and Catastrophic Natural Disasters

Susan V. Berresford

Susan V. Berresford chairs the board of directors of United States Artists. She was named president of the Ford Foundation in 1996. One of the largest foundations in the United States, the Ford Foundation supports programs around the world that strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement.

At the time of her election as president, Ms. Berresford was executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Ford Foundation. She joined the foundation in 1970 as a project assistant in the Division of National Affairs. Between 1972 and 1980 she served as a program officer in that division. In 1980 she was named officer in charge of the foundation’s women’s programs. She became vice president for the foundation’s U.S. and International Affairs programs in 1981 and subsequently served as vice president of the program division in charge of worldwide programming for the foundation from 1989.

Under Ms. Berresford’s leadership, the Ford Foundation has launched a major new graduate fellowship program for thousands of marginalized men and women around the world, a national initiative to support individual artists, and major investment in efforts to bring homeownership and matched savings to tens of thousands of low-income Americans. The foundation has also provided prime funding for the International Center for Transitional Justice, which helps societies emerging from conflict to promote justice and secure sustainable peace, and for coalitions to promote affirmative action and global work on HIV/AIDS. Ms. Berresford has also led the foundation’s efforts to support the creation and capitalization of nearly two dozen new foundations around the world, including the African-led and governed TrustAfrica.

Prior to joining the foundation, Ms. Berresford served as a program officer for the Neighborhood Youth Corps from 1965 until 1967. In 1967–68 she worked for the Manpower Career Development Agency, where she was responsible for the evaluation of training, education, and work programs.
Ms. Berresford attended Vassar College and then studied American history at Radcliffe College, where she graduated cum laude in 1965.

Ms. Berresford is a board member of the Independent Sector. She is an advisory board member of the Trinidad Trust Fund (California) and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, the European Foundation Centre’s Governing Council, and Trinity Church Vestry (New York). Ms. Berresford is also the convener of the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/Dioxin.

Clark Kent Ervin


A native Houstonian, he served in the state government of Texas from 1995 to 2001, first as Assistant Secretary of State, and then as a Deputy Attorney General.

He has practiced law twice in the private sector, with the Houston based firms of Vinson & Elkins, and Locke, Liddell, & Sapp, respectively.


In addition to his work at The Aspen Institute, Mr. Ervin is a member of the Wartime Contracting Commission on Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also an on-air analyst and contributor at CNN, where he focuses on homeland security, national security, and intelligence issues. He is frequently cited as an expert on these matters by major national and international publications, including The Wall Street Journal, Time.

Mr. Ervin serves on the Board of Advisers of Clear Path Technologies, Inc. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, and the American Association of Rhodes Scholars.

Raymond W. Kelly

Raymond W. Kelly was appointed Police Commissioner of the City of New York by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, making Commissioner Kelly the first person to hold the post for a second, separate tenure. Commissioner Kelly was formerly Senior Managing Director, Global Corporate Security, at Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. Before that, he served as Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, where he managed the agency’s 20,000 employees and $20 billion in annual revenue. For his accomplishments at Customs, Commissioner Kelly was awarded the Alexander Hamilton Medal for Exceptional Service. From 1996-98, Commissioner Kelly was Under Secretary for Enforcement at the U.S. Treasury Department. There he supervised the Department’s enforcement bureaus, including the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. In addition, Mr. Kelly served on the executive committee and was elected Vice President for the Americas of Interpol, the international police organization, from 1996-2000. He served previously as Director of the International Police Monitors in Haiti, a U.S. led force responsible for ending human rights abuses and establishing an interim police force there. For this service, Commissioner Kelly was awarded the Exceptionally Meritorious Service Commendation by the President of the United States and the Commander’s Medal for Public Service by the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff. Commissioner Kelly spent 31 years in the New York City Police Department, serving in 25 different commands and as Police Commissioner from 1992-1994.
A combat veteran of the Vietnam War, Commissioner Kelly retired as a Colonel from the Marine Corps Reserves after 30 years of service. He holds a BBA from Manhattan College, a JD from St. John’s University School of Law, an LLM from New York University Graduate School of Law and an MPA from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has received honorary degrees from Marist College, Manhattan College, the College of St. Rose, St. John’s University and the State University of New York.

Jeanne Olivier

Jeanne Olivier is the General Manager of the Port Authority’s Aviation Security and Technology Division. Ms. Olivier joined the Port Authority in 1984. In addition to her current position, she also has served as manager of LaGuardia Airport’s Maintenance Services Division; manager of the former International Arrivals Building at John F. Kennedy International Airport; and manager of Newark Liberty International’s Airport Services Division. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Association of Airport Executives, and past president of its Northeast Chapter. Recently, Ms. Olivier, a Plainsboro, N.J., resident who has been with the Port Authority for more than 20 years, took a one-year leave of absence from the agency to assist the Iraqi government as it begins to rebuild its airports so that Iraq can attract commercial airline service and revitalize its aviation industry.

Charles G. Slepian

Slepian is a native New Yorker who was raised and educated in New York City. After graduating from New York City’s public schools he went on to receive a Bachelors degree from the City of College of New York, a Master’s Degree from New York’s St. John’s University and a Juris Doctor from the Fordham Law School.

After five years service as a New York City public school teacher, he served 7 years in the administration of Mayor John V. Lindsay as a mayoral aide involved in community affairs and the monitoring of demonstrations and civil disorders during the highly charged Viet Nam War and Civil Rights protest eras. He advanced to become the City’s first
director of tourism and deputy chief of protocol as a deputy commissioner of New York City’s Department of Public Events.

Joining the private sector in 1974, Slepian was later called upon to assist in the development of broad security policies for Trans World Airlines in 1986, where he served as security consultant to the company’s chairman putting in place programs designed to secure the company’s property and ensure the safety and security of its employees and passengers on a system-wide basis.

In response to the attack on Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, Slepian submitted an evaluation of the state of security in domestic airports to the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism on behalf of the International Criminal Law Center, Fordham Law School. His work was acknowledged by the Committee as foreseeing basic legal issues of commercial aviation security some of which have since 9/11 been embodied in federal law. In 1996, he was asked to contribute further recommendations in response to the loss of TWA 800 over the Atlantic Ocean within days of the event; he once again asked for federal responsibility for the securing of commercial airports.

Recognized as an expert on issues of liability for security negligence, he regularly writes on security issues while continuing to consult and speak on issues of homeland security in general and aviation security in particular. A regular contributor to the national discourse on aviation security, Slepian focuses on the development of the Foreseeable Risk Analysis Center and its web site (www.frac.com) designed to expand public knowledge on issues of homeland security.

**Bethann Rooney**

Bethann Rooney is the Manager, Port Security for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. She is responsible for implementing and managing a comprehensive port security program to avoid and/or minimize losses associated with a natural or manmade disasters or criminal activity. Beth works with local stakeholders and federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to develop initiatives to address the areas of awareness, prevention, protection, response and recovery including Operation Safe Commerce, port security grants, demonstrations of new technology and the preparation of security plans and vulnerability
assessments. Actively involved in the legislative and regulatory processes, Beth has often been called upon to testify before Congress regarding port and maritime security. Beth is the Chair of the Area Maritime Security Committee for the Port of New York and New Jersey and a member of the Commercial Operators Advisory Committee (COAC) and National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) TWIC Working Group.

Beth is a graduate of the State University of New York Maritime College with a Bachelors Degree in Marine Transportation, a Masters Degree in International Transportation Management and qualifications as a Third Mate.

She has held several positions in the Port Commerce Department of the Port Authority including stints in Operations, Property Management, Intermodal and Technology Planning. Prior to joining the Port Authority in 1993, Beth worked as a port captain / steamship agent in several deep-water ports.

**Ken Winkler**

Ken Winkler is a retired Detective from the N.Y.P.D. He served 21 years with the department, the last 16 of which he was assigned to the Emergency Service Unit. He was part of the unit’s counter sniper team, and has been trained in advanced dignitary protection. Ken has worked as an instructor with the NYPD’s specialized training school teaching public safety diving, auto extrication and high-rise rescue, hostage rescue and recovery. He is currently an EMT-D and a PADI assistant instructor. Ken was part of the rescue teams that worked the 1993 World Trade Center attack and in 1995 responded with NY-TF 1 to the Oklahoma City bombing. In 2002 he was awarded the Medal of Valor for his actions on 9-11-01. Ken is a certified canine handler specializing in explosive detection.

Since January 2004, Ken has served as the Facility Security Officer for the Manhattan Cruise Terminal. The terminal serves approximately one million passengers and crew as well as hosting numerous high-profile events.
William Rooney

William Rooney is Amtrak Vice President of Security, and the head of the Office of Security Strategy and Special Operations (OSSSO). Prior to serving in this capacity, he was Senior Counter Terrorism and Intelligence Advisor in Amtrak Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Rooney came to Amtrak after serving in a distinguished career in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations.

Mr. Rooney has lived a number of years in foreign countries, and speaks several languages.

Owen J. Monaghan

Deputy Chief Owen J. Monaghan has been a member of the NYPD for over 26 years. He is currently assigned as the Executive Officer of the 2600 member Transit Bureau. The Transit Bureau is responsible for policing the 468 subway stations and 28 separate lines on which 4.8 million people ride daily. He has been a Commanding Officer of Transit Districts 1 and 34 encompassing the Times Square and Coney Island subway complexes. His experience also includes commanding the 109th Precinct and the Resource Analysis Section of the Office of Management Analysis & Planning.

Chief Monaghan received his bachelor’s degree from the State University of New York College at Oneonta and is a graduate of Columbia University’s Police Management Institute. His training includes the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center’s Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Course, the US Department of Transportation’s Transit System Security Course and the American Society of Industrial Security’s Assets Protection Course I, II & III.

He is a Certified Protection Professional, (CPP) and his professional affiliations include the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the American Association of Professional Law Enforcement and the American Society of Industrial Security.
Michael Balboni

Governor Eliot Spitzer appointed Michael Balboni as Deputy Secretary for Public Safety in January 2007. Mr. Balboni is the administration’s senior homeland security and law enforcement official. A sampling of the state agencies which report to him are: Office of Homeland Security, Division of State Police, Division of Military and Naval Affairs, Department of Correctional Services, Division of Criminal Justice Services, and the State Emergency Management Office.

Prior to accepting this appointment, Michael Balboni represented the 7th Senate District, located in Nassau County, since 1997. Previously he served in the State Assembly for eight years.

In the Senate, he chaired the Committee on Veterans, Homeland Security and Military Affairs where he led the enactment of several new anti-terrorism laws in New York State that criminalize acts of biological and chemical terrorism, set up security requirements for small airports and established procedures for securing chemical plants against terrorist attacks.

In March 2004, then-federal Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge appointed then-Senator Balboni to a national Task Force that examined the flow of homeland security dollars from the federal government to local communities. In 2005, he was named a Senior Fellow of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University and was appointed co-chairman of the Executive Task Force on Homeland Security of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).

In 2006, Senator Balboni was appointed to the State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee (SLSAC) of the United States Homeland Security Advisory Council. In that role he helps to leverage the ingenuity and expertise of state, local and tribal leaders to provide federal Advisory Council members with the best possible advice on a range of homeland security issues. He was also appointed a member of the Board of Advisors of the Homeland Security Management Institute of Long Island University.

Michael Balboni resides in East Williston, Long Island with his wife Stephanie and their 4 children.
Ron Shindel

Ron Shindel, Deputy Inspector (NYPD-Retired), was the commanding officer for a select group of investigators who were assigned to the World Trade Center Recovery site on September 13, 2001, until that group was disbanded on January 29, 2002. Positioned at every station of the site, the group worked two shifts around the clock without scheduled days off and was responsible for the verifiable information made available to the public. In 2002, after 21 years with the NYPD, Ron was recruited to the American Stock Exchange as Senior Vice President in charge of Security, Property Management, and Business Continuity. He is currently the Vice President for Public Safety and Quality of Life for the Times Square Management District, a not-for-profit business improvement company providing services to member constituents with a combined annual economic output of $53 Billion. Ron also heads the Times Square Security Council, a group of security professionals within the constituent district with the emphasis on counter-terrorism, safety, and crime reduction. He also works with KKP, a strategic planning firm, where he lectures and advises on national security, law enforcement, and leadership during crisis management to candidates for public office and sitting members of Congress. He graduated first in his class at Hofstra University, summa cum laude, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

Richard Mosquera

We live with the reality that New York City in general and Wall Street in particular house the most critical economic infrastructure in the country. Con Ed is a viable target and someone could disrupt the viability,” explains Rick Mosquera, Con Ed’s Director of Corporate Security.

Con Ed has exceeded compliance requirements. In a new facility security cameras and the monitoring center will be used to check critical gauges and readings without physically visiting those locations. The operating units will also record repair processes and maintenance and monitor ongoing work activity at street levels through the security surveillance system.
Keeping up with mandates such as the TWIC (Transportation Worker Identity Card) credentialing requirements (Con Ed has waterside facilities) and the cost to administer these programs demands management. The biggest challenge Mosquera sees for our industry: “We must avoid complacency.”

Christopher L. Kelley

Christopher L. Kelley has served as director of Nuclear Security for the Entergy Corporation of Jackson, MS since 2000. He is responsible for security at Entergy’s fleet of 11 nuclear reactors.

Prior to working at Entergy Mr. Kelley served as Corporate Security Manager of the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority in Chattanooga, TN. While there he was responsible for Security at TVA’s fleet of 6 nuclear reactors. Prior to his career in Nuclear Security he served in the US Army and as a police officer. Mr. Kelley earned a Bachelors Degree in Political Science from East Tennessee State University and a Masters Degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Tennessee.

Douglas J. Walters

Doug Walters is a Senior Director at the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the industry organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry.

He has 28 years experience in the nuclear power industry where his responsibilities have run the gamut of nuclear plant construction, licensing and operations. He has been with NEI and its predecessor organizations since 1991, responsible for the management of a number of regulatory issues including the maintenance rule, license renewal and security. He assumed his current position as Senior Director in 2005 and is responsible for oversight of nuclear plant security.

In his tenure at NEI, Mr. Walters has led industry efforts in areas including license renewal rulemaking, guidance for preparing an environmental impact statement for license renewal and guidance for preparing an early site permit. He was instrumental in leading industry security efforts in response to the 9/11 events including strategies for implementing numerous security orders.
Prior to joining NEI, Mr. Walters was with Pennsylvania Power & Light Company in various engineering and licensing positions in support of the construction and operation of the Susquehanna nuclear power plant.

Mr. Walters is a graduate of York College of Pennsylvania (Bachelor of Science in Engineering Management).

**Moustafa Fawzy**

Moustafa Fawzy is the Director of the Division of Emergency Response and Technical Assessment for the Department of Environmental Protection, one of the few scientific first responder groups in the Nation. He responds with team personnel regularly to high threat CBRNE/ HazMat emergencies in NYC and the surrounding counties. Division CBRNE first responders are readily deployed in conjunction with the NYPD Emergency Services Unit and Counter Terrorism Bureau personnel for high profile incidents and special events such as the UN General Assembly, Fleet Week, and US Open. During such events his group conducts air dispersion plume modeling using real time meteorological stations and deploys specialized chemical, biological and radiological early detection devices. This group is the only unit charged with performing invasive sampling at suspicious substance incidents in NYC. Under his leadership the Division has designed a State of the art lab with high Tech instrumentation used for identifying chemical, radiological and explosive substances. In addition to emergency response, Moustafa is also the program manager of field operations for the NYC Biowatch Program, which operates under presidential directive 18. He also directs the inspection of chemical facilities in NYC and was responsible for developing the first online secure database on over 7000 facilities in NYC which provides real time access for emergency responders.

Moustafa received his Bachelor of Engineering in Chemical Engineering from Manhattan College in 1988. He is a Master level Certified Hazardous Materials Manager and member of the Local Emergency Planning Committee, Hazardous Substances Advisory Board, Biological Action Committee and Radiological Response and Recovery working group. His greatest accomplishment and enjoyment is in the fathering of his three sons and coaching soccer.
Mark B. Codd

Mr. Mark B. Codd was born and raised in New York City, and received his Bachelor of Arts Degree from Manhattan College. Mr. Codd subsequently obtained his Master of Arts Degree from the University of Detroit, and later was awarded a Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University in Lansing, Michigan.

Mr. Codd began his career with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in April, 1972 and was assigned as an investigative Special Agent in the Detroit Field Office. In 1986, Mr. Codd was promoted to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. as a Supervisory Special Agent, and in 1991 was again promoted and transferred to New York City to head the Public Corruption Squad in that major FBI Office.

In mid-1995 he was again promoted and transferred to FBI Headquarters as the Chief Investigator at the Office of Independent Counsel, located in Washington, D.C. He was next promoted to the position of the Chief of the FBI’s nationwide Public Corruption Unit, likewise in Washington, D.C.

In October, 1999, Mr. Codd was promoted, and returned home to become the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office. In that position his responsibilities included all personnel, training, business continuity and infrastructure needs associated with operating the largest field office in the FBI. He was so assigned during and after the events of September 11, 2001, when as part of the Executive management of the New York Office, he helped lead FBI efforts to deal with the catastrophic events of those days.

In June, 2002, Mr. Codd retired from the FBI upon completion of thirty years of service, and accepted the newly created position of Chief Security Officer at Siemens, U.S. In this role he is charged with the responsibility to keep 75,000 United States based employees of this multi-national Corporation safe and secure from a range of internal and external threats. Further, his duties include creating and supporting liaison relationships with a wide variety of governmental agencies, to include federal, state and local law enforcement organizations. He is also responsible for the creation and updating of Crisis Management Planning for Siemens, U.S.
Leslie G. Wiser, Jr.

Leslie G. Wiser, Jr. is the Director of Security and Head of Government Relations for Devils Arena Entertainment (DAE), LLC, an affiliate company of the New Jersey Devils, and he is the Director of Security for Newark’s Prudential Center, which is operated by DAE and managed by AEG Worldwide. The Prudential Center opened in October, 2007.

Mr. Wiser accepted the position with DAE in February 2007 after nearly 28 years of law enforcement and intelligence experience with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Navy. Following nomination by his peers and by the Director of the FBI, President Bush recognized Mr. Wiser’s sustained exceptional performance in February, honoring him with the Presidential Rank of Meritorious Executive for 2006.

In April 2005, Director Mueller appointed Mr. Wiser as Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Newark Division, the FBI’s 7th largest field office. As SAC, he was responsible for all FBI investigations, operations, and administration in 18 of New Jersey’s 21 counties.

Mr. Wiser joined the FBI in 1983, serving in the Minneapolis Division and the Washington Field Office. In 1994, the Director of Central Intelligence awarded Mr. Wiser the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement for leading the espionage investigation of CIA officer and Russian spy Aldrich Ames, for which Mr. Wiser’s squad was given a Meritorious Unit Citation. Later, Mr. Wiser served as liaison to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees, coordinated worldwide FBI espionage investigations, and led the Special Operations Branch at the Washington Field Office. In 2000, he was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and reported to the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters as the Chief of Training, Outreach, and Strategy for the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). At the NIPC, he published a plan and guide, acclaimed by the White House, to protect the data and communications systems of the nation’s 18,000 police departments.

In 2002, Director Mueller dispatched Mr. Wiser to Los Angeles as Inspector-in-Charge, conducting national security investigations involving the penetration of the Los Angeles Division by the People’s Republic of China. His successful efforts resulted in his receipt of the
prestigious Director’s Award for Outstanding Investigation. Thereafter, Mr. Wiser was named SAC of the Columbia Division, responsible for all FBI matters in South Carolina, where, among other accomplishments, he was recognized for initiating a highly effective gang task force.

From 1979 to 1983, Mr. Wiser served in the U.S. Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps aboard the USS Fulton and at the Naval Submarine Base, New London, Groton, CT, where he rose to be the Head Prosecutor. Mr. Wiser was admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1979. He received a J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1979, and he graduated *cum laude* from Allegheny College with a B.A. in 1976. He is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, serving on the Private Sector Liaison Committee and the ad hoc Committee on Computer Crime and Digital Evidence. He is also an original Board Member of the Newark Police Foundation. Mr. Wiser has been married for 29 years. He and his wife have two children.

**Michael McCann, Esq.**

Michael McCann, the former Chief of Security of the United Nations, is the President of McCann Protective Services, LLC. The company delivers discrete and customized security services for the diplomatic community, corporate executives, celebrities and their families. In addition to Executive Protection, services include threat – risk - vulnerability assessments, investigations, computer forensics, training and counter security sweeps.

As Chief of Security, Mr. McCann was responsible for the protection of delegates, staff, visiting dignitaries, and other visitors at the United Nations headquarters and at conferences and meetings organized by the United Nations held in the United States and overseas. In addition to his responsibilities for the safety of the Secretary-General and other senior UN officials, Mr. McCann provided strategic and executive direction for UN security operations, including emergency preparedness, crisis management plans and the development of uniform security standards and practices for UN offices globally. The UN Security and Safety Service is recognized internationally for its diversity, professionalism and ability to carry out its missions under challenging circumstances.
Mr. McCann is a former senior ranking officer from the New York City Police Department. Prior to working at the UN, McCann was a Commanding Officer of the Intelligence Division’s Dignitary Protection and Threat Assessment Units, responsible for the protection of national and international officials visiting New York City. Previously as the Commanding Officer of the 25th Police Precinct he was responsible for all police service in East Harlem. A 26-year veteran of the New York City Police Department, Mr. McCann began his career as a Police Officer.

Mr. McCann is also a member of the International Association of the Chief of Police (IACP) and serves on the International Policing Division Steering Committee, the New York State Bar Association, the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS), the National Law Enforcement Association and the NYPD Captains Endowment Association.

Mr. McCann received a Jurist Doctorate degree from New York Law School and a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from the City University of New York’s John Jay College of Criminal Justice. He is the President of John Jay’s Alumni Association.

**Chip Smith**

Chip Smith assumed his duties as Director of Global Security for the Bank of New York Mellon in February 2000. He directs and supervises a worldwide security program that encompasses the investigation and prevention of fraud related activities as well as the physical protection of corporate assets, employees, customers and executives. He serves on the Bank’s Crisis Management, Business Continuity, Contingency Planning and Anti-Money Laundering Teams. The Bank of New York Mellon is a global leader in the financial markets.

Mr. Smith retired from the United States Secret Service after 24 years of service. He held a variety of positions in field offices and headquarters, culminating with his appointment as the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office, the Service’s largest and busiest office.

During his career, Mr. Smith was assigned to the Vice Presidential Protective Division, the Presidential Protective Division and as the Special Assistant to the Treasury Secretary. He served as the security coordinator for several high profile protective venues, to include: the

Mr. Smith serves as a board member for Argyle Security, the American Academy For Professional Law Enforcement and the Marty Lyons Foundation. Mr. Smith also serves on the advisory boards for The College of Saint Elizabeth, Convent Station, NJ; the Federal Law Enforcement Foundation (NY); and the Nashville Songwriters Hall of Fame Foundation.

Mr. Smith holds bachelors and masters degrees in Criminal Justice from West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. He and his wife Barbara have been married 36 years and reside in Madison, New Jersey.

**Peter J. Dowling**

Peter J. Dowling is Senior Vice President of Operational Risk Management of AXA Equitable. He is responsible for business continuity management, privacy, crisis management, physical and information security, and records management.

Prior to joining AXA Equitable in April, 2002, Mr. Dowling was Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) for the United States Secret Service at the Washington, D.C. Field Office. He was also SAIC of Liaison Division, and as such, was the principal, global external representative of the Secret Service. Earlier, he held other positions for the Secret Service, including Assistant SAIC in the Presidential Protective Division. Mr. Dowling held these positions successively between May 1976 and March 2002. Previously, he was a Police Officer in Montgomery County, Maryland.

Mr. Dowling received a BA degree in English from Mount Saint Mary’s College in Emmitsburg, Maryland.
Community activities include: New York City Partnership, Executive Board Member of The Bankers and Brokers Roundtable, Federal Law Enforcement Foundation, Former Executive Board Member Washington Council of Governments, Former Executive Board Member Washington/Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA).

He resides in the New York metropolitan area with his wife and three children.

David Cohen

Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly announced the appointment of David Cohen in the newly-created post of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. The Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence gathers, analyzes, and distributes intelligence, enabling the NYPD to conduct its increasingly global law enforcement operations more effectively.

“David Cohen has spent a lifetime researching, assessing, and tackling intelligence and security issues and I am confident that he will build upon his accomplishments while serving with New York’s Finest.”

“For 35 years, David Cohen helped lead the American intelligence efforts around the world,” Commissioner Kelly said. “In joining the NYPD, he provides a distinguished record of achievement in the field of security and the vision and ability to anticipate and prevent threats from materializing. David has a strong reputation for forging ties and working effectively with other government agencies, foreign governments, and the private sector, and his drawing upon those strengths and contacts will greatly benefit the City as he directs the Police Department’s intelligence efforts.”

Prior to his appointment, Cohen was at American International Group, a global financial services firm where he had served since November 2000. He spent 35 years with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before joining the firm. During his career at the CIA, Cohen guided the agency’s operations and analysis functions. He also served as the senior CIA official in the New York area.
From 1995 to 1997, Cohen directed the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, where he oversaw the agency’s worldwide operations, managed the CIA’s global network of offices and personnel, and maintained agency relationships with foreign intelligence and security services. From 1991 to 1995, Cohen was deputy director of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, where he guided the agency’s analysis program, which reviewed every political, economic, and military assessment prepared by the CIA for the President and his senior national security advisors. Cohen’s career at the CIA was marked by his leadership in combating global terrorism, international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Cohen received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Northeastern University in 1963 and a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Boston University in 1965.

**Michael Puzziferri**

Michael Puzziferri is the Acting Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness for the Fire Department of the City of New York. In his 29-year career, Chief Puzziferri has gained enough of an experience in traditional emergency operations to understand that leading first responders in the post 9/11 world requires they become first preventers against acts of terrorism. Toward this end, Chief Puzziferri completes his thesis “The FDNY-DHS Intelligence Enterprise,” a study in practical research, for the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s Master of Arts Degree Program at the Naval Post Graduate School. In his spare time, Chief Puzziferri serves on the DHS/Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Steering Committee, The Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Council, and the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. Chief Puzziferri was a member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement’s Scientific Committee SC2-1 that composed Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism (NCRP Commentary No. 19). In addition, he has authored a study entitled “The Effects of the Electromagnetic Pulse on the Operations of the Fire Department of the City of New York,” a piece that led to further research with the Department of Defense.
**Kelly R. McKinney**

Kelly McKinney is Deputy Commissioner for Planning and Preparedness at the New York City Office of Emergency Management. He is a professional engineer with twenty years experience in public and private sector engineering and management. Previously, McKinney was the Associate Commissioner for Environmental Health at the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. McKinney has an MPA from Columbia University and a BS in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Kansas.

**Isaac B. Weisfuse, MD, MPH**

Isaac B. Weisfuse is Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. He received his BA and MPH from Columbia University, and his MD from the State University of New York at Downstate. Dr. Weisfuse is board certified in Internal Medicine. He began his public health career at the Centers for Disease Control as an Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer. Since 1987, he has worked in public health in New York City at the Health Department. His current responsibilities include prevention and control of communicable diseases, including HIV/AIDS, TB, and STDs, as well as emergency preparedness, and public health laboratory services, through oversight of the Division of Disease Control. This Division has approximately 1,500 employees, with an annual budget in excess of $350 million. Dr. Weisfuse has extensive public health emergency experience, and served as agency incident commander during the World Trade Center Crisis. He is in charge of pandemic flu planning for the City of New York.

**Jerome M. Hauer**

Jerome M. Hauer is the Chief Executive Officer of the Hauer Group. The Hauer Group provides consulting services in the areas of Homeland Security, Emergency Management and Public Health and Medical Planning, Training and Response to disasters and assists a variety of companies in achieving their strategic mission in these areas. The Hauer group assists governments worldwide in developing plans for managing terrorist incidents.
Hauer was most recently the Director of the Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute (READI) at The George Washington University. Appointed as the institute’s first director Mr. Hauer was working with the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate and deliver first responder, medical and public health training for the National Capital Region (NCR).

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy G. Thompson named Jerome M. Hauer as Acting Assistant Secretary for the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness in 2002. In this role, Hauer was responsible for coordinating the country’s medical and public health preparedness in response to emergencies, including acts of biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism. The office oversees over $1 billion dollars per year in bioterrorism preparedness grant funding for state and local governments. Before his appointment as Acting Assistant Secretary in June, Mr. Hauer had served as Director of the Office of Public Health Preparedness. Mr. Hauer also served as senior advisor to the Secretary for National Security and Emergency Management during the events of September 11, 2001, and the nation’s anthrax crisis.

Before coming to HHS, Mr. Hauer was named by Mayor Rudolf Giuliani’s as New York City’s first Director of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) for the City of New York. During his tenure at OEM, Mr. Hauer was charged with coordinating the city’s planning for and response to natural and man-made events, including acts of terrorism. New York became the first city to develop a bioterrorism response plan and to do large-scale bioterrorism exercises. New York City, under Hauer’s leadership, also pioneered surveillance systems for detecting unusual health events. New York has, for years, been recognized as being in the forefront of preparedness for terrorism.

Mr. Hauer has a Master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and a Bachelor’s Degree from New York University. Mr. Hauer is the recipient of numerous honors, including Outstanding Alumni of the Year from the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, the Distinguished Alumni Award from NYU, The New York State Conspicuous Service Medal, the Police Service Award-United States Capitol Police, and the Indiana Commendation Medal for
Exceptional Meritorious Service, Legion of Hoosier Heroes Award. In 1998 he and the Office of Emergency Management were included in the Federal Emergency Management’s Compendium of Exemplary Practices for New York City’s Terrorism Preparedness Initiative. He is a member of the New York City Police Department’s Honor Legion, and is an honorary Assistant Chief in the New York City Fire Department. Mr. Hauer has coauthored forty-six (46) publications, three (3) books/chapters and two (2) monographs.

Mark J. Mershon

Washington D.C. - Director Robert S. Mueller, III, today announced the appointment of Mark J. Mershon to the position of Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) of the New York Office. As ADIC, Mr. Mershon will head the FBI’s largest field office, overseeing more than 2,000 FBI employees and a region composed of the five boroughs of New York City, and the counties of Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, Sullivan, and Westchester.

Director Muller said, “Mr. Mershon is no stranger to the New York area, and brings a wide range of investigative and management experience to the position.”

After joining the FBI as a Special Agent in 1975, Mershon was assigned to the New York Office. From 1980 to 1991 he worked on White Collar Crime in the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Drugs and Organized Crime in Miami, and then served as Unit Chief of the Fugitive/Government Reservation Crimes Unit, CID. He served as the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Division from 1992 to 1997, and as Chief Inspector in the Inspection Division from 1997 to 1999. In 1999, he was designated Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Denver Field Office, responsible for Colorado and Wyoming. He has served as SAC of the San Francisco Office since 2002.

Prior to joining the FBI, Mr. Mershon worked for Touche Ross and Company, where he served as a Senior Accountant. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, in 1973.
Director Mueller said, “Mark Mershon has the commitment, innovation, and leadership that the New York Office needs to navigate changing threats and successfully evolve the challenging mission of the FBI. I look forward to working with him in his new position.”

Mark J. Mershon is a 1973 graduate of the University of Notre Dame

F. David Sheppard

Brigadier General F. David Sheppard is the Director of the New York State Office of Homeland Security. He is also assigned as the Deputy Commander of the New York Army National Guard, Division of Military and Naval Affairs.

General Sheppard served as the Joint Task Force “Dual Hat” Commander in support of the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City. He also coordinated the joint New York State Organized Militia Force emergency response to civil authorities during the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.

General Sheppard began his military career in 1970 by attending U.S. Army Basic Training at Fort Polk, Louisiana

and subsequently graduating from U.S. Army Helicopter Pilot Flight School, Fort Rucker, Alabama in 1971. In 1972 after receiving his U.S. Army pilot wings, General Sheppard reported to South Vietnam and served as a combat helicopter pilot flying 841 hours during his one year tour of duty. He completed his active duty service as an Instructor Pilot at Ft. Rucker, Alabama before joining the New York Army National Guard in 1975. General Sheppard served in a variety of military assignments to include Director of Aviation and Safety, Chief of Staff, Deputy Adjutant General and Commander, 53rd Troop Command, New York Army National Guard.

General Sheppard is a native New Yorker – born in Utica and raised in the Capital District area. He received his Bachelor of Science Degree from the University of the State of New York in Albany in 1988, Certificate from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government – State and Local programs in February 2002, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks with a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies. General Sheppard is a licensed fixed-wing and rotary-wing
Commercial Pilot, a Foundation Board Member of Empire State College, and an Executive Board Member of the Boy Scouts of America Twin Rivers Council. He is also the Chair of the New York State Governor’s Executive Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the Chair of the New York State Governor’s Homeland Security Executive Council.

His military decorations and awards include the Bronze Star for Valor, the Bronze Star for Meritorious Service, an Air Medal for Valor, Fifteen Air Medals for Combat Missions, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Bronze Star, the Army Aviation Broken Wing Award, and the New York State Governor’s Medal for Valor.

General Sheppard and his wife Vicki have one daughter.

Matthew C. Matia

Mr. Matia is a native of Cleveland, OH and a graduate of Bowling Green State University (OH). He is the Deputy Regional Administrator for Region II of the Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) in New York City. Mr. Matia has worked in the emergency management community since 1987, when he joined BDM International, Inc., a professional services firm in the Washington, DC area. He worked initially as a staff member supporting exercise and training contract efforts for a wide variety of Federal government clients; including the Defense Nuclear Agency, the Department of the Army, Headquarters, US Army Corps of Engineers, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In this capacity he provided subject matter expertise in the development of emergency response training and exercise programs for his clients. He was a senior program manager for the Information and Technologies Division of TRW, Inc. prior to joining FEMA in 2002.

He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science, and was awarded a Master’s degree in Systems Management from Troy State University (AL) in 1983. Mr. Matia is also a graduate of the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Mr. Matia currently holds the rank of Brigadier General in the United States Army Reserve. He is currently assigned as the Commanding General, 11th Theater Aviation Command, headquartered at Fort Knox, KY.
R. P. Eddy

As Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism at the Manhattan Institute, R. P. Eddy founded and is Executive Director of the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) which focuses on the role of police in the fight against terror. Eddy is also CEO of Ergo, a global advisory firm which crafts custom solutions from the insights of frontline experts.

CPT leverages a global network of premier counterterrorism experts and brings their collective experience to bear on the counterterror challenges of a core group of state and local law enforcement agencies. Eddy has worked with the New York Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, the Greek Government, the United Nations and various multinational corporations on terrorism and security issues. He is a founding member of ICTAC—The International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community.

Previously, Eddy served in various posts in the US Government National Security arena and as an United Nations Diplomat. Eddy was last Senior Policy Officer to United Nations Secretary-General where, amongst other work, he helped lead the Secretary-General’s initiatives to mobilize an international response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. He was also a Managing Director at Gerson Lehrman Group and an executive at The Monitor Group. Prior to joining the UN, Eddy served variously as Director of Counterterrorism at the White House National Security Council; Chief of Staff to the US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke; Senior Advisor for Intelligence and Counterterrorism to the Secretary of Energy, and as an US representative to international negotiations including the creation of the International Criminal Court and peace negotiations in Angola and Rwanda.

Eddy is a World Economic Forum Global Leader for Tomorrow, a member of the Council of Foreign Relations, the co-chair of Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s Counterterrorism Committee, was awarded two Leland Fellowships, was selected as a Manfred-Wörner Scholar and as a Evangelische Akademie scholar. Eddy was selected by the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine as one of “100 of America’s most esteemed terrorism and national security experts.” He regularly appears on global news stations and has been a commentator on Fox News: The O’Reilly Factor, PBS: Charlie Rose, CNN: Anderson Cooper 360, NPR radio and many oth-
ers. His writing has been published in The Times of London, The National Review Online and other papers. Eddy has a BS in Neuroscience from Brown University.

**Noah Simon**

Noah Simon has served as the National Program Manager of the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN) since July 2005. He also serves as the American Red Cross’ Director of Partner Services in the Disaster Services Department where he oversees the development, management and implementation of the organization’s disaster related partnerships with non-governmental organizations. In his role with CAN, he provides management support to the program ensuring that implementation and defined activities are executed in accordance with specified CAN objectives. He is responsible for providing planning, design and implementation support to assigned program areas. He is also responsible for developing and implementing short and long-term strategies to integrate priorities into the overall CAN business plan.

Prior to his current position, Noah served from August 2001 to July 2005 in the American Red Cross’ Public Policy & Partner Relations Department (formerly the Government Relations Department) at National Headquarters. As the Senior Director for Federal Relations & Policy he was responsible for the coordination and management of partnerships between the Red Cross and Federal Agencies across all lines of service to forward the mission and strategic plan of the Red Cross. Prior to that he, served as Senior Associate for Legislative Affairs responsible for implementing the organization’s federal legislative strategies and priorities on Capitol Hill.

Before joining the Red Cross, Noah worked for the House Armed Services Committee. From 2000 to 2001 he was a Research Assistant to the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee responsible for oversight of the Department of Defense’s military construction, real estate acquisitions and disposals, housing and support, base closures, and related activities. From 1997 to 2000 he served as Staff Assistant to the Military Procurement Subcommittee.

A native of Rochester, New York, Noah received his BA degree from Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Terry Bischoff

Terry Bischoff is CEO of the American Red Cross in Greater New York (ARC/GNY). As CEO she has worked to increase emergency preparedness strategies for individuals and families as well as to reverse our culture’s low level of preparedness. Among her many goals as CEO she is working to increase the number of trained volunteers in our communities. She has also coordinated visits between the American and Israeli Red Cross Societies in an effort to exchange information and gain leading-edge technology in disaster response.

Kathryn S. Wylde

Kathryn Wylde is President & CEO of the Partnership for New York City, a nonprofit organization of the city’s business leaders, established by David Rockefeller in 1979. The Partnership is dedicated to maintaining New York City as a center of world commerce, finance and innovation. Its public policy focus is on issues in the areas of education, infrastructure and the economy.

The Partnership’s economic development arm is the New York City Investment Fund. Wylde served as founding President & CEO of this $110 million civic fund, which was established in 1996 under the leadership of Henry R. Kravis.

Wylde was also founding President & CEO of the Housing Partnership Development Corporation, serving from 1982-96. In that capacity, she was instrumental in creation of a number of pioneering initiatives in affordable housing at the local, state and national levels. Under her leadership, more than $2 billion in private funds were invested in public-private partnerships that produced affordable housing and commercial developments in economically distressed communities across the city.

An internationally known expert in housing, economic development and urban policy, Wylde serves on a number of boards and advisory groups, including the New York State Commission to Modernize the Regulation of Financial Services, the Mayor’s Sustainability Advisory Board, NYC Economic Development Corporation, The Legal Aid Society, Research Partnership for New York City Schools, NYC Leadership Academy, Governors Island Advisory Council, the
Manhattan Institute and the Biomedical Research Alliance of New York, the Special Commission on the Future of NYS Courts, Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commission for the First Judicial District. She was appointed by NYC Council Speaker Christine Quinn to the Traffic Mitigation Congestion Commission. She has authored numerous articles and policy papers and has been recognized for leadership by dozens of educational, professional and nonprofit institutions.

Wylde resides in Brooklyn and has a second home in Puerto Rico. She is a native of Madison, Wisconsin, and a graduate of St. Olaf College, ’68.

Pamela D. Delaney
Pamela D. Delaney is President of the New York City Police Foundation, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving public safety in New York City by providing resources to support the New York City Police Department.

In addition, the Foundation she is currently assisting Commissioner Kelly’s massive overhaul of the NYPD’s information systems to bring 21st century technology to crime fighting.

Before joining the Foundation in 1983, Ms. Delaney was a policy advisor to four New York City police commissioners. Her duties included directing the major expansion of civilian employees in the NYPD and chairing the Civilian Complaint Review Board. As the Foundation’s CEO, she works closely with the Police Commissioner and his staff to encourage, develop and fund innovative police projects.

Ms. Delaney is a graduate of Boston College and has graduate degrees from Columbia and Rutgers Universities.

John J. Tierney
John J. Tierney is a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) and a Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) with more than 20 years experience in information systems and security.
John is a Founder and Executive Vice President of the New York Metro InfraGard Members Alliance, an FBI program whose mission is information sharing and the security of critical infrastructure. The InfraGard has nearly 20,000 members nationwide with Alliances at each of the FBI field offices.

He is currently the Director, Information Systems & Security for a New York State water utility with responsibilities including all technology resources, disaster recovery, emergency response and communications with the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (WaterISAC).

He has performed multiple roles as an independent consultant providing technical and administrative information systems design, security auditing, assessment and evaluation, training programs as well as forensic investigation services for mid-sized and international organizations.

John is Chairman of the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) Certification Programs Committee. He has also represented the ISSA as a member of a Department of Defense working group that is seeking to create an industry-wide information security certification accreditation body. Other members of this body include the Department of Homeland Security, the Institute for Defense Analyses, ISC2, ISACA, Microsoft, Cisco and IBM.

Mitchell L. Moss

Mitchell L. Moss is the Henry Hart Rice Professor of Urban Policy and Planning at the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University. He conducts research and writes about urban government and politics, telecommunications and economic development, and the future of cities.

Mitchell Moss has been on the faculty of New York University since 1973 where he teaches “Public Policy and Planning in New York.” His essays have appeared in The New York Times, New York Daily News, Newsday, The New York Observer, and The New York Post. Professor Moss was voted The Best Teacher in 2002 by NYU Wagner students and has directed projects for the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, NYU’s Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response and leading private firms. Mitchell Moss received his B.A. from Northwestern University, M.A. from the University of Washington, and Ph.D. from the University of Southern California.

Irwin Redlener, MD

Dr. Redlener is president and co-founder, along with singer-songwriter, Paul Simon of The Children’s Health Fund, a philanthropic initiative created to develop health care programs in some of the nation’s most medically underserved urban and rural communities. He is also associate dean, professor of Clinical Public Health and Pediatrics, as well as director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health.

In his role as pediatrician-child advocate and president of The Children’s Health Fund, Dr. Redlener has published, spoken and testified extensively on the subjects of health care for homeless and indigent children, child abuse and neglect and national health policy. Recognized as a national expert on a range of issues, Dr. Redlener also speaks and writes extensively on national disaster preparedness policies, pandemic influenza, the threat of terrorism in the U.S., the impact and consequences of major natural disasters and related issues.

Dr. Redlener has worked extensively in the Gulf region following hurricane Katrina where he helped establish on-going medical and public health programs. He also organized medical response teams in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks on 9/11 and has had disaster management leadership experience internationally and nationally. He is the author of Americans At Risk: Why We Are Not Prepared For Megadisasters and What We Can Do Now, published in August 2006 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Dr. Redlener received his M.D. degree from the University of Miami School of Medicine, and pediatric training at Babies Hospital of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York City, the University of Colorado Medical Center and the University of Miami-Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. He holds an honorary Doctor of Science degree from Hunter College of the City University of New York, among numerous other awards and honors.
David J. Kaufman

David Kaufman is the Director, Preparedness Policy, Planning and Analysis within the Department of Homeland Security/FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate. He is responsible for policy formulation and strategic planning for the Directorate as well as preparedness doctrine, planning guidance, and performance metrics. He is also responsible for development of the National Preparedness System, including national planning and capability assessment mechanisms, called for in the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.

Mr. Kaufman has nearly ten years’ experience developing and implementing homeland security preparedness programs. In particular, he has been responsible for developing and implementing the FY 2007 DHS Risk Analysis, FY 2006 Homeland Security planning process, the Urban Area Security Initiative, initiating FEMA's National Mutual Aid project, successfully transitioning the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program from the Department of Defense to the Department of Justice, and establishing an assistance-based operating model for engaging with States and Urban Areas in the development and implementation of their Homeland Security Strategies.

Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Kaufman served as the Acting Director and Deputy Director of Preparedness Programs Division in the Preparedness Directorate, where he had responsibility for overseeing and directing the day-to-day activities of DHS’ $3 billion portfolio of preparedness assistance programs, including the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, a suite of transportation infrastructure security programs, and its technical assistance program.

Mr. Kaufman holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a Master of Public Policy degree from the University of Michigan.

Johanna Schneider

Johanna Schneider has played a key role in successfully managing communications for over 30 years, moving from reporter and anchor to top posts in government--Congress, the Executive Branch--and in the business arena.
Ms. Schneider is currently the Executive Director-External Relations of the Business Roundtable, an organization of top Chief Executive Officers of global companies. Recently cited as “the most influential chief executive lobbying group in the U.S.” by the Financial Times, Business Roundtable members are at the forefront of public policy, advocating for a vigorous, dynamic global economy.

Ms. Schneider directs all external relations including communications, media relations, advertising, digital communications, branding and reputation, corporate membership, and all external advocacy. Prior to her appointment as Executive Director-External Relations, she held the post of Director of Communications for the Roundtable. At the Roundtable, she conceived and launched the highly-regarded, CEO Economic Outlook survey. Her work on public policy garnered the Bronze Sabre Award.

Before joining the Roundtable, Ms. Schneider was the Senior Advisor for Media Relations to the Director of the National Institutes of Health, Dr. Bernadine Healy. At NIH, Schneider played a major role in launching the groundbreaking Women’s Health Initiative, the largest clinical trial ever undertaken in the U.S., focusing on the major causes of death and disability in women. She also managed cDNA patenting, ethics in Science, and AIDS research communications.

Prior to her service at NIH, Schneider served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to Labor Secretaries Elizabeth Dole and Lynn Martin. At the Department of Labor she orchestrated the ground-breaking study on women and minorities difficulty in moving up the career ladder, titled the Glass Ceiling Initiative. She also handled the successful resolution of the Pittston Coal Strike, a historic dispute where more than 17,700 mine workers in seven states went on strike over labor issues and she oversaw pension portability.

Filling one of the top jobs in the U.S. Congress, Ms. Schneider also served as Press Secretary to the House Republican Leader, Bob Michel (R-IL). From 1984 to 1989, she managed the Leadership press operation, coordinated House and Senate press responses and served as media liaison to the White House.

From 1980 to 1984, Schneider served as Press Secretary to Congresswoman Lynn Martin (R-IL), the highest ranking women in House Republican Leadership.
Timothy M. Hall

I received a Ph.D. in physics from Cornell University in 1991, and followed with a post-doctoral fellowship at the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) and Columbia University from 1991–1993. After this I spent one year in France and three in Australia on research fellowships. I returned to NASA GISS in 1997, becoming a permanent staff scientist in 2001. I am also an adjunct professor in the Department of Applied Physics, Columbia University, in which capacity I advise Columbia graduate students. Much of my research focuses on transport processes in the atmosphere and ocean, particularly how they are diagnosed by, and affect the global distribution of, natural and anthropogenic trace gases. My recent application of this work addresses the uptake and storage of anthropogenic carbon by the ocean. I am involved with ongoing development of the GISS global climate model, in particular the installation in the model ocean of an interactive biogeochemical carbon module. In the past two years I have also become interested in tropical cyclones and climate, especially the statistical modeling of tropical cyclones. In this effort I have worked closely with private-sector catastrophe risk modelers.

I enjoy giving presentations on global climate change to non-specialists and the general public, most recently at an automotive engineering conference, an annual meeting of science-museum professionals, and a conference of biologists studying parasites. I also participate in a summer educational outreach and mentoring program at NASA GISS to NYC-area high-school students interested in science. I live with my wife and two children in Cold Spring, NY, and in what spare time I can find enjoy running and playing guitar.

Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D.

Stephen Flynn is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of the critically acclaimed The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (Random House, 2007) and national bestseller, America the Vulnerable (HarperCollins, 2004). Dr. Flynn is a Consulting Professor at the Center of International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; a Senior Fellow at the Wharton School’s Risk Management and Decision Processes Center at the University of Pennsylvania; and a
member of the Marine Board of the National Research Council. He ranks among the world’s most widely cited experts on homeland security issues, including providing congressional testimony on nineteen occasions since 9/11. He spent twenty years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Coast Guard, was awarded the Legion of Merit, and retired at the rank of Commander. During his time on active duty he had two commands at sea, served in the White House Military Office during the George H.W. Bush administration, and was director for Global Issues on the National Security Council staff during the Clinton administration. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.S. from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

**Dr. Matt Statler**

As InterCEP’s Associate Director, Matt’s responsibilities include conducting research and coordinating special projects to generate findings and recommendations for strategic action. Before joining InterCEP, Matt served as Director of Research at the Imagination Lab, a nonprofit Swiss foundation. In that role, he designed and facilitated strategy processes for major corporate, non-governmental, and educational organizations, while guiding a multidisciplinary research team that produced dozens of academic publications. Previously Matt had worked in A.T. Kearney’s Nonprofit Practice, and as Managing Director at Weberize, an internet consulting firm. Matt’s educational background includes BA’s in Philosophy and Spanish Literature from the University of Missouri, Columbia. He spent one year at the University of Heidelberg as a Fulbright Scholar, and then obtained a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University. Written with the support of the Mellon Foundation, his dissertation examined the role of repetition in education and focused specifically on the philosopher’s allegorical return to the cave. His organizational research has appeared in a number of academic journals, and his most recent book publication is Everyday Strategic Preparedness: The Role of Practical Wisdom in Organizations (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007).
EXHIBIT C

The Audience List
New York City’s Preparedness for Terrorism and Catastrophic Natural Disasters

1. **John Beal**, DHS/I&A State & Local Fusion Centers

2. **David A. Berman**, Center for Catastrophe Preparedness & Response, New York University

3. **Anna Brown**, Rockefeller Foundation

4. **P.J. Crowley**, The Center for American Progress

5. **David Garten**, The Office of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY)


7. **Barbara A. Grewe**, The MITRE Corporation

8. **David Heyman**, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

9. **Jonathan Kraden**, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

10. **Colonel Randall J. Larsen**, The Institute for Homeland Security

11. **Jay Lavender**, NSPYR


13. **Karlheinz Muhr**, Credit Suisse

14. **Brad Penuel**, Center for Catastrophe Preparedness & Response

15. **Veronique Pluviose-Fenton**, House Committee on Homeland Security
16. Cristina Rumbaitis del Rio, Rockefeller Foundation

17. Mike Russell, House Committee on Homeland Security

18. Charles Shelhamer, New York University

19. John Solomon

20. K. A. Taipale, Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy