Los Angeles’ Preparedness for Terrorism

By Clark Kent Ervin
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Introduction

This is the second in a series of reports about various cities’ preparedness for terrorism and/or natural disasters. It is the outgrowth of a series of roundtable discussions in 2007 and 2008 in New York, Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, and Los Angeles among key federal, state, and local government officials in each such city, as well as private sector stakeholders, and think tank/academic experts on homeland security and counterterrorism. The series was financed by a generous lead grant by the Ford Foundation, supplemented by additional grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, the McCormick Foundation, and the Houston Endowment. The goal in each city was to identify best practices that can be replicated around the country; to identify any gaps in preparedness; and to recommend to policymakers ways and means of closing any such gaps.

The Los Angeles roundtable, held on March 31-April 2, 2008, was co-sponsored by not only the Ford Foundation, but also the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California, which also served as our host. A copy of the agenda for the roundtable; the biographies of each speaker; and a list of audience members are attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, and C, respectively. A summary of the best practices identified in the report; the preparedness gaps; and, for want of a better term, “general themes” that permeate the report, precede the exhibits. (Recommendations to close the identified preparedness gaps are implicit in the explanation of the gaps.)

As noted in the initial report on New York City, a caveat (or two) is in order. First, this report is not, and is not represented to be, an exhaustive and rigorous examination of homeland security preparedness. It is, instead, the product of the considered judgment of front-line practitioners and nationally recognized experts as of a particular moment in time. It should, nonetheless, be an invaluable tool for policymakers as they evaluate, eight years after 9/11, what we have accomplished in terms of counterterrorism preparedness in the intervening years and what remains to be done.
Second, like the New York report, this report focuses exclusively on counterterrorism preparedness, as opposed to natural disaster preparedness. Like New York City, Los Angeles is likewise at the top of terrorists’ target list. This is not meant to denigrate the importance of preparing for natural disasters, especially in a city like Los Angeles that is prone to them and, especially earthquakes. The roundtable duly noted that the city is due for “a big one” one day, and that natural disaster preparedness and counterterrorism preparedness are, to a large degree, complementary.

Perhaps the most profound point in the entire report is this one, made by the Commanding Officer of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Emergency Services Division. The goal of counterterrorism should, of course, be prevention, but we must recognize that we cannot prevent everything.

“So, an attack in and of itself is not a failure. A preventable attack is a failure.” It is hoped that what has proved to work in Los Angeles will be tried in other cities, and that steps will be taken to close the gaps in preparedness identified herein.

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“FIRST PREVENTERS”

Los Angeles Police Department

Given that Los Angeles is the nation’s second largest city; the largest city in California, a state that would rank among the world’s tenth largest economies if it were a country; a global melting pot teeming with a rich stew of races and ethnicities speaking a wide variety of languages and dialects; a trendsetter as to popular attitudes and social mores; and the capital of America’s iconic film and television industry, it stands to reason that it ranks at or near the very top of the terror target list.

This is not a matter of simple logic or mere conjecture. At least two of the 9/11 hijackers spent time in Los Angeles in the months leading up to the attacks. The so-called “Millennium Bomber,” Ahmed Ressam, was arrested at the Canadian border on New Year’s Eve, 1999 with the intent to bomb Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). On the Fourth of July in 2002, an Egyptian limousine driver, Hesham Muhammad Ali Hadayet, shot two people to death at the El Al Israeli airline ticket counter at LAX and wounded three before being killed himself by airline security guards. According to then President Bush, American counterterrorism officials foiled a plot that same year (2002) to bomb Los Angeles’ Liberty Tower, the tallest building west of the Mississippi. In 2005, an arrest in a string of seemingly prosaic gas station robberies in the suburb of Torrance led detectives to an Al Qaeda-inspired terror plot targeting U.S. Army recruiting centers and synagogues.

If the bad news is that, like New York City, Los Angeles ranks high on terrorists’ target list, the good news is that, like New York City, Los Angeles is far better protected that most cities in the United States for
a terror attack, thanks, in large part, as in New York, to the man at the helm of the city’s police department.

Not coincidentally, Chief Bill Bratton is the only person ever to have served as the chief executive of both Los Angeles’ police department (LAPD) and New York City’s (NYPD). By the time he was appointed Chief of LAPD in 2002, Bratton had already garnered international attention for dramatically cutting crime rates in New York in the 1990s, at a time when it was widely believed that nothing could be done about it, by implementing the “COMPSTAT” program that mapped crime incidents; analyzed them for patterns and trends; and then targeted high-crime areas with an aggressive response and “relentless” follow-up.

Bratton has applied essentially the same approach to terrorism. He calls the nation’s approximately 750,000 state and local police officers the “first preventers” of terrorism. Bratton touts the fusion centers of federal, state, and local intelligence analysts in states around the country as “centers of gravity” for connecting the proverbial dots that can constitute trends and patterns pointing to terrorist-related activities. A strong proponent of the “all crimes, all hazards” model of policing, he believes that police departments, and, by extension, fusion centers, need not, and should not, focus solely on either fighting crime or fighting terrorism. They must do both, and in pursuing one mission, they are necessarily pursuing both, with the Torrance case referenced above being the most vivid example.

Bratton restructured LAPD by forming a Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, consisting of 267 officers (out of a total of 9600) “dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building.” He proudly notes that, though his counterterrorism force is considerably smaller in number than NYPD’s 1000 (out of 35,000), it is slightly larger proportionally. The bureau is pioneering the use of “Suspicious Activity Reports” or “SARs,” with a view to working with “Major Cities Chiefs” (the heads of the 75 largest police departments in the United States and Canada) to expand the use of them across the nation. These reports document incidents of criminal activity that might have a nexus to terrorism.

LAPD is also part of the Intelligence Commanders Group, which is
The Report

comprised of the senior officer from every major city’s police department intelligence unit.

The aim of the department’s varied counterterrorism efforts is “to hunt and disrupt terrorists’ operational capacity and [to] directly address the motivational side of the terrorist equation.” Bratton echoes Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff’s conviction that “we have to build a network to beat a network.” Toward these ends, LAPD employs seven strategies.

First, the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau collects, fuses, analyzes, and disseminates “strategic and actionable intelligence.” The bureau works in concert with regional and federal partners in the seven counties served by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center or “JRIC,” the local intelligence counterterrorism fusion center.

Second, “Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs)” train “an ever wider net” of people in the city to augment the bureau’s ranks by themselves serving as “public data collectors and first preventers.” There is a TLO for every one of the 19 patrol areas in the city.

Third, building on similar gatherings for African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and gays and lesbians, “Muslim Forums” are held to bring area Muslim leaders together to discuss how the police can “better understand, protect, and serve their communities.”

Fourth, arguing that most of the nation’s state and local law enforcement officials have no idea of the difference between Sunnis and the Shiites4 or Hamas and Hezbollah, and that we must get to know the enemy if we are to have any hope of defeating it, the bureau has founded a first of its kind “National Counterterrorism Academy” to train state and local law enforcement officials in these and other fundamentals. The Academy was started with private funding; Bratton is hoping for funding from DHS going forward, and that DHS will start regional academies using LAPD’s curriculum.

Fifth, the department created the “Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System,” an electronic tool facilitating web and BlackBerry communication within its ranks and between LAPD and the private sector.
Sixth, in partnership with DHS and funded by a $3 million DHS grant, LAPD developed “Operation Archangel,” a critical infrastructure protection system. The department works with private sector owners/operators of area sectors and sites that are critical to national security to inventory and prioritize assets; identify vulnerabilities and assess risk; and address those vulnerabilities and to reduce risk. Among the program’s features is the “Protective Security Task Force,” a team of 25 officers modeled on the “Hercules” teams in New York who can deploy on a random or intelligence-driven basis to sensitive locations to provide a “cloak of security."

Finally, a “Human Source Development Unit,” increases LAPD’s ability to develop actionable intelligence by recruiting informants who can infiltrate terror networks and thereby become privy to plots and plans.

The upshot of LAPD’s aggressive approach, Bratton argues, is that, while the city might well be attacked, it will not be “defeated.” The same approach that brought crime down in the 1990s from stratospheric levels to manageable ones can likewise reduce the scale of the terror threat from an existential level to that of a nuisance.

To get there from here, Bratton calls upon the federal government to overcome the Bush Administration’s ideological reluctance to fund state and local policing efforts. The nation’s three quarters of a million state and local law enforcement officials (supplemented by the approximately 2 million security directors of private businesses) can significantly augment the ranks of federal counterterrorism officials, but they can do so only if they have the necessary resources. At a time of dwindling funding at all levels of government and at a time when the threat of terrorism is widely perceived to be diminished, it is getting harder and harder for police departments to justify spending scarce funds on terrorism. By stressing the nexus between crime and terrorism and explaining that working to deter one can, in fact, deter both, Bratton makes as persuasive a case as can be made for robust counterterrorism funding years after 9/11.

He acknowledges that the nation is safer than we were in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, in large part because the federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence communities are working
together as never before. State and local law enforcement officials, led by cities like Los Angeles and New York, having shown that they add value to the equation, have earned a seat at the proverbial table “above the salt,” and “are no longer feeding off the breadcrumbs.” There is as close to a seamless flow of information between and among governmental and non-governmental partners as possible.

Bratton contends that the Los Angeles region is ahead of the rest of the country in terms of cooperation among law enforcement entities. LAPD and its partner entities have put “ego and pride in [their respective] organizations aside [so as] to have a seamless focus on counterterrorism.” The relevant organizations complement each other, as opposed to competing against each other. For example, unlike the case at JFK in New York or Dulles in Washington, DC, there are two LAPD officers at each checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport. It “costs a fortune” to have a permanent city police force presence there (as opposed to simply the airport police), but it is worth it to cut to zero the wait time for response if/when there is an incident.

And, to ensure that there is no conflict among or between jurisdictions when something happens, LAPD has already worked out in advance a matrix which indicates which entity takes the lead in any given threat scenario. “After action” reports designed to capture and implement any lessons learned are part of the standard operating procedure.

All four police departments in the Los Angeles area are recruited and trained according to a common standard. Over the course of the next four years, nearly 70% of the total personnel in these forces will have been trained together, further promoting seamless collaboration if/when terror strikes.

Bratton boasts of being connected not only to federal, state, and local partners, but also to international ones. LAPD has received private funding to acquire the British “hydra system,” a computerized system that allows officers to interact through networked computers. He has “multiple levels of connectivity,” including the ability to connect via BlackBerry with contacts in 50 American cities, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For example, while attending, coincidentally, a conference on how to communicate during emergencies, Bratton was alerted to the second set of terror bombings in London
in the summer of 2005 by an LAPD officer dispatched to the city after the first set of bombings two weeks earlier. The officer alerted Bratton by BlackBerry to the second bombings in real time hours before CNN broadcast the news.

A challenge to robust information sharing that Bratton cites is the fact that, at least in some states, every document is a public record.

Another challenge to effective counterterrorism policing is the concern on the part of some that acting too soon to disrupt a suspected plot may instead be simply entrapment or criminalizing thought or speech. Bratton believes in erring on the side of disrupting plots sooner rather than later, given the potentially horrific consequences of acting too slowly.

In sum, Bratton believes that “terrorism is not going away. It is going to continue through our lives, our children’s lives, and their children’s lives… [But] we have the ideas and the technology to leverage the crime-fighting skills that we have honed for decades and adapt them to this new threat. But, we also need to collaborate with one another. We must develop meaningful partnerships, more robust trust networks, and we must create policy that leverages law enforcement resources in the United States. It is this that will constitute our front line prevention and defense of the homeland.”

Supplementing Bratton’s presentation was that of Captain Horace Frank, the Commanding Officer of LAPD’s Emergency Services Division.

Frank emphasized the importance of involving average citizens in counterterrorism. People see things they are suspicious of and yet fail to report them. Alternatively, he says, people do report things to the police, and the police do not take the tips seriously. It is “common citizens who are likely to see terrorist indicators first.” The value of SARs is that every potential terrorist indicator is coded, so suspicious patterns and trends can be noted and investigated to see, for example, whether they might point to pre-attack surveillance.

Frank believes that post-9/11 complacency is a “danger.” If we are attacked again, he says that we will panic and overreact again. So, we need to better prepare the public for future attempted terror attacks and, indeed, future successful terror attacks. The goal is prevention,
but we cannot prevent everything. “So, an attack in and of itself is not a failure. A preventable attack is a failure.”

**Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department**

In his efforts to combat terrorism in the Los Angeles area, Bratton is complemented by an equally insightful, imaginative, and aggressive sheriff in Lee Baca. The two work so closely that Bratton joked that they spend more time with each other than their respective wives. Baca calls Bratton a “refreshing” police chief because he welcomes the help of the Sheriff’s department, recognizing that, in a county of 10 million people (a county larger, he says, than the population of 42 states), the police department “can’t do it all.”

Baca argues that the plethora of police departments across the country – some 19,000 in all according to him – is as much a disadvantage as regards counterterrorism as an advantage. He believes that we need a *national* police force to combat what is essentially a national problem. That said, he believes that the seamless cooperation in Los Angeles among the police department, the sheriff’s department, the JRIC, and related entities serves as a model for the kind of cooperative network that can be formed around the country so as effectively to constitute a national counterterrorism-focused police agency. Technology, he says, is the means by which to connect the members of this network to each other.

Like Bratton, he stresses that Washington should be more of a partner with local law enforcement officials. The federal government should do more to help fund local counterterrorism programs. National policymakers should take advice and counsel from local law enforcement officials as to how to combat terrorism, inasmuch as local officials are on the proverbial front lines. In his words, “our structure of responsibility is upside down.” Basically, he believes that the federal government has “not decided what to do” as regards counterterrorism, so it should get out of the way and “let the locals take over.”

According to Baca, we are “massively undervaluing” the Muslim community as partners in the fight against terrorism. He says that the media tends to feature the “wrong people,” the tiny minority of Muslims who advocate violence.
Baca also wants to reach out to Muslim nations to a far greater degree than we have done before. He himself has made such outreach a top priority, mentioning visits to meet counterterrorism officials in Pakistan (including President Musharraf), Saudi Arabia; Jordan, the Palestinian territories; and Qatar. He calls it “ironic” that he can see top-level government officials in Muslim nations, but he cannot get an appointment with White House Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Adviser Fran Townsend. On principle, he refuses to apply for a security clearance because he believes that, by virtue of his position and reputation, he should be trusted to handle classified information responsibly.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

Eric Velez represented the then newly created intelligence division of the FBI’s LA field office. According to Velez, the threat of terrorism in the Los Angeles area is not increasing or decreasing; it is “constant.”

As between the threat from “Al Qaeda Central,” on the one hand, and “homegrown terrorism” on the other, he believes the greater threat is that of homegrown terrorism. He is especially concerned about “single incidents” like the 2002 El Al ticket counter shootings at LAX mentioned above.

Velez posits that we have not been attacked since 9/11 because “Al Qaeda does not want to fail,” and they want the next attack to be even more grandiose and spectacular than the last one. They know that we are better prepared than we were on 9/11, and terrorists realize that they are being watched. He says “people have been turned away after concluding that ‘eyes are trained on me.’”

He believes that complacency is “an enemy,” noting that Al Qaeda tends to try again and again until they succeed in attacking a target.

Velez warns against focusing only a particular stereotype of a terrorist. Terrorists will “change and adapt” to confound any such stereotypes.

The FBI, he says, is now focused primarily on preventing terror attacks, not investigating them after they occur. There were 33 Joint Terrorism Task Forces before 9/11; there are now about 100. The CT (counterterrorism) 6 squad focuses on resolving every single threat tip.
that comes to the JTTF’s attention. The unique thing, he says, is that the
squad is located not at the FBI, but at the JRIC fusion center. Echoing
Bratton and Baca, Velez says that local law enforcement officials and
the FBI in the Los Angeles area work cooperatively.

Velez stressed the importance of training police officers, fire fighters,
private security guards, and even mail carriers to be on the lookout for
indications of terrorism. Citing the case of the 2005 London bombings,
he noted that plants outside the safe house had turned white from the
peroxide being used inside to mix explosives. If mail carriers had been
trained to be alert for such anomalies, the plot might have been disrupted.

Uncovering the Torrance plot, he says, was “mostly luck.” So, we
need to get better at developing and deploying intelligence. That plot
was launched in prison by a self-styled imam. We know, Velez says, that
prisons can be centers of radicalization, and we know when people are
going to be released and where they are planning to live. We should be
on the lookout for people who have been radicalized in prison and then
monitor them upon their release.

Los Angeles, he says, is better prepared than many other cities for a
terror attack in part because the city is already trained to respond to and
recover from natural disasters. Many of the key players are the same
in both scenarios. They all know each other, and, echoing Bratton, the
jurisdictional issues have all been worked out beforehand.

Velez concluded by stressing that the FBI is “really driven to share
information now because God forbid if a future attack is not prevented
by information hoarding.”

**Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD)**

LAFD has 3700 fire fighters and 106 fire stations. There is a dedicated
homeland security division.

The targets Chief Douglas Barry most worries about are LAX; the
ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach; the subway system; entertain-
ment venues; and “large outside events.”

He is particularly concerned about multiple terror incidents at once,
and, as a means of attack, improvised explosive devices (or IEDs).
In terms of best practices that he recommends for fire departments around the country, the Chief cites a dedicated homeland security division and a means of involving the community in spotting and reporting suspicious incidents and indicators, or, as he put it, a “means of community intel.”

He cited as a security gap the relative lack of funding for counterterrorism measures.

Los Angeles Mayor’s Office

Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security and Public Safety Arif Alikhan says that it is not a question of whether terrorists will attempt to attack the city, but when. Like others, he makes the further point that the city’s preparations for natural disasters serve to better prepare it for terror attacks and vice versa.

He is particularly concerned about a vehicle-borne IED attack at LAX or the seaports, which, in either case, would have a huge economic and psychological impact in addition to whatever impact there might be in terms of death and injury. Alikhan worries also about the possibility of a trained shooter.

The city is trying hard to educate its citizens on the threat. As noted by Chief Bratton, there are special outreach efforts to the Muslim community so as to enlist their help in ferreting out any dangerous elements and in better understanding their culture.

Alikhan touted the creation in Los Angeles, echoing Bratton, of the National Counterterrorism Academy, hoping that it will serve to train law enforcement officials around the country to spot terrorist indicators as they work to prevent and solve ordinary crime.

He argues that it is important to plan and organize regionally.

Noting in passing that animosity between the police and fire departments in New York City is “legendary, interoperability is still a “major issue” in Los Angeles as well. LAPD and LAFD can talk to each other, but that is because some fire department units have police radios. There is an ongoing upgrade project costing $260 million.
Alikhan called for DHS to give localities flexibility in spending “orange alert” counterterrorism money so it can be spent to reimburse the city for natural disaster-related costs as well. And, he laments that while DHS gives localities money for equipment, it has been reluctant to allow the use of money for staffing, training, and maintenance.

Los Angeles City Council

Los Angeles is fortunate to have on its city council a member who is especially focused on counterterrorism, Jack Weiss. According to Weiss, the “glass is half empty.” Homeland security is no longer on the minds of politicians or the public. Neither is interested in making the necessary investments in preparedness. In his words, “we need to connect the dots, but we have to collect them first.” It is “local cops” who connect the dots, and they cost money. Weiss says that Chief Bratton and Sheriff Baca are given too little money to work with it, and that “Bratton is robbing Peter to pay Paul.”

Weiss says interoperability remains a problem. LAFD has LAPD radios in their trucks, because their systems cannot “talk to each other.” The city uses a Raytheon system to patch the police and fire departments through to each other. He questions why there is no federal program for satellite phones for first responders in those instances when the web is down. Only Chief Bratton presently has a satellite phone.

Weiss stressed the importance of filling key counterterrorism slots with able, imaginative, and focused leaders. In his words, “who you have in these jobs makes such a difference.”

Finally, Weiss conceded that the city would be unable to organize a mass evacuation, if that ever prove to be necessary. “LA’s not ready for rain.”

Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Department

According to General Manager James Featherstone, there are 150 emergency managers in New York City; there are fewer than 30 in Los Angeles. Featherstone holds a daily emergency management briefing that “looks out” as far as two weeks ahead as to what may be emergen-
cies or threats. Large-scale real world events are used as training exercises, as well as specially devised exercises like the “Lead Shield” exercise with the Department of Defense during which the seaports are mined.

Unlike City Councilmember Weiss, Featherstone argues that interoperability is a technical issue, not a cultural one.

Los Angeles does not have a citywide emergency logistics plan, though the city is in the process of developing one.

The city’s present Operations Center is “small and antiquated;” the city is in the process of building a new one.

Echoing officials in New York, Featherstone cites the need for a “culture of preparedness.”

**Los Angeles County Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response**

Dr. Laurene Mascola, the Chief of the department’s Communicable Disease Control Program, makes the point that the area’s familiarity with natural disasters serves to better prepare it for a terror attack.

She also stressed that, fortunately, public health professionals in Los Angeles County now think of themselves as first responders when disasters strike.

**California Governor’s Office of Homeland Security**

Created in 2003, the office manages California’s homeland security grants process. It also organizes training and exercises, and conducts research and planning as to terrorism preparedness.

Chief Deputy Director Gary Winuck believes that the Los Angeles area offers terrorists a wide array of attractive targets, ranging from the Hollywood sign and movie and television production lots to Disneyland, oil refineries, synagogues and Jewish community centers. There is a large population of Iranians, Somalis, and Southeast Asians, as well as Arabs and Muslims generally. Los Angeles is a fundraising base for Hezbollah. Given the area’s ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
diversity, it is easy to blend in. The prison system is large, and it is a “hotbed” for terrorist recruitment.

Among the area’s best practices is the emphasis among the more than 350 police agencies and 100,000 law enforcement officers to share information, with the caveat that “trying to pull it all together is a huge challenge.” The various fusion centers are key to this effort.

Commendably, if not uniquely, California has a metrics program to help figure out to get the most out of every counterterrorism dollar.

There is a Governor’s Executive Emergency Committee that meets regularly with a view to coordinating efforts and exercising contingencies. The “Golden Guardian” brings a wealth of agencies and entities together to simulate terror attacks and natural disasters and to test responses.

As preparedness gaps, Winuck cites intelligence, though “great progress has been made in that regard, and “coordination issues,” given the plethora of jurisdictions and entities involved.

**California Department of Justice**

A number of state organizations focus, in one way or another, on terrorism-related intelligence, so many, in fact, that the differences, if any, between and among them are difficult to determine.

Established by the Governor and the Attorney General in partnership with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center provides a means for law enforcement agencies throughout the state to obtain information on terrorist threats and activities through a secure and centralized database. The intelligence is analyzed by, among others, intelligence professionals from the Attorney General’s office.

The State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center is a multi-agency (namely, the California Department of Justice, California Highway Patrol, and Governor’s Office of Homeland Security) fusion center created for the purpose of terrorism/criminal intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.
The four Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers throughout the state (in Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego) mirror those of the four FBI Field Offices within the state, minimizing reporting conflicts, providing statewide coverage and facilitating coordination with the FBI. The centers are managed and staffed by local public safety agencies.

The FBI’s four Joint Terrorism Task Forces, comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, serve the purpose of identifying and disrupting potential terrorist plots by individuals or terror cells and sharing that information with law enforcement and intelligence partners.

The Attorney General’s Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence runs an Intelligence Operations Center that provides onsite tactical analysis for law enforcement entities.

According to Al Cruz, the Special Agent in Charge of the California Department of Justice, “a lot” of terror-related fundraising takes place in California by means of illegal activity like drug trafficking, selling counterfeit goods including cigarettes and infant formula, and document fraud. Among the terror groups raising money are Hezbollah and Hamas.

Cruz noted that Al Qaeda, too, has ties to California. Media spokesman Adam Gadahn, well-known in counterterrorism circles for threats like “Yesterday, London and Madrid; tomorrow, LA and Melbourne, Allah willing,” grew up in the northern part of the state.

Cruz stresses, ominously, that “they mean what they say and they are very patient.” He believes that the terror threat is, at best, static; and, at worst, increasing. Each year without another attack, he says, gives Al Qaeda an additional incentive for attacking.

As to why terrorists have not attacked since 9/11, Cruz attributes it to the perception that strategic targets have been hardened. The flip side of this is that, in his view, as a consequence, “soft targets,” (like shopping centers and sports stadiums) which by definition are relatively easy to attack, have become still more attractive.

Cruz believes that chlorine plants are particularly vulnerable as they are hardly protected at all. Noting that terrorists seek “maximum
media coverage,” Cruz cites the large number of landmarks and icons in California that make the state a prime target for terrorism.

The terror threat is “evolving,” in Cruz’s view. The biggest threat, he thinks, comes from homegrown cells composed of people radicalized in prison and/or right-wing extremists in league with radical Islamists. He fears that Al Qaeda may attempt to recruit American citizens, not only in prisons but also mosques. “Fiery clerics” have set up shop in California, attempting to “embed” recruits in key government agencies like the Department of Motor Vehicles.

The decentralization of terror networks makes the identification of small terror cells difficult. There is no useful profile of someone who is susceptible to the radicalization process, he believes. So, Cruz argues that understanding the adversary is critical and, as noted below, likewise, embracing cultural diversity.

As to what is being done to counter the threat to Los Angeles and the surrounding area, Cruz cites: (1) increased cooperation within and between the law enforcement and intelligence communities; (2) the Patriot Act; (3) public vigilance; (4) the “creative” use of criminal statutes like those relating to drug offenses, immigration law violations, and money laundering; and (5) enlisting the cooperation of key ethnic and religious communities. He wholeheartedly agrees with the “all crimes, all hazards” approach to counterterrorism policing that LAPD practices.

As gaps, Cruz cited apathy and the lack of information-sharing technology or outdated technology. He said it took four years from conception to implementation to transform a disparate database into one website with one password that can produce easily readable reports “to do relationships and visual analysis.” Such gaps exist because of lack of money and personnel (which, are, of course, related). Another gap is lack of inter-cultural understanding. He cautions that what some may consider “suspicious” activity may simply be behavior that is outside the norm of mainstream culture. Another gap is still inadequate legal tools.

Cruz says it is critical that counterterrorism efforts be continued, notwithstanding creeping complacency. The costs of attempting to prevent terrorism should be compared against the far larger costs of responding to and recovering from it.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Los Angeles Police Foundation

According to Foundation president Karen Wagener, only 5% of LAPD’s budget can be used for anything other than salary and benefits. The Los Angeles Police Foundation, then, provides “gap” funding for things like training. For example, the foundation has funded officer travel to Paris to attend a conference on Islamic radicalization and another on an intelligence-related matter. A “risk management” program for officers who use deadly force inappropriately has also been funded.

The Foundation is particularly focused on the threat of homegrown terrorism. Staff members are monitoring Internet chat rooms to search for discussions that might be linked to this particular threat.

Muslim American Homeland Security Congress

Shakeel Syed, the Executive Director of the Muslim American Homeland Security Council, maintains that the relationship between area law enforcement officials and the Muslim American community is evolving, largely in a positive direction. Through town hall meetings, presentations at conferences like the roundtable, and other such outreach efforts, the Council is encouraging “reciprocal education.” There is now less mutual mistrust and more cooperation.

But, the relationship remains “superficial,” in his judgment. Stereotypes, and, therefore, profiling, continues to exist. The government fails to tap the full range of opinion in the Muslim community. Dialogue, Syed maintains, should not be based on counterterrorism concerns solely. He worries about an anti-Muslim backlash, should there be another terror attack perpetrated in the name of Islam. Syed worries, too, about Muslim’s exercising their First Amendment rights to worship at mosques and to contribute to charities given FBI surveillance at the former and the Treasury Department’s crackdown on contributions to charities deemed to be linked to terrorism.
Meetings between law enforcement officials and representatives of the Muslim community must be substantive, he argues, and there must be follow-through. And, terms like “Islamofascism” and “Islamic terrorism” are inaccurate, because “terrorism has no faith,” as well as counterproductive.

Infragard

This FBI-led program works with the private sector owners/operators of critical infrastructure to secure their sectors and facilities against terror threats. There are some 86 chapters with 20,000 members nationwide, all of whom are vetted by the FBI. The Los Angeles chapter focuses on twelve sectors. The chapter works closely with the local Joint Regional Intelligence Center, with JRIC identifying trends and patterns that might be indicative of emerging threats.

Homeland Security Advisory Council

The Chairman of the Los Angeles Homeland Security Advisory Council, business leader Marc Nathanson, commends local law enforcement officials for recognizing that the private sector has a huge role to play in counterterrorism preparedness. Founded in 2002, the Council is composed of 75 “strategic” CEOs from major area industries like real estate, media and entertainment to “support law enforcement in the event of a disaster and to educate and prepare the public before, during, and after a disaster.”

The Council buttresses the work of law enforcement officials by providing additional dedicated staff and additional funding through membership dues and grants. Annual costs are approximately $350,000, not including donations. There is also the “business response network,” a secure online database through which companies can pre-register the resources they can make available during an emergency. Over 100 businesses now take part, supplying things like food, water, medical supplies, drivers, medical supplies, warehouses, generators, pilots, office space, interpreters, and accreditation services totaling hundreds of millions of dollars in value. Builder’s and trade unions’ services are being brought into the database.
A Business Operations Center provides a link between key businesses and government during emergencies. Businesses are represented in regional and state Emergency Operations Centers during emergencies.

The Council is working with area radio and television stations to advise private citizens on what they can do to protect themselves in an emergency.

The Council participates in exercises, like a recent one with the Coast Guard at the seaports, to better acquaint the private sector with what to do in the event of a terror attack. There are also occasional half-day seminars sponsored by LAPD and the Sheriff’s department with different sectors of the business community, like shopping centers, to share information and improve communication.

Members of the Council work with the Sheriff’s Department to evaluate counterterrorism-focused technology. And, the Council works to limit the legal liability of people who respond in emergencies.

Among Nathanson’s suggestions for improving the Council and similar organizations around the country are the following:

1. DHS counterterrorism preparedness grants to states and localities should include “carve outs” for the private sector.

2. DHS should coordinate national campaigns with local HSACs (Homeland Security Advisory Councils).

3. DHS should help recruit business leaders to serve on local HSACs.

4. Federal intelligence agencies must do a better job of sharing information with the private sector. In particular, he believes that the private sector should have representatives at the JRIC and like state/local/regional intelligence fusion centers. He notes that information sharing can and should be a two-way street; the private sector has intelligence information that can and should be shared with government.

5. HSACs should be bipartisan and apolitical.
6. Unions should be part of HSACs. (Los Angeles, he said, is the first city to talk about doing this.)

7. HSACs should reach out to young people and racial/ethnic/religious minorities.

8. Board members must avoid conflicts of interest.

9. There should be statewide HSACs funded by the state, with local chapters. (Iowa and New Jersey are considering this, according to Nathanson).

10. Colleges and universities should provide interns.

11. DHS should set standards in certain areas, for example, building standards for surviving terror strikes or earthquakes.

PRIVATE SECTOR SECURITY DIRECTORS AT POTENTIAL TARGET SITES

9/11 brought about a sea change in attitudes as to the necessity of securing key icons in Los Angeles.

Hollywood Sign

At the iconic Hollywood sign, for example, park rangers were “kind of watching” it before the 2001 terror attacks. Now, the sign is monitored by city and county law enforcement officials on a 24/7 basis by a network of underground cameras and microphones. Park rangers and/or helicopters can be dispatched quickly if and when people trespass onto the site. The city and county maintain a critical radio relay system whose preservation from compromise provides an additional reason to monitor activity at or near the sign closely. (Tellingly, the security director, Chris Baumgart, realized during the session that he did not know or interact with the people in the communications bunker and resolved to get to know them.)
U.S. Bank Tower

At 1017 feet, the U.S. Bank Tower (formerly the “Library Tower,” misidentified by former President Bush as “Liberty Tower” in an important 2006 speech on counterterrorism, noted above) is the tallest building on the West Coast. An average of 2500-3000 people are in the building at any one time on any given day.

Before 9/11, there were 35 security guards. Vehicles were not inspected, and they could park right in front of the building. Identification was not required to enter the building. There were 36 closed circuit cameras. Building security officers had minimal contact with LAPD.

On 9/11, the building was evacuated for the first time. After the attacks, the noted security firm, Kroll and Associates, was engaged to conduct an in-depth study of what it would take to “drop” the building.

Today there are 42 security officers, who serve as a “visual deterrent.” There is considerable outreach to and interaction with Los Angeles police. There are 72 cameras; a web-based security system; 10-foot bollards in front of the building; optical turnstiles; and a reconfiguration of the entrance that requires all to enter through a common entrance and to present identification. Bags are inspected, and vehicles are searched. All deliveries are received at the back of the building, where they are screened on the street. There are regular evacuation drills and exercises simulating fires, earthquakes and terror attacks. In addition to drills and exercises, there is online training. All of these measures are costly, about $1 million a year apportioned among the tenants, according to Security Director Patrick Silver. In the ideal world, all major buildings would have the same or similar measures in place, but whether any given one does boils down to a matter of “dollars and cents.”

According to Silver, after the Bush speech, efforts to secure the building intensified with an even greater degree of attention and help from LAPD, DHS, and the FBI. Though the building has been hardened considerably, Silver acknowledged that Al Qaeda tends to keep after certain targets until they succeed in carrying out an attack, and he cautions that we may be in a “surveillance cycle.” Silver says that the risk of attack and the cost of security have scared some tenants away.
Though he receives intelligence from LAPD, FBI, and DHS, Silver’s security clearance is only “in process.”

Silver notes a need to balance security and “aesthetics.” People in a commercial building do not want to feel “as though they are entering the Pentagon.”

**Universal Studios**

The facts that the movie and television industry are part and parcel of American culture, and that it was identified as a potential target in a 1990s Al Qaeda video, lead Security Director Brian Brady to pay particular attention to counterterrorism issues.

The studio encompasses a campus of 400 acres, 85% of which are located in the city of Los Angeles, and 15% in the county. There is also property in nearby Burbank. In addition to the studio, there are stores, restaurants, and bars.

Brady and his team (the small corporate team is supplemented by contract guards and personnel from the LA Sheriff’s department) are part of the Department of Homeland Security’s subcommittee on sports and entertainment-oriented commercial facilities which meets twice a year. They are also part of the LAPD “Archangel” infrastructure protection program, and the FBI-led infrastructure protection program, Infragard. Brady’s team also works with State Department diplomatic security personnel in countries around the world where they are filming on location.

There is a Los Angeles Fire Department substation on the property and stockpiles of food and water so that the facility can sustain itself during emergencies. As a result of 9/11, the studio lot was fenced and gated, and one needs a pass to get onto the property. Bags are checked before entry is granted. In addition to guards, there are cameras. There are annual drills which focus on different kinds of disasters (earthquakes, fires, etc.) The fact that studio personnel’s job is to act means that the simulations are as elaborate (with costumes and real-world scenarios) as blockbuster Hollywood films. Even the CEO participates, which signals to all employees that the drills are important and should be taken seriously.
Kodak Theater

The theater is the site of the Academy and Emmy Awards each year; it also was the site of a CNN presidential debate in 2008. The award programs are among the most popular television shows of the year. It is a prime soft target, with hundreds of stars attending a broadcast beamed live throughout the world.

The security team meets weekly with representatives of Operation Archangel, as well as the Los Angeles Fire Department. There is an annual drill simulating a terror attack, dubbed “Operation Dark Cloud.”

During the run-up to the debate during the presidential campaign, Archangel representatives made 17 unsuccessful attempts to compromise the theater’s security measures, earning it an “A+” security rating from the city.

Golden Globe Awards

Similarly, the Golden Globe awards attract legions of stars and, therefore, media attention. The security director, Lorenzo Soria, gets intelligence from LAPD, the FBI, and “a friend at the Secret Service.” He has “no direct access to DHS.”

Potential Sector Targets

Aviation Security

Larry Fetters, the Federal Security Director (i.e. the top Department of Homeland Security official, specifically, the Transportation Security Administration or TSA) at LAX, stresses that Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the aviation sector. Los Angeles International Airport is a prime target. Its famous McDonald’s-like arches make it a global icon, and the 400,000 jobs tied to it, directly or indirectly, make it a major local economic engine. Particular means of attack that especially concern him include VBIEDs, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and MANPADs, shoulder-fired rocket launchers that can take down an airplane.
One hundred thousand people board planes at LAX on average every day, and about the same number of pieces of luggage. According to Fetters, these statistics represent “200,000 Al Qaeda potential opportunities a day.”

Fetters praises the then Administrator of TSA, Kip Hawley, from moving from a “defensive” approach to aviation security to an “offensive” approach. TSA now concentrates on three international security prongs: (1) people (i.e., improving the quality of those hired as screeners and enhancing their training; (2) processes (i.e., for example, setting up separate checkpoint lanes for experienced business travelers on the one hand, and those who are elderly, disabled, or traveling with children, on the other, so as to make the checkpoint process calmer so anomalies are easier to spot; and occasional document and baggage checks at the departure gate, so as to introduce randomness into the system to foil terrorists’ casing operations); and (3) technology.

In terms of technology, Fetters is introducing 68 multi-view x-ray machines that can rotate carry-on bags placed on conveyer belts at checkpoints in a three-dimensional fashion so that otherwise obscured concealed weapons can be revealed. Millimeter wave technology, that can see through clothing to reveal weapons hidden on or about passenger’s bodies, is also being phased in at four of eight terminals as a secondary inspection protocol. Technology to detect liquid explosives is also being phased in.

As in New York City, there are VIPER (Visible Intermodal Protection and Response) teams of LAPD officers, LAX police, screeners, and Behavior Detection Officers (about which more later) who surge to different parts at the airport periodically, based on alerts, intelligence, or sheer randomness. Such surges can deter and disrupt terror plots, as well as reassure passengers that security is a priority.

TSA is deploying document checkers to spot people with fraudulent identification. The checkers are specially trained screeners.

As for air cargo, which Congress has mandated be 100% screened for explosives by 2010, Fetters says that Continental Airlines has a pilot program at LAX to test feasibility. At present, the airport relies on a “certified” cargo screening program, whereby cargo shippers forward their cargo to private companies that do the screening on TSA’s behalf.
for a fee, with 60 TSA personnel doing spot checks to confirm that cargo is being screened. Fetters does not doubt that the deadline will be met, though he does note that screening palletized (i.e., pre-packaged in bulk) cargo is challenging. He thinks it more efficient and economical for private industry to do the screening than TSA.

TSA is deploying a “robust” team of “proprietary explosive detection canines,” who will be handled by TSA personnel. There are ten dogs at the airport currently.

There are two intelligence officers assigned to LAX, one full-time, and the other is the supervisor for the Western part of the country. There are weekly intelligence briefings, with additional ones being scheduled as necessary, as well as regular interagency meetings. There are also BDOs, Behavior Detection Officers, who observe passengers for signs of stress and anger that might indicate terrorist intent. To date, people with weapons, fraudulent identification, and drugs have been found, but no terrorists.

At most airports, workers are “trusted” because they wear certain identification badges. There is an “aggressive” badge challenge program at LAX, whereby employees are to check whether their colleagues are wearing proper identification at all times. Those without identification are to be turned in to the authorities. At LAX, the approximately 40,000 workers are not only “badged” through the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program; they are also randomly screened as they go to work so as to mitigate the “insider threat.” When they are hired, employees’ backgrounds are checked through a variety of criminal and terrorist databases. TSA then periodically run updates on employees, occasionally uncovering subsequent arrests. Fetters would rather that all employees be screened each time they approach a checkpoint, as with passengers, noting that pilot programs are underway around the country to test the feasibility of the notion.

The Airside Security Initiative aims to protect LAX’s perimeter by, among other things, installing a ring of bollards around the airport so as to mitigate the risk of VBIEDs. The perimeter is also continually patrolled by a heavy presence of police officers and bomb sniffing dogs, with random stops of vehicles as they approach the terminals. These measures make LAX, in Fetter’s words, “maybe the safest piece of turf
There are BAOs, bomb appraisal officers – five presently, with three more “in the pipeline” - who can help determine whether something screeners think may be a bomb is in fact one. BAOs tend to be more “discerning” than police department bomb squads, so their involvement reduces the need to shut down checkpoints and terminals for no good reason.

Fetters believes that there are enough air marshals at LAX to cover all “high-risk flights,” but he is unaware of the details of how many there are and how adequate their coverage is.

Fetters argues that the key to countering terrorism is cooperation and collaboration among law enforcement entities. Toward that end, there is a Los Angeles Aviation Security Advisory Committee, modeled on a program at the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, comprised of all federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations, along with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

Like Fetters, Erroll Southers, the Assistant Chief of Airport Police for Los Angeles World Airports, emphasizes that “LAX is a trophy [Al Qaeda] would love to add to their list.” According to Southers, no other airport in the country has been targeted more often.

To counter the threat, LAX has the largest police force of any airport in the country, some 400 officers, 75 of whom are devoted exclusively to counterterrorism. The total number of officers makes the airport police force larger than most cities’ police departments. Only Heathrow airport in London and Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv are comparable in size. The total budget is approximately $86 million.

Citing a 2005 RAND Corporation study of eleven potential attack scenarios, Southers worries most about the insider threat and VBIEDs. To counter the latter threat, he touts the “ARMOR” (Assisted Randomized Monitoring Over Routes) program, developed in partnership with CREATE, the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, of which Southers is Associate Director. Checkpoints are randomly set up around the airport perimeter. Officers, bomb-sniffing dogs, and BDOs staff the checkpoints. To preserve the element of surprise, assignments are given out only the night before.
Los Angeles’ Preparedness for Terrorism

Southers also participates in the “Tripwire” pilot project sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security. Through this project, software predicts the likelihood of attacks on critical infrastructure by analyzing security reports and by means of video surveillance.

The airport’s police force is part of Operation Archangel that protects critical infrastructure, and they participate in monthly meetings with the national intelligence community, specifically the CIA and the National Security Agency.

Among the best practices Southers touts is regular communication with experts and local consulates (especially those of Israel and Britain) as to potential terror threats.

For example, he has traveled to Israel to discuss TATP, the highly volatile homemade explosive intended to be used by shoe bomber Richard Reid. Southers is assessing whether it is cost-effective to deploy a handheld device at the airport that can detect it.

Maritime Security

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are the two largest ports in the United States, and together constitute the world’s fifth largest port complex. They handle 40% of the containers entering the United States. One million passengers arrive annually, and half a million imported automobiles. Over half of California’s oil needs pass through the ports. Annual trade is over $250 billion, and the ports support over two million jobs.

George Cummings, the Director of Homeland Security at the Port of Los Angeles analyzes maritime risk in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. His counterterrorism strategy focuses on deterrence, prevention, response, and recovery/trade resumption. Cummings participates in the Area Maritime Security Committee that brings the relevant federal, state, local governmental and private sector stakeholders together to focus on counterterrorism. Established in 2004, the Committee has an Area Maritime Security Plan.

Due, in part, to the $90 million in port grants the Los Angeles has received over the years, Cummings is installing a sophisticated waterside surveillance camera system, with fiber optics, that will be complet-
ed by the end of the year. There is also a Joint Command and Control Center with the Port of Long Beach’s Information Awareness Center. Cummings is developing a security awareness training program. The TWIC (Transportation Workers Identification Card) biometric system will be rolled out in the summer or fall, after which the cards will be mandatory for unescorted access to the port’s 27 terminals.

Additional initiatives include expanded port police personnel and operations. For example, port waters are patrolled on a 24/7 basis by two vessels. There is also a vehicle and cargo inspection team. There are dedicated tactical frequencies so as to expand communications capabilities.

The top DHS official at the ports, Todd Hoffman, emphasizes the twin objections of security and facilitating commerce. Toward those ends, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) pursues a number of interrelated initiatives, namely: (1) advance information; (2) advance targeting; and (3) sophisticated detection technology.

CBP requires carriers to submit electronically, no later than 24 hours before the cargo is laden aboard a vessel at a foreign port, information as to, among other things, its contents and shipping route so as to provide data to its automated target system (ATS). Based on certain algorithms that assign different levels of risk to different data, some cargo is deemed to be “high-risk.”

In an effort to detect a weapon of mass destruction, 100% of high risk cargo is scanned by Radiation Portal Monitors. Trucks go through the RPMs as they exit the port, at a speed of 5 m.p.h. There are 24 fixed and mobile RPMs at the ports, costing a totaling of $25 million. Thirty-five percent of incoming cargo is bound for rail; that cargo is scanned by hand-held devices- personal radiation detectors - that simply determine whether any radiation emissions are gamma or neutron. When the presence of radiation is indicated, RIIDs (Radiation Isotope Identification Devices) are used “in secondary” to distinguish between deadly radiation and harmless radiation that occurs naturally in certain substances. The port has 120 RIIDs, which Hoffman says are enough. There are between 400-600 false alarms per day at the ports. Inspectors have to be vigilant, Hoffman says, and not complacent, since “there is one false alarm after another.”
New technology promises to reduce false positives, but it is still in the testing phase. Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP), which at $50,000 a piece are costly, can both detect radiation and identify the isotope. The “grand vision” is to have ASPs as the primary inspection tool and that they not alarm at all if any radiation detected is benign.

In an effort to “push the borders out,” so that a weapon of mass destruction aimed at the United States before it arrives at one of our seaports, there is the DHS-initiated Container Security Initiative (CSI). CBP inspectors are stationed at 58 ports overseas, constituting 86% of the containers bound for the United States. When information submitted through ATS indicates that a given container is high risk, CBP inspectors are to ask local inspectors to screen those shipments.

Another international program is the Secure Freight Initiative, under which RPMs and x-ray scans are stationed at six foreign ports so as to test the feasibility of the congressional mandate to scan 100% of incoming cargo containers for radiation.

CBP participates also in the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program (C-TPAT). Shippers, importers, carriers and other in the supply chain can join the program if they have certain security measures. In exchange for those measures, members’ cargo has less chance of being inspected. There are 7,000 members in the program; 97% of their security programs are validated by CBP as containing the security features claimed, according to Hoffman.

Hoffman says the port is “looking at” RFID (radio frequency identification) technology that can monitor cargo in transit to detect deviation from the stated route and also tampering, but privacy concerns must be worked out before it is deployed.

There is a team of underwater divers who periodically search for mines.

Hoffman says that ferries, helicopter transport, and cruise lines are particularly vulnerable.

There is no scanning of cars at the port today or other “roro “cargo, though the port is planning to scan roll-on roll off (i.e., non-contain- erized) cargo eventually.
Ronald Boyd, the Chief of Los Angeles Port Police, focuses on disrupting terror plots, with his force of 200 officers. He “struggles” with resources and manpower, so in his view, technology has to be the “force multiplier.” His initiatives include a port-wide publication notification system; the development of a business continuity and port recovery plan; upgrading the emergency procedures plan; and undertaking a real-time evacuation exercise.

**Mass Transit Security**

Commander Dan Finkelstein, the Chief of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, heads the second largest transit police force in the nation. There are four rail lines, and 220 buses. One and half million people a day use mass transit in the area, 10% of the population of Los Angeles County.

Finkelstein argues that the best counterterrorism strategy is awareness, the proverbial “see saying; say something” campaign.

He laments that it took 18 months for him to get his SECRET security clearance, terming the length of time it took “crazy.” Transit executives likewise need security clearances, Finkelstein maintains. They need not know sources and methods, but they do need to know the sum and substance of terror threats if they are to do their jobs properly.

The Commander says that it is easy to get federal dollars for “stuff,” i.e., equipment and technology, but not for “bodies,” i.e. personnel.

Because his and like agencies do not have the expertise or time to evaluate them, third parties should evaluate competing counterterrorism technologies and strategies.

He has twelve canine explosive teams that are “really more for show than substance,” but “show,” he says, “is part of the job.” Finkelstein also has some BDOs.

Gary Dominguez, the Chief of the California Highway Patrol has 1300 officers. Traffic enforcement is CHP’s main mission. Officers make millions of stops each year. He can mobilize hundreds of officers across the state with equipment for weeks at a time.
CHP is represented on the JTTF. The force works closely with LAPD and the Sheriff’s office.

As for evacuations, should they ever be necessary, Dominguez says getting 10 million people out of Los Angeles is “not very easy.”

There are 500 closed circuit t.v. cameras in Los Angeles. There is a catwalk in the subway system, so people can walk out in an emergency. Bio-detection in the subway is “iffy.”

Interoperability among area law enforcement agencies is not a problem, according to Dominguez.

Like Finkelstein, Dominguez laments the difficulty of getting security clearances, arguing for a national coordinator who can see to it that key state and local officials get the clearances they need in a timely fashion.

“Leading Thinkers”

The penultimate roundtable panel featured prominent area commentators on homeland security related issues. First among them was Detlof von Winterfeldt, the Director of CREATE (the University of Southern California think tank funded by DHS). Von Winterfeldt distinguishes among threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, and consequence assessments. Threats are of concern to the degree that a given target, if attacked, is vulnerable to that mode of attack and to the degree that a successful attack on that target is consequential in terms of deaths, injuries, and economic damage. If, for example, the consequences of an attack against a given target would be huge, but the target in question is only slightly vulnerable to such an attack, the threat is of lesser concern. If, on the other hand, the consequences were relatively small, but the target in question is highly vulnerable, the threat would be of greater concern. Of course, given limited resources and the inherent tension in a democratic society between security and liberty, the most attention must be paid to threats against the most vulnerable and consequential targets. And, it should go without saying that threats must be distinguished from each other on the basis of credibility, specificity, and timeliness. Von Winterfeldt argues that as among them, assessing consequences is the easiest task; assessing threats is the most difficult.
Relatively small events in terms of deaths can have huge economic effects, according to von Winterfeldt. For example, an attack on a port by means of an improvised explosive device would be unlikely to kill many people, but the economic impact could reach $20 billion. The economic impact correlates to the degree of public fear, noting the impact of 9/11 on air travel. Indirect economic impact tends to be greater than the direct economic impact. 9/11 had a direct economic effect of between $40-60 billion, while the indirect impact ranged from $250 billion to $450 billion.

To mitigate risk, to the extent it is possible to do so, Von Winterfeldt touts “smart randomization.” Varying security protocols “can confuse terrorists,” and it can foil “dumb” plots.

Raising the key question of how secure is secure enough, Von Winterfeldt notes that the costs of reducing risk to zero (to the extent that can be done) would be huge, given the cost in dollars and liberty.

Seth Jacobson, a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST), worries about “petro-terrorism,” an attack on petrochemical facilities in the Mideast, with Los Angeles being a major net importer. In his judgment, an attack on foreign targets that affect our oil supply are likelier than attacks on U.S. soil. To counter the threat, Jacobson argues for a crash effort to maximize the recovery of oil from U.S. fields, as well as redoubling our efforts to achieve energy independence.

RAND Corporation terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins argues that smaller scale attacks perpetrated by terrorists already in the country are more likely now than spectacular 9/11-scale attacks perpetrated by terrorists who enter the country. Because terrorists believe that a successful attack proves that Allah approves of it, Jenkins says “soft” targets are likelier now to be attacked than harder ones because, by definition, the former are more vulnerable.

Jenkins also considers the threat of homegrown terrorism to be “a major threat today,” citing various plots like those at Fort Dix, and Torrance California, among others.

That said, Jenkins believes Los Angeles to be less likely to be targeted than New York City. He says that there are few natural physical barriers in Los Angeles; the population is widely dispersed; there are rela-
tively few “iconic” targets,” and the non-Jewish population of Mideast
descent tends to be relatively well-off and socially integrated, with more
Christians and Iranians than is proportionately the case in New York.

Should Los Angeles be attacked, however, the fact that “the mutual
aid model works” there, meaning that federal, state, regional, and local
entities work well together and have lots of practice in doing so from
both natural disasters and various terror plots, will make the response
more effective than it would otherwise be. Still, he notes that the mul-
tiplicity of jurisdictions constitutes a challenge in itself.

Among the preparedness gaps in Los Angeles are a lessening of the
perception of the seriousness of the terror threat as more time passes
after 9/11 without another attack. Another factor is the scarcity of
government funds. And, third, there is a strong local resistance to intel-
ligence collection.

Jenkins is particularly concerned about the potential for mass tran-
sit attacks somewhere in the United States, noting that 47% of terror
attacks over the past 15 years were aimed at buses, and 46% on sub-
ways. The large concentration of people in a confined area makes mass
transit a terrorist “killing field.” That said, he adds that a mass transit
attack would be unlikely in Los Angeles because the subway system is
relatively small, and, though buses are especially vulnerable, the num-
ber of riders on any one of them is small. If there were an attack on
either system, the effect on surface travel would be minimal compared
to the effect of 9/11 on air travel. Most bus and subway riders are dis-
cretionary; they can easily take cars instead.

Best Practices

1. Foremost among the many best practices in Los Angeles is the
   police department’s conviction that fighting crime and coun-
tering terrorism are complementary imperatives, not compet-
ing ones. The particulars flow from this overarching belief.
   Accordingly, Chief Bratton has applied the “COMPSTAT”
model of policing that reduced crime in New York in the 1990s
from overwhelming proportions to manageable ones. Incidents
that might be terror-related are noted in “suspicious activ-
ity reports (SARs); mapped; analyzed for patterns and trends; and then responded to and followed up on “aggressively” and “relentlessly.” Criminal statutes relating, for example, to drug offenses, immigration, and money laundering, are used “creatively.” There are at least three advantages to this “all crimes, all hazards” approach. First, and most important, it works. As noted in the report, an arrest in a string of seemingly prosaic gas station robberies in the suburb of Torrance ultimately led enterprising detectives to an Al-Qaeda-inspired terror plot targeting U.S. Army recruiting centers and synagogues. Second, by training each officer to be alert to things that might be linked to terrorism, the full manpower resources of the police department are harnessed for maximum effect. Third, at a time of severe budgetary pressures, and a time when the public perceives terrorism to be, at most, a secondary concern, it is tough to make a political case for dedicating scarce resources to counterterrorism. It is much more palatable to argue that fighting crime is countering terrorism and vice versa.

2. LAPD has a Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau that collects, fuses, analyzes, and then disseminates “strategic and actionable” intelligence, working in concert with regional and federal partners in the seven counties served by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), the local counterterrorism-related intelligence fusion center.

3. Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) train “an ever wider net” of people in the city to augment the Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau’s ranks by themselves serving as “public data collectors and first preventers.” For example, as noted in the report, if mail carriers had been trained in terrorism indicators prior to the London bombings in the summer of 2005, they might have called the authorities’ attention to the fact that plants outside the safe house had turned white, indicating that dangerous chemicals were being mixed inside. There is a TLO for every one of the 19 patrol areas in the city. The upshot of this and complementary initiatives is, to paraphrase Chief Bratton’s citation of former DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff’s words, “to create a network to beat a network.”

4. Complementing the work of the Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau and TLOs is a “Human Source Development Unit” that recruits informants who can infiltrate terror networks and thereby become privy to terrorist plots and plans. The unit is modeled on the work of bureaus around the country that seek to break up drug rings, Mafia syndicates, and garden variety street gangs.

5. There are “forums” to engage discrete communities – notably the Muslim community – in regular dialogue with the police department, to build trust and promote mutual understanding. Over time, cooperative relationships can be formed that can foil terror plots, and better still, prevent them from being conceived in the first place.

6. The average police officer around the country knows little about terrorism, and even less about Islam, in whose name 9/11 was carried out. LAPD founded a first of its kind “National Counterterrorism Academy” to train state and local law enforcement officials in certain fundamentals, like the difference between Sunnis and Shiites and Hamas and Hezbollah, that are key to understanding international terrorism today.

7. There is unusually close collaboration among federal, state, regional, and local law enforcement officials in the Los Angeles area. All four police departments in the Los Angeles area are recruited and trained according to a common standard. Over the course of the next four years, nearly 70% of the total personnel in these forces will have trained together, further conducing to seamless collaboration when and if terror strikes. Who does what under various scenarios is worked out in advance, so as to avoid confusion and conflict during emergencies. After action reports are drafted and studied after training sessions and real incidents to ensure that lessons are learned.
8. Thanks to private sector funding, LAPD has acquired the British “hydra” system, a computerized system that allows officers to interact through networked computers. Chief Bratton has “multiple levels of connectivity,” including the ability to connect via BlackBerry to contacts in 50 American cities, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

9. Metrics are used to figure out how to get the most out of every scarce counterterrorism dollar.

10. Los Angeles has a powerful private sector “Homeland Security Advisory Council” composed of 75 “strategic” CEOs from major industries like real estate and media and entertainment to “support law enforcement in the event of a disaster and to educate and prepare the public before, during, and after a disaster.” There is a business response network, a secure online database through which companies can pre-register the resources they can make available during an emergency. Over 100 businesses now take part, supplying things like food, water, medicine and medical equipment, drivers, warehouses, and generators. A business operations center links key companies and sectors with government during emergencies. The council works with the media to advise citizens of what they can do to protect themselves in an emergency. It evaluates technology for the law enforcement community, and it seeks to limit the legal ability of those who voluntarily respond to emergencies, among other things.

11. To the same effect, through “Operation Archangel,” LAPD works with the largely private sector owners/operators of critical infrastructure to inventory and prioritize assets; to identify vulnerabilities and assess risk; and to address those vulnerabilities and to reduce risk. Among the program’s key features is the “Protective Security Task Force,” a team of 25 officers modeled on the “Hercules” teams in New York who can deploy on a random or intelligence-driven basis to sensitive locations to provide a “cloak of security.”
12. To protect critical infrastructure further, Los Angeles uses “Tripwire,” software that predicts the likelihood of attacks on critical infrastructure by analyzing security reports and video surveillance.

13. With regard to aviation specifically, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) deploys several technologies that hold the promise of significantly increasing screeners’ ability to spot concealed weapons and explosives, including millimeter wave, multi-view x-ray, and liquid explosives technology.

14. At LAX, there are BAOs, or bomb appraisal officers. BAOs can be summoned to checkpoints by screeners who think they may have spotted a concealed bomb to determine definitively whether the item in question is in fact an explosive. BAOs are on site, and, therefore, can respond more quickly than a police department bomb squad. And, they are especially well-trained, so they tend to be more discerning and discriminating than police bomb squads, so the disruption and cost of evacuating terminals (or, if need be, whole airports) can usually be avoided.

15. BDOs, or behavior detection officers, are deployed to scan passengers and airport visitors for signs of stress or anxiety that might indicate terrorist intent.

16. TDCs, or travel document checkers, are deployed to check passengers’ tickets or boarding passes and identification as a means of confirming their bona fides.

17. Bomb sniffing dogs are deployed widely throughout the airport, and they are used in perimeter patrols as well.

18. LAX has the heaviest police presence of any airport in the country, including some 400 officers on the airport’s police own police force who are supplemented by a significant number of officers from LAPD (for example, there are two LAPD officers at each checkpoint). Needless to say, such a force size can serve not only to respond to and detect terror plots, but
also to deter them. And, it helps to reassure the traveling public that the airport is safe.

19. The police force aggressively patrols the airport perimeter, randomly stopping and searching vehicles and passengers as they approach the terminal through a program called ARMOR (Assisted Randomized Monitoring Over Routes).

20. The leadership at LAX reaches out to learn from other countries’ (especially the United Kingdom and Israel, for obvious reasons) counterterrorism programs. There is extensive outreach to local consulates and occasional trips abroad toward this end.

21. To learn from each other and to promote collaboration, there is an Aviation Advisory Security Committee.

22. As for maritime security, complementing the Aviation Advisory Security Committee, there is an Area Maritime Security Committee covering the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

23. There is a surveillance camera system at the ports to spot and to deter terrorist activity.

24. There are regular exercises and drills; a port-wide notification system for emergencies; and a business continuity and port recovery plan is being developed.

Gaps

1. A number of participants, including the Los Angeles County Sheriff, complained about the difficulty of obtaining clearances from the federal government to access the intelligence they need to do their jobs.

2. We know that prisons in America in general, and those in California in particular, are hotbeds of radicalization, and yet
there is no organized effort to monitor prisoners who might be radicalized in prison after they are released.

3. Interoperability – the ability of police, fire, and other emergency response personnel to communicate with and among each other during a crisis – remains both a technical and cultural challenge.

4. There is no city-wide logistics plan for emergencies.

5. Evacuating Los Angeles is impractical, to say the least, should evacuation ever prove to be necessary.

6. As noted in the companion report on New York City, the nation lacks a “culture of preparedness.” To some degree, the fact that average citizens and most businesses are unprepared for a catastrophe reflects a good thing – the infrequency of terror attacks and apocalyptic natural disasters in our country. On the other hand, the lack of experience with catastrophes has made us inattentive to the omnipresent threat of them, and, thus, woefully, unprepared for them.

7. It takes too long to develop and deploy technology.

8. The plethora of intelligence fusion centers in the region makes coordination among them so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts a challenge.

9. In terms of aviation security, the top TSA official at LAX, the Federal Security Director, does not himself know the complement of air marshals covering each flight, and whether, in fact, there are at least enough to cover every flight deemed to be “high risk.” At present, like his counterparts in New York, the FSD relies upon the head of the local air marshal force’s assurances to this effect.
10. In terms of maritime security, a number of programs CBP employs (nationwide, not just in the Los Angeles area) are flawed. Cargo is targeted for inspection based on a score it receives based on a computerized analysis of data points supplied by companies in the supply chain like stated contents and shipping route. There is no way of knowing whether the information in the system is accurate. The C-TPAT program, whereby companies can reduce the risk that their cargo is inspected by asserting that they follow rigorous security regimes, is based on the notion of “verify but trust” in that the benefit of a reduced chance of inspection is provided before the government (DHS’ Customs and Border Protection bureau) verifies that the asserted security regime is in fact in place. And, even once a program is verified, it may subsequently be compromised in some way, while the benefit remains. Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), we station our CBP inspectors at many ports abroad to ensure that cargo bound for the United States that we deem to be high-risk is inspected before it reaches our shores, but we have to rely on foreign personnel to the inspections and they can and sometimes do fail to carry out those inspections. And, while we are beginning to screen all incoming cargo for radiation, so as to spot a dirty bomb or, worse, a weapon of mass destruction, neither our present generation technology, nor “next generation” technology, ASP (Advanced Spectroscopic Portals) can distinguish between deadly and harmless radiation).

11. There is presently no use of RFID (radio frequency identification) technology that can monitor cargo in transit to detect deviation from the stated route as well as tampering along the way, though the ports are “looking at it” now.

12. There is now no scanning of cars and other “roro” non-containerized cargo that rolls onto and off ships, though there are plans to do so “eventually.”
General Themes

1. As more time goes by after 9/11 without another attack, complacency is increasingly setting in, making the nation more vulnerable to the threat of another terror attack.

2. As noted above, given the state of the economy, money is especially tight now, so making the case for counterterrorism expenditures in the absence of a perceived imminent threat is all the harder.

3. There is a tendency on government’s part to fund the purchase of new technology/equipment, as opposed to maintenance of what exists and ongoing personnel costs.

4. A key reason for Los Angeles’ greater degree of preparedness for terrorism than most cities is its experience with and readiness for earthquakes and other natural disasters, underscoring the utility of the “all hazards” approach that the Department of Homeland Security takes.

5. The goal is prevention, but we cannot prevent everything. So, another terror attack is not, in and of itself, a failure; a preventable attack is a failure.
Notes


3. There was initially some controversy within law enforcement circles as to whether this incident was linked to terrorism. The FBI has since deemed it so to be. See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002-2005, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.htm

4. This is certainly not to suggest that Sunnis and Shiites as a group are terrorists. But simply that the terrorism at issue here is carried out in the name of Islam, and, consequently, counterterrorism officials must understand the fundamentals of that religion and culture.

5. Chief Bratton was referring to the practice, in earlier ages, of limiting the then precious condiment of salt to the wealthy and powerful.

6. Mr. Alikhan has since been appointed Assistant Secretary for Policy Development at the Department of Homeland Security.

7. Regrettably, Weiss lost his campaign for re-election.

8. By “secondary inspection protocol,” I mean that passengers would be screened through millimeter wave only if the alarm were to sound when they passed through the checkpoint and the alarm could not be resolved by, for example, divesting themselves of items inadvertently left in their pockets like keys or change.

9. According to Chief Southers, there was a plan in 2004 to move the entire checkpoint apparatus at LAX outside the airport and to re-design the whole complex with security in mind. The plan was shot down by various politicians and developers who were concerned about the economic impact.

10. The six ports are Port Qasim in Pakistan; Puerto Cortes in Honduras; Southampton in the United Kingdom; Port Salalah in Oman; the Port of Singapore; and Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in South Korea.

Ford – CREATE¹ – Aspen Roundtable

Los Angeles’ Preparedness for Terrorism

Location: Davidson Conference Center (Alumni Room) University of Southern California 3415 South Figueroa Street Los Angeles, CA 90889

March 31 – April 2nd 2008

AGENDA:

Monday, March 31, 2008

Welcoming Remarks – 9:00 a.m. –9:15 a.m.

Clark Kent Ervin  
_Director, Homeland Security Program, The Aspen Institute_

Dr. Detlof von Winterfeldt  
_Director, National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events_

Dr. Bonnie Jenkins  
_Program Officer, U.S. Foreign and Security Policy, The Ford Foundation_

Keynote Address – 9:15 a.m. –10:15 a.m

The Honorable William J. Bratton  
_Chand, Los Angeles Police Department_

Break – 10:15 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

Aviation Security – 10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Lawrence Fetters  
_Federal Security Director_  
_Transportation Security Administration_  
_Los Angeles International Airport_

¹ University of Southern California’s National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events
Erroll Southers  
*Assistant Chief of Airport Police*  
*Associate Director of CREATE at USC*  
*Los Angeles World Airports*

**Break** – 12:00 p.m. – 12:15 p.m.

**Luncheon Address** – 12:15 p.m. – 1:15 p.m.  
The Honorable Leroy D. Baca  
*Sheriff*  
*Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department*

**Port Security** – 1:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.  
Ronald J. Boyd  
*Chief*  
*Los Angeles Port Police*

Todd A. Hoffman  
*Port Director of the Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport*  
*Customs and Board Protection*  
*U.S. Department of Homeland Security*

George Cummings  
*Director of Homeland Security*  
*Port of Los Angeles*

**Break** – 3:30 p.m. – 3:45 p.m.

**Mass Transit Security** – 3:45 p.m. – 5:15 p.m.  
Dan Finkelstein, Commander  
*Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department - Office of Homeland Security*  
*Chief of Transit Police, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority*

Gary Dominguez  
*Chief*  
*California Highway Patrol*
Tuesday, April 1, 2008

Critical Infrastructure, Icons, and Soft Targets – 9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

Patrick Silver
Director of Security
U.S. Bank Tower

Chris Baumgart
Chairman
The Hollywood Sign Trust

Break – 10:30 a.m. – 10:45 p.m.

Critical Infrastructure, Icons, and Soft Targets (continued) – 10:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Brian Brady
NBC Universal Studios
Corporate Security Vice President

Tony Drake
Andrews International Security
Special Event Security Contractor
Kodak Theatre

Lorenzo Soria
Security
Golden Globes

Break – 12:00 p.m. – 12:15 p.m.

Luncheon Address – 12:15 p.m. – 1:15 p.m.

Marc Nathanson
Chairman
Los Angeles Homeland Security Advisory Council

Break – 1:15 p.m. – 1:30 p.m.
Preventers and Responders – 1:30 p.m. –3:00 p.m.

Captain Horace E. Frank  
*CTCIB Commanding Officer of Emergency Services Division*  
*Los Angeles Police Department*

Eric Velez  
*Federal Bureau of Investigation*  
*Special Agent in Charge*  
*Intelligence Division*  
*Los Angeles Field Office*

Break – 3:00 p.m. –3:15 p.m.

Preventers and Responders (continued) – 2:45 p.m. –4:15 p.m.

Brigadier General Kevin Ellsworth  
*Assistant Adjutant General*  
*California Army National Guard*

James G. Featherstone  
*General Manager*  
*City of Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Department*

Laurene Mascola M.D., M.P.H., F.A.A.P  
*Chief, Acute Communicable Disease Control Program*  
*Los Angeles County Department of Public Health*  
*County of Los Angeles Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response*

Henry Renteria  
*Director*  
*Governor’s Office of Emergency Service*

Jack Weiss  
*LA City Council Member*

Douglas L. Barry  
*Fire Chief*  
*Los Angeles Fire Department*
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008

Preventers and Responders: – 9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

Al Cruz
Special Agent in Charge
California Department of Justice

Break – 10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.

Non-Governmental Organizations – 10:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Paul Schultz
CEO
American Red Cross of Greater Los Angeles

Karen Wagener
President
Los Angeles Police Foundation

Richard L. Jones
President
Infragard (Los Angeles)

Shakeel Syed
Executive Director, Islamic Shura Council
Muslim American Homeland Security Congress

Lunch – 12:15 p.m. – 1:15 p.m.

Arif Alikhan
Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security and Public Safety

Natural Disaster Preparedness: – 1:15 p.m. – 2:45 p.m.

Farley Howell
Division Director
National Preparedness
FEMA Region IX
Dr. Lucile M. Jones  
Chairman, Seismic Safety Commission  
Scientist-in-Charge, Southern California Earthquake Hazards Team  
U.S. Geological Survey  

Gilbert Pedroza  
Emergency Operations  
Superintendent  
City of Los Angeles Dept. of Public Works  
Bureau of Street Services  

Break – 2:45 p.m. –3:00 p.m.  

Leading Thinkers: – 3:00 p.m. –4:30 p.m.  

Dr. Detlof von Winterfeldt  
Director  
USC Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events  

Dr. Tom LaTourrette  
Senior Physical Scientist  
RAND Corporation  

Seth Jacobson  
Senior Research Fellow  
Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST)  

Brian Jenkins  
RAND and Mineta Transportation Institute  

Break: – 4:30 p.m. –4:45 p.m.  

Closing Address: – 4:45 p.m. –5:30 p.m.  

Gary S. Winuk  
Chief Deputy Director  
California Governor’s Office of Homeland Security
EXHIBIT B

The Participants’ Bios
Clark Kent Ervin


A native Houstonian, he served in the state government of Texas from 1995 to 2001, first as Assistant Secretary of State, and then as a Deputy Attorney General.

He has practiced law twice in the private sector, with the Houston based firms of Vinson & Elkins, and Locke, Liddell, & Sapp, respectively.


In addition to his work at The Aspen Institute, Mr. Ervin is a member of the Wartime Contracting Commission on Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also an on-air analyst and contributor at CNN, where he focuses on homeland security, national security, and intelligence issues. He is frequently cited as an expert on these matters by major national and

Mr. Ervin serves on the Board of Advisers of Clear Path Technologies, Inc. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, and the American Association of Rhodes Scholars.

**Detlof von Winterfeldt**

Detlof von Winterfeldt is a Professor of Industrial and Systems Engineering in the Viterbi School of Engineering and a Professor of Public Policy and Management in the School of Policy, Planning, and Development at the University of Southern California (USC). He also is the Director of the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), the first university-based center of excellence funded by the Department of Homeland Security. For the past thirty years, he has been active in teaching, research, university administration, and consulting. He has taught courses in statistics, decision analysis, risk analysis, systems analysis, research design, and behavioral decision research. His research interests are in the foundation and practice of decision and risk analysis as applied to the areas of technology development, environmental risks, natural hazards and terrorism. He is the co-author of two books, two edited volumes, and author or co-author of over 100 journal articles and book chapters on these topics. As a consultant he has applied decision and risk analysis to many management problems of government and private industry. He has served on several committees and panels of the National Science Foundation and the National Academies (NAS), including a recent appointment to the NAS Board on Mathematical Sciences and their Applications. He is a fellow of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) and of the Society for Risk Analysis. In 2000, he received the Ramsey Medal for distinguished contributions to decision analysis from the Decision Analysis Society of INFORMS.
Dr. Bonnie Jenkins

Bonnie Jenkins is the Program Officer for US Foreign and Security Policy in the New York-based Governance and Civil Society Unit of the Ford Foundation. Bonnie has responsibility for the portfolio of US Security Policy, but combines it with a broader focus on US Foreign Policy along with facilitating the Foundation’s US Foreign Policy Learning Circle. By bringing together two areas of work that increasingly overlap, Ford is able to generate a more effective and coherent body of grant-making at a crucial time for America in world affairs. Ms. Jenkins also has responsibility at the foundation for grants in the field of international peace efforts.

Bonnie Jenkins most recently was a Fellow in Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Prior to her time at Belfer, she spent many years in government service. Ms. Jenkins entered government as a Presidential Management Fellow at the Pentagon, and then worked as Attorney-Advisor in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where she helped to negotiate a number of important disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and conventions including the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines, and the UN Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, winning the Agency’s Outstanding Service Award in 1999. Bonnie then moved as General Counsel to the US Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and later to the US National Commission on Terrorism. After brief periods in the State Department (as Deputy Director of the Kosovo History project in the Office of Policy Planning) and the Rand Corporation (as Research Associate in National Security), she was appointed Counsel to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”), where she had responsibility for the research and writing on counterterrorism policy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as on military operations to combat terrorism, particularly operations against al-Qaeda, from 1998 – 2001. Ms Jenkins interviewed current and former senior Department of Defense Officials such as Donald Rumsfeld, William Cohen, Paul Wolfowitz, Chairman Richard Meyers, Chairman Hugh Shelton, General Tommy Franks,
General Anthony Zinni, and wrote part of the 9/11 Commission report which has since become a bestseller.

Bonnie holds a BA degree in Psychology and Black Studies from Amherst College, an MPA from the SUNY Albany, a JD from Albany Law School, an LLM in International Law from Georgetown Law Center, and a PhD in International Relations from the University of Virginia. She attended The Hague Academy of International Law in 1995. Ms. Jenkins also holds the rank of Lieutenant Commander in the US Naval Reserve and has received numerous awards during her Naval career, including the nationwide Junior Officer of the Year award.

**William J. Bratton**

William J. Bratton was appointed Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in October 2002. Chief Bratton oversees the third largest police department in the United States, managing 9,500 sworn officers, 3,000 civilian employees, and an annual budget of more than one billion dollars. After directing a major reengineering and reform effort, he is now driving initiatives in LA aimed at utilizing real-time information to further reduce crime, target gang violence, and mitigate the threat posed by terrorism. After five years in office, crime in LA has been reduced to historically low levels, with Part I crimes down 32% and homicides down 40%.

The only person ever to serve as chief executive of both the LAPD and the NYPD, Chief Bratton established an international reputation for reengineering police departments and fighting crime in the 1990s. As Chief of the New York City Transit Police, Boston Police Commissioner, then New York City Police Commissioner, he revitalized morale and cut crime in all three posts, achieving the largest crime declines in New York City’s history. He led the development of CompStat, the internationally acclaimed computerized crime-mapping system developed by the NYPD in the 1990s and now used by police departments nationwide. By bringing all crime and arrest data together by category and by neighborhood, CompStat revolutionized policing, enabling officers to focus their efforts in problem areas, armed with real-time information, accurate intelligence, rapid deployment of resources, individual
accountability, and relentless follow-up. From 1996 on, Chief Bratton worked in the private sector, where he formed his own private consulting company, The Bratton Group, L.L.C., working on four continents, including extensive consulting in South America. He also consulted with the Kroll Associates monitoring team overseeing the implementation of the Federal Consent Decree with the LAPD.

A U.S. Army Vietnam veteran, Chief Bratton began his policing career in 1970 as a police officer with the Boston Police Department, rising to Superintendent of Police, the department’s highest sworn rank, in just 10 years. In the 1980s, Chief Bratton headed two other police agencies, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police and the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission Police.

Chief Bratton holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Law Enforcement from Boston State College/University of Massachusetts. He is a graduate of the FBI National Executive Institute and was a Senior Executive Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also the only chief executive to serve two terms as the elected President of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). He is a frequent lecturer, writer, and commentator. His critically acclaimed autobiography, *Turnaround*, was published by Random House in 1998. Among his many honors and awards, Chief Bratton holds the Schroeder Brothers Medal, the Boston Police Department’s highest award for valor, and in 2007 was honored by Governing Magazine as one of their Public Officials of the year. Chief Bratton is married to Attorney Rikki Klieman and has one grown son, David Bratton.

**Lawrence Fetters**

Larry Fetters was born in Pasadena, California and has lived most of his life in Southern California.

He is a graduate of California State University at Los Angeles, earned an MPA (Master of Public Administration) from the University of Southern California and attended the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

He was a career police officer with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and retired from city service as a Deputy Chief.
During his police career and later as a civilian security executive, Larry participated in securing two International Olympic Games in America, the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles and the Centennial Olympic Games (1996) in Atlanta, Georgia.

Larry currently serves as the Federal Security Director, U.S. Transportation Security Administration, at Los Angeles International Airport. In his current position, Larry directs and oversees a workforce of more than 2,000 federal employees who provide security services at the nation’s third busiest airport.

**Erroll G. Southers**

Erroll G. Southers is the Chief of Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism of the Los Angeles World Airports Police Department, the nation’s largest aviation law enforcement agency. He is also the Associate Director of the National Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California (USC), where he is an Adjunct Professor of Terrorism and Public Policy. Mr. Southers is the former Deputy Director of the California Office of Homeland Security, appointed by Governor Schwarzenegger and responsible for the oversight of critical infrastructure counterterrorism policy and national pilot programs.

His international experience includes counterterrorism studies in Israel, at the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israeli Defense Forces’ Home Front Command. He is a former FBI Special Agent assigned to matters of counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, and a member of the Bureau’s SWAT Team. He is a former Santa Monica Police Department detective, member of the Rio Hondo Police Academy faculty and tactical staff, and a court-qualified gang expert. He ascended to the position of Assistant Vice President at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art after serving as Chief of the institution’s police agency and contract security services.

Mr. Southers is a Certified Institutional Protection manager and certified in homeland security by the American College of Forensic Examiners Institute. He is a consultant to numerous international firms and regularly featured in the media as an expert on matters of counter-
terrorism and infrastructure protection. Mr. Southers is a Senior Fellow of the UCLA School of Public Affairs and a Next Generation Fellow of the American Assembly at Columbia University. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree at Brown University and his Master of Public Administration at USC, where he is a doctoral candidate.

**Leroy D. Baca, Sheriff**

Sheriff Baca commands the largest Sheriff’s Department in the United States with a budget of 2.4 billion dollars. He leads over 18,000 budgeted sworn and professional staff. The Sheriff’s Department is the law enforcement provider to 40 incorporated cities, 90 unincorporated communities, 9 community colleges, and hundreds of thousands of daily commuters of the Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Rapid Rail Transit District. Over 4 million people are directly protected by the Sheriff’s Department.

The Sheriff’s Department also protects 58 Superior Courts and 600 bench officers. Moreover, the Department manages the Nation’s largest local jail system housing over 20,000 prisoners.

Sheriff Baca is the Director of Homeland Security-Mutual Aid for California Region I, which includes the County of Orange. Region I serves 13 million people.

Sheriff Baca incorporates innovative best practices into his leadership style based on pro-active, progressive problem solving.

His development of leadership qualities in all levels of the Sheriff’s Department have resulted in strong solutions to problems such as drug addiction, domestic violence, homelessness, gangs, illiteracy, at-risk youth, parenting, and the quality of life in neighborhoods. He also manages four non-profit Youth Athletic League Centers serving at-risk youth in after-school programs involving academics, sports, and cultural arts.

Sheriff Baca also developed the Office of Independent Review, comprised of six civil rights attorneys who manage all internal affairs and internal criminal investigations concerning alleged misconduct by Department personnel. This unique model of civilian oversight is a natural model of police accountability.
Sheriff Baca earned his Doctorate of Public Administration Degree from the University of Southern California. He is a life member of the Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi, USC Chapter. A strong advocate of education, he developed the LASD University in conjunction with 13 universities where over 950 members of the Sheriff’s Department are enrolled in Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree programs.

Sheriff Baca was elected Sheriff of Los Angeles County in December 1998, and was re-elected in June 2006 for his third term in office. He entered the Sheriff’s Department on August 23, 1965. He served in the United States Marine Corps Reserves.

**Ronald J. Boyd**

Ronald J. Boyd is a 24-year law enforcement veteran. He has served as the Chief of Los Angeles Port Police since 2004. A member of the Port Police from 1982-1999, Boyd rose up the rank to lieutenant before joining 200+ strong police force at Los Angeles World Airports in where he currently serves as Patrol Services Commander and Assistant Airport Security Coordinator.

**Todd A. Hoffman**

Todd A. Hoffman is currently the Port Director of the Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport. In this capacity Mr. Hoffman manages and oversees U.S. Customs and Border Protection operations at the Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and Hueneme. Prior to his current position, Mr. Hoffman served as the Director, Non-Intrusive Inspection Division for the Office of Field Operations at U.S. Customs and Border Protection Headquarters in Washington, DC. In this capacity, he was responsible for developing strategies for the operational implementation of tools and technology that enhance the security of our nation’s ports of entry. He managed an operating budget for technology that included non-intrusive imaging systems and radiation detection technology that averaged $100 million annually. Additionally, Mr. Hoffman oversaw the policies and set national priorities for the anti-terrorism and contraband enforcement teams and mobile tactical enforcement teams located throughout the country.
Prior to serving as the Director, Non-Intrusive Inspection Division for the Office of Field Operations at U.S. Customs and Border Protection Headquarters in Washington, DC, Mr. Hoffman served as a Program Manager for the Anti-Smuggling Division for the Office of Field Operations at Customs Headquarters. From March 1999 to October 2001, he was assigned to Newark International Airport, where he supervised airport operations for the U.S. Customs Service. He also served an earlier tour of duty at Customs Headquarters as a Program Officer for Outbound Programs from March 1996 to March 1999, where he managed export enforcement and anti-terrorism programs. He began his Customs career in 1991, where he served as an inspector in Buffalo, NY. Mr. Hoffman graduated magna cum laude from Michigan State University in 1990. He also completed intensive management development programs at Columbia University’s School of Business and Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He and his wife Sherri have one son.

**George Cummings**

George Cummings is the Director of Homeland Security for the Port of Los Angeles, he has been in the position since February 2004. He retired from the U.S. Coast Guard at the rank of Commander after serving 21 years, his career included shipboard engineering, marine safety and maritime security assignments. His final Coast Guard assignment was as Deputy Group Commander and Alternate Captain of the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, where he directed Coast Guard operations for more than 300 miles of central California coastline. His formal education includes a Bachelor of Science in Marine Engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School.

**Dan Finkelstein**

Commander Dan Finkelstein, a 31-year veteran of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, serves as Chief of Transit Police for the Los Angeles County Metro system (MTA). In that role, he commands a force of approximately 500 employees, providing security and law
enforcement services for MTA’s bus and rail lines throughout the county, as well as the Metrolink commuter railway, that serves six southern California counties. Together, the county’s mass transit systems move 1.7 million people daily.

Commander Finkelstein holds a Master’s Degree in Health Sciences, with a concentration in Emergency and Disaster Management. He has traveled to Israel, France, Canada, and has been to London twice with other Sheriff’s Department employees in an effort to learn how to better prepare Los Angeles County’s system against terrorist attacks.

Gary Dominguez

Chief Gary Dominguez began his distinguished career with the California Highway Patrol in 1981. After graduating from the CHP Academy in Sacramento, he was assigned to Southern Division’s Baldwin Park Area where he worked for 18 months. He then transferred to San Jose, Hanford, and Visalia. After working road patrol for about four years, he applied for and was selected to be an instructor at the CHP Academy’s Emergency Vehicle Operations Course. After one year at the Academy, he promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1987, and was assigned back to Southern Division in the West Valley Area. Having built quite a reputation for himself as a superior instructor for newly hired cadets, Gary only spent one year at West Valley before the Academy was calling for his services once again.

Chief Dominguez worked at the Academy for about eight months as an instructor covering Laws of Arrest curriculum with new cadets. He was recruited into the CHP’s Equal Employment Opportunity unit in Sacramento and after one year promoted to Lieutenant. He was assigned to the Long Range Planning unit at CHP Headquarters where his management skills were quickly noticed by Executive Management. Gary was assigned to serve as the Commander of the Los Banos Area in late 1990, and just three years later promoted to Captain.

He served as the East Los Angeles Area Commander for four years before being promoted to Assistant Chief in Southern Division. In late 1997, he transferred to Border Division where he remained until his promotion to Deputy Chief in 2001. Chief Dominguez worked in the
office of the Assistant Commissioner, Staff in Sacramento for a short time before taking over as the Central Division (Fresno) Commander. In late 2004, Chief Dominguez took over the CHP’s Information Management Division (IMD) in Sacramento and remained there until June 2005, when he returned to his “roots” as Southern Division Commander. He has an Associates of Arts Degree in Criminal Justice from College of the Sequoia’s and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from San Jose State University. He began his graduate work in Public Administration at the University of Southern California.

**Patrick Silver**

I come from a service industry background, having worked at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Marina Del Rey as a security officer. After being promoted to a supervisor I was soon promoted to Night Manager.

In 2000 I joined Universal Protection Service where I began work as a Security Director at the Water Garden in Santa Monica. Shortly after the 9/11 incident I accepted a position as the Assistant Security Director of the US Bank Tower in downtown Los Angeles. It was determined shortly after 9/11 that the US Bank Tower was targeted for an attack by Al-Qaeda.

I was promoted in 2005 to Security Director of the US Bank Tower.

I had the opportunity to help create a training program with the LAPD called SOTAC (Security Officer Training Awareness Course). This training was targeted to assist private security personnel look out for potential terrorism indicators.

Recently I’ve had the opportunity to conduct a presentation to the Sergeant’s school at the LAPD academy on the US Bank Tower and Infrastructure Protection. I was invited to conduct the presentation by the LAPD Major Crimes Department, which is responsible for the protection and investigation of incidents at the US Bank Tower.

I’m currently finishing school at Santa Monica College and plan to pursue my Bachelors Degree in Business Management at CAL State LA.
Chris Baumgart

As chairman of the Hollywood Sign Trust since 1993, Chris Baumgart leads the entity responsible for protecting, preserving and promoting the global icon of the entertainment industry. During his tenure, Mr. Baumgart has overseen a range of projects to secure and maintain the Sign, including the installation of a web-based, state-of-the-art security and surveillance system and two major refurbishments.

While serving as general manager of Panasonic Corporate Systems Company, Los Angeles, he was recognized for his expertise in developing unique security system proposals for industry-segments including sports, transportation, theme parks and casinos and forging alliances with strategic security partners. Previously Mr. Baumgart was president of Shoreline Professional Video Systems, working with a range of clients including Fox Television, the City of Los Angeles, the Oakland Raiders, Disney and Universal Studios.

A graduate of UCLA and the Stanford University M.B.A program, he has also served as Chairman of the Hollywood Chamber of Commerce and the Hollywood Police Advisory Board and has been a member of the Board of Trustees of the Stevenson School since 1985. Currently he is a realtor in Pebble Beach, CA.

Brian Brady

• Currently Vice President of Corporate Security, NBC Universal
• Joined NBC Universal in January of 2005
• Served more than 34 years in Municipal Law Enforcement, with the cities of Berkeley, Baldwin Park and Novato, California and in Farmington, New Mexico.
• Worked virtually all police assignments, including Patrol, Investigations, Traffic, Administrative, and Specialty Assignments i.e. SWAT and Crisis Management.
• Retired in December of 2003 as the Police Chief with the City of Novato, in the San Francisco Bay Area.
• Owned and managed a Training Company providing specialized training for Federal, State, County and Municipal Law Enforcement
personnel. Under contract to the US Government, provided specialized training to military personnel.

• Provided protective services and management for major events and for celebrity clients.

• BA, Golden Gate University, San Francisco; MS, Madison University and California State University, Sonoma

• Married, wife Candie is a retired LAPD Captain.

• Two sons, one is an attorney in Texas and the second is a supervisor at a hotel in the Napa Valley.

• Two Grandsons.

Anthony R. Drake

P.O.S.T. certified security specialist with over ten years of law enforcement experience, two years experience in the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office, and over nine years experience in the private security field. Strong knowledge of law enforcement operations, private security operations, and California Penal Code. Self-motivated individual with solid leadership, managerial and organizational skills. Proven negotiation skills and ability to work in high-stress situations. Working knowledge of Spanish (written and spoken), with superior communication/presentation skills. All state permits are current.

Los Angeles Police Department

Uniformed Patrol and Narcotics Investigator, 1995-2005

Conducted narcotic investigations in Detective and Undercover capacities and served high-risk felony narcotic warrants in the City of Los Angeles.

Served as a liaison between LAPD and the LA District Attorney’s office, negotiating felony narcotic complaints resulting in an increase in successful prosecutions.

Lorenzo Soria

Lorenzo Soria has been living in Los Angeles as the West Coast correspondent of the Italian weekly newsmagazine L’Espresso for the past
Marc Nathanson

Marc Nathanson is one of America’s leading communications executives. A 35-year veteran of the cable television industry, Nathanson founded and served as chairman and CEO of Falcon Holding Group, Inc., a cable television provider, and its predecessors from 1975 to 1999. He is currently Vice Chairman of Charter Communications. Nathanson is the founder and Co-chair of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) for Los Angeles / Orange Counties. He is a member of Mayor’s Homeland Security Advisory Committee and Chair of the Subcommittee on Private Sector. He is on the Board of the Governor’s Anti-terrorism Information Center. Currently he chairs Mapleton Investments LLC, an investment company he formed in 1999. In 1995, President Bill Clinton appointed Nathanson as chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors for the International Broadcasting, an independent federal agency which supervises all U.S. government-supported non-military global communications, including Voice of America, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Ahurra TV and Radio Sawa). He is vice chair of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Mr. Nathanson serves on the board of a number of public and private organizations, including the Skirball Cultural Center, Los Angeles Philharmonic, the American Democracy Institute, and USC Annenberg School for Communications Chair of Center for the Digital Future, and is a member of Business Executives for National Security (BENS).

Horace Frank

Captain Horrace Frank began his career as a police officer in 1988. He promoted to Sergeant in March 1993 and to the rank of Lieutenant in February 1999. After promoting to Captain in April 2005, Captain Frank was assigned to Southeast Patrol Division as the Commanding
The Participants’ Bios

Officer, where he led a very successful effort to bring the community and the Division closer together in a successful crime reduction effort.

In September 2006, he was upgraded and reassigned to Emergency Services Division, Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, where he now serves as the Commanding Officer. His current duties include oversight of the Bomb Squad, Hazardous Materials Unit, Bomb Detection Canine and Archangel Sections. Additionally, he serves as the Secretary on the Organized Crime Committee of the International Association Of Chiefs of Police. Among his many assignments, Captain Frank was an academic instructor at the Los Angeles Police Department’s Academy, a staff writer at Human Resources Bureau, an Associate Advocate at Internal Affairs Group and an Employee Relations Investigation Advocate at Employee Relations Section. Just prior to his promotion to Captain, he served as the Adjutant to the Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau Chief. A native of Guyana, South America, Captain Frank spent 8 1/2 years in the United States Air Force. He earned his Bachelor of Arts Degree in Sociology from Chapman University and later continued his educational endeavors at Golden Gate University, earning a Master’s Degree in Public Administration. Captain Frank is married, with three children. He is an avid runner who enjoys reading and listening to jazz and traveling.

Eric Velez

Mr. Eric Velez entered on duty with the FBI on September 25, 1985 and served as a Computer Specialist in the San Juan Division prior to entering New Agents Training on July 12, 1992. His first office of assignment as a Special Agent was the McAllen Resident Agency of the San Antonio Division where he worked Organized Crime/Drug matters from November 1992 through July 1997.

In July 1997, Mr. Velez was transferred to the Aguadilla Resident Agency of the San Juan Division, in Puerto Rico. He was assigned to work Public Corruption matters. In February 2000, Mr. Velez received a promotional transfer to FBIHQ, where he served as a Supervisory Special Agent in the Drug Section, and was detailed to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Mr. Velez served two years coor-
dinating major drug trafficking investigations throughout the U.S.

In February 2002, Mr. Velez was transferred to the Santa Ana Resident Agency, Los Angeles Division, where he served as the Organized Crime/Drug supervisor until August 2002, when he was re-assigned to supervise the Orange County Joint Terrorism Task Force (OCJTTF). He was promoted in December 2004 to the position of Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Office Counterterrorism Program. Mr. Velez oversaw three Joint Terrorism Task Forces, to include the OCJTTF, the Long Beach JTTF and the Inland Empire JTTF. He was later assigned to the Long Beach Resident Agency and had executive oversight of the field office’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Squad, Extraterritorial Counterterrorism Squad, Counterterrorism Threat Squad, and the domestic Terrorism Squad in Los Angeles.

Mr. Velez co-chaired the Area Maritime Security Committee with the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port and was responsible for securing the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, the nation’s two largest seaports. He also served as co-chair of the Airport Security Advisory Committee responsible for the Security of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), as well as the airports in Burbank, Ontario and Van Nuys, CA.

In July, 2006, Mr. Velez was appointed as the Deputy Director of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), in Washington, DC. The TSC is a multi-agency center responsible of the U.S. Government’s consolidated approach to watchlisting, aimed at preventing known or suspected terrorists from entering the United States.

In August, 2008, FBI Director, Robert Mueller, appointed Mr. Velez as the first Special Agent in Charge of the newly created Intelligence Division of the Los Angeles Field Office, where he is currently serving.

**Brigadier General Kevin G. Ellsworth**

Brigadier General Kevin G. Ellsworth is the Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Joint Force Headquarters, California Army National Guard. He was appointed to this position on 9 April 2007. Prior to this position, he served as the Commander, Joint Task Force Vista for Operation JUMP START from 1 June 2006 to 15 March 2007.
Brigadier General Ellsworth, as a full-time member of the California Army National Guard, has been assigned to numerous positions in Facilities and Engineering and Government Affairs with responsibility for facility operations, construction, real estate, and legislative programs. As the J4, or Logistics Officer, he led a team of professionals in the Facilities Engineering Directorate and Office of Environmental Programs.

Brigadier General Ellsworth began his military career in 1970. He enlisted in the California Army National Guard and attained the rank of Staff Sergeant before attending the California Military Academy in 1976.

Brigadier General Ellsworth has commanded JTF Vista, the 223d Regiment (Combat Arms), the Division Engineer Brigade, 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 579th Engineer Battalion (Combat), HHD State Area Command, HHC 1320th Engineer Battalion and DET 1, Company E, 132d Engineer Battalion. He has also held various command and staff assignments with the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the State Area Command.

Brigadier General Ellsworth is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Course, Engineer Officer Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College, and U.S. Army War College.

James G. Featherstone

In October of 2007, James G. Featherstone was appointed as the General Manager of the City of Los Angeles’ Emergency Management Department. A native of Washington D.C. and veteran of the United States Navy, Featherstone began his years of service to the City of Los Angeles in 1986 with the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD).

In January 2006, Featherstone was selected as the Interim Assistant General Manager of L.A.’s Emergency Preparedness Department. In this role, he spearheaded a reorganization and enhancement of the department.

While working for the LAFD, he served tours as a Public Information Officer, academy instructor, Chief Officer’s Staff Assistant, Station Commander, and Task Force Commander. In 2004, Featherstone was transferred to the LAFD’s Tactical Training Section. As the section’s
Tactical Training Officer he oversaw all WMD and catastrophic event training, simulations and exercises. Over the course of three years, he developed and led numerous Homeland Security exercise and evaluation efforts in Greater Los Angeles.

Featherstone is a veteran of the 1992 Civil Disturbance, 1993 Firestorm, and the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, and numerous local major emergencies and regional campaign incidents. In the spring of 2000, Featherstone was selected as a Fire Plans Officer for the 2000 Democratic National Convention (DNC). He was instrumental in the development of the Fire Department’s Operation and Tactical Plans. During the operational phase of the DNC, Featherstone was assigned as the Metro Area Command Plans Officer.

An alumnus of the National Fire Academy (NFA), Featherstone completed the NFA’s residence curriculum of Incident Management courses. He serves as an Adjunct Instructor at the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center at Texas A&M University. Professional studies and field experience in command and control operations have given him a solid foundation in both emergency planning and incident management.

Featherstone remains a member of United Firefighters of Los Angeles City Local 112, where he served on the Executive Board, as a Negotiation Team Member for 19 years, and as Chief Negotiator for 5 years. Featherstone is also a member and past Executive Board Member of the Stentorians of Los Angeles City, which represents African Americans in the Fire Service.

Laurene Mascola, M.D., M.P.H., F.A.A.P.

Chief, Acute Communicable Disease Control Program

Laurene Mascola, M.D., M.P.H., F.A.A.P., is the Chief of the Acute Communicable Disease Control Program (ACDC) for the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health which performs disease surveillance and epidemic control activities for more than 80 diseases and syndromes. Dr. Mascola oversees the County’s programs/sections for Immunization, Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Investigation, Epidemiology & Data Support, Hospital Outreach, Food Safety,
Bloodborne Pathogens, Sub-Acute Care and Waterborne Disease, Planning and Evaluation, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Automated Disease Surveillance. Dr. Mascola has extensive experience in epidemiology and disease prevention, publishing more than 100 articles and abstracts in numerous medical and public health journals and some book chapters. Dr. Mascola received her Bachelor of Science in biology from the University of Rochester and graduated from medical school from St. Louis University. She received her pediatric training at Childrens Hospital in Los Angeles County, her master in Public Health from the University of California Los Angeles and trained at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Epidemic Intelligence Services in Atlanta, Georgia. She has worked for the World Health Organization in Ethiopia, Brazil, India and Nepal. She is a voluntary Assistant Professor of Pediatrics for the LAC/USC School of Medicine.

Currently, Dr. Mascola is a reviewer of the Journal of the American Medical Association, Lancet, Clinical Infectious Diseases, and the New England Journal of Medicine among others. She presents regularly at the annual Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (ICAAC) and Infectious Diseases Society of America. In 1997, she received ICAAC’s honor for Best Abstract for her paper “From Sea to Shining Sea” which examined fishborne outbreaks in Los Angeles County over a 20-year period. She is a member of the Alpha Omega Alpha (Medical honor society), the American Academy of Pediatrics Executive Epidemiology Committee, the California State Immunization Committee and the National BioWatch Epidemiology Advisory Workgroup.

Previously, she has served as an Expert Member of the FDA Food and Safety Committee in addition to serving on numerous national and statewide panels and committees on HIV/AIDS. She pioneered the program of voluntary HIV prenatal testing in Los Angeles County prenatal clinics along with a hospital outreach unit in which public health nurses play an integral role in assessing infection control practices along with hospital based infection control practitioners. Her vision entails the continuing collaboration with major health care partners and public health to better promote the health of Los Angeles County residents and prevent diseases.
Henry Renteria

In May 2004, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger appointed Henry Renteria the Director of the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES). Mr. Renteria began his career in emergency management in 1984 after a successful career in social services in Texas, where he was a trainer for the Crisis Hotline of Houston and spent 10 years as the Executive Director for Crisis Intervention of Houston. After relocating to California and briefly working as the Emergency Services Coordinator for Contra Costa County, Renteria became the first director of the Oakland Office of Emergency Services in 1985. In this role, he participated in the Bay Area Regional Earthquake Preparedness Project. Following the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, Renteria traveled to the region to conduct research in order to help prepare the Bay Area for a similar disaster.

Under Mr. Renteria’s leadership, the Oakland Office of Emergency Services responded to numerous federally declared disasters that hit the region including the winter storms of 1986-87, the Loma Prieta Earthquake in 1989, the freeze in 1990, the Oakland Fire Storm in 1991 and flooding in 1996, 1998 and 1999. During his tenure in Oakland, Mr. Renteria helped design and implement the original Emergency Managers Mutual Aid Program deployed for use following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake and was involved in the original design and implementation of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). He was also responsible for citywide disaster planning, response, recovery, and mitigation programs and management of the homeland security and hazardous material regulatory programs. In 1995, on the one-year anniversary of the Northridge Earthquake while Mr. Renteria was attending an earthquake conference in Kobe, Japan, a powerful temblor hit. The quake devastated much of the city, killing nearly 6,000 people. Mr. Renteria and those in his delegation were unharmed and remained in Kobe for 10 days, advising the Japanese government and further gathering information on earthquake preparedness and response.

Since his appointment as OES Director, Mr. Renteria has directed response and recovery operations to 35 emergencies, including seven presidentially-declared disasters. The disasters included the 2007 Southern California Fires and the Angora Fire in Lake Tahoe, the
2007 Severe Freeze, numerous winter storm emergencies in 2005 and 2006, and the 2004 Jones Tract Levee break in San Joaquin County. Additionally, Mr. Renteria has sought and received FEMA Fire Management Assistance Grants for 50 California wildfires. Under Renteria’s leadership, OES launched the State’s first-ever Public/Private Partnership Initiative to support emergency planning, response and recovery operations. Mr. Renteria also oversaw the State’s integration of its landmark SEMS system into the National Incident Management System, serves as Chair of Governor Schwarzenegger’s Governor’s Emergency Operations Executive Council, and represents the Governor as Chair of the State Emergency Council.

Mr. Renteria is a member of the National Emergency Management Association. He is past president of the California Emergency Services Association, a member of the International Association of Emergency Managers and on the board of directors of the American Red Cross.

**Jack Weiss**

Jack Weiss was elected to the 5th District of the City Council in June 2001 and reelected on March 8, 2005. The district includes parts of the San Fernando Valley and West Los Angeles. Much of Jack Weiss’ legislative program is dedicated to improving the City’s ability to fight crime, prevent disasters and respond to emergencies, particularly through improved local homeland security. In 2002 he wrote “Preparing Los Angeles for Terrorism – A Ten-Point Plan” which is among the most thorough assessments of local threat preparedness in the nation. In 2002, the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) selected him as the “New Democrat of the Week” to recognize his leadership on local security, and he was named one the “100 New Democrats to Watch” in 2003.

A former federal prosecutor, Jack Weiss works to ensure that police policies and practices reflect modern standards. As Chair of the Council’s Public Safety Committee, he is leading the effort to grow the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to 10,000 officers and he strives to achieve meaningful police reform. He has led the way to improve the use of DNA testing by LAPD to identify and prosecute rapists. In 2005 he received the Humanitarian Award from the Los Angeles Commission
on Assualts Against Women, and the Los Angeles County Sexual Assault Coordinating Council honored him for his work in 2003.

Environmental issues are a significant legislative priority for Jack Weiss. He has focused his efforts on cleaning up Santa Monica Bay and local urban waterways, for which he received the Award for Public Service from the Los Angeles League of Conservation Voters in April 2003. He is president of the Santa Monica Bay Watershed Council and served for four years as the chair of the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Commission.

Jack Weiss is a member of the Council’s Planning & Land Use Management Committee, which oversees issues affecting the region’s growth and development. He is a member of the Rules and Government Committee and Vice Chair of the Ad Hoc Stadium Committee.

Prior to his election, Jack Weiss served as an Assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles, where he was assigned to the Public Corruption and Government Fraud Section. He focused on criminal prosecutions involving sophisticated white collar crimes, corrupt public officials, civil rights violations, and violent crimes.

Jack Weiss is active in numerous civic and professional organizations. He serves on the Southwest Regional Board of the Anti-Defamation League. He is a founding member of the Cesar E. Chavez Foundation, a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Westside Urban Forum, Heal the Bay, and Los Angeles County Young Democrats, and has served on many local bodies and bar committees.

Jack Weiss received his law degree from UCLA, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the UCLA Law Review. He received his undergraduate degree with honors from Princeton University, where he majored in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Before returning to law school, he worked as a foreign policy adviser on Capitol Hill and as an arms control researcher in Washington, D.C. He is married and has two children.
Douglas L. Barry

Fire Chief Douglas L. Barry is a 33-year veteran of the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) with an exemplary record as a Firefighter, Apparatus Operator, Engineer, Captain, Battalion Chief, Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief, Assistant Fire Marshal and most recently Fire Chief.

Chief Barry has commanded some of LAFD’s busiest Fire Stations in the South Los Angeles, Port of Los Angeles, Los Angeles International Airport, and the Wilshire Corridor. Chief Barry has overseen Management of Department discipline, Worker’s Compensation, Wellness and Risk management programs; has served as liaison to the City Attorney’s Office, LAPD, City Council and Mayor’s Office; Chief Barry also provided leadership and oversight to the Fire Chief’s Planning Section, Employee Relations Office, and Community Relations Office; Chief Barry served as Assistant Fire Marshal, managing the day-to-day operations of the Fire Prevention Bureau, which included inspections of high-rise and commercial buildings, brush and hazardous materials processors, until his recent appointment by Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa to Interim and now Fire Chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department.

Chief Barry was born and raised in the South Bay, attending Narbonne High School, L.A. Harbor College, and California State University, Long Beach. He is married and has three adult daughters and two grandchildren.

Chief Barry has earned the respect and support of not only his fellow Firefighters, but also his community, serving as Treasurer/Trustee and Deacon of Mt. Sinai Baptist Church in San Pedro.

Al Cruz

Special Agent in Charge Al Cruz (SAC) currently manages the Intelligence Operations Programs for the California Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence (BII), within the Division of Law Enforcement. Al Cruz began his law enforcement career in 1977 after completing a six year tour of duty with the United States Air Force and has over 26 years of law enforcement experience. Prior to joining DOJ he was a Police Officer for the cities of Vallejo and Concord,
CA, where he was assigned to the Patrol and Investigations Divisions.

In May of 1987, Al Cruz joined DOJ and was assigned to the San Francisco Regional Office, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE), where he worked a variety of assignments and significant investigations. As a special agent, Al Cruz was the Department’s asset forfeiture representative to the California District Attorney’s Association, and was also a regional office range master and firearms instructor.

In 1990, SAC Cruz was promoted to Special Agent Supervisor in the San Jose Regional Office. During his tenure as a supervisor, he oversaw a variety of programs including the Allied Agencies Narcotic Enforcement Team, the Clandestine Laboratory Investigation Team, the Santa Cruz County Narcotic Enforcement Team, the Solano County Narcotic Enforcement Team, the San Francisco Tenderloin Task Force, and the Violence Suppression Team.

After the devastating attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, SAC Cruz was recalled to duty with the Air Force, where as a Reservist he had kept his military career running alongside his law enforcement career. As a Flight Engineer on the C5 Galaxy Jumbo Jet he flew many missions into the combat zone and was deployed in support of the Iraq war effort on four different occasions. In July 2006, SAC Cruz retired from the Air Force Reserve with the rank of Chief Master Sergeant after serving 36 years.

In July 2006, SAC Cruz resumed his law enforcement career at the California Department of Justice. He was selected to supervise the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center in Sacramento and in May 2007 was promoted to Special Agent in Charge. Following a Bureau reorganization, SAC Cruz was given responsibility for management of the State’s Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center Program and DOJ’s Special Agent contribution to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces in California.

SAC Cruz is a lifetime member of the California Narcotic Officer’s Association, a member of the CAL GANG Node Advisory Committee, and also the Assistant Central Coordinating Agency coordinator for the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). SAC Cruz holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice Administration from California State University, Hayward.
Paul Schulz

Paul Schulz is the Chief Executive Officer of the American Red Cross of Greater Los Angeles, the second largest chapter in the nation serving 6 million people and covering over 1,600 square miles. Prior to joining the Red Cross, Mr. Schulz served as Senior Vice President of Yahoo!, President of the Recycler Classifieds (a subsidiary of the Los Angeles Times) and Manager at McKinsey & Company.

In the non-profit sector, Mr. Schulz currently serves on the Board of Directors of the California Community Foundation, Goodwill Industries of Southern California, and the Gould Center at Claremont McKenna College. He is a member of the LA5 Rotary Club and a former board member of Big Brothers Big Sisters of Los Angeles.

Paul Schulz holds a B.A. in Economics from Claremont McKenna College and an M.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Oriel College, Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

Karen Oleon Wagener

Karen Wagener has devoted most of her career to organizational development, volunteerism and non-profit management.

She has served for six years as President of the Los Angeles Police Foundation, the major support group for the Los Angeles Police Department. The foundation supports and promotes public safety by funding essential equipment, training and programs that are not provided in the city budget. The foundation helps the police serve at their highest level and enhances LAPD-community relations.

Karen was Executive Director, Volunteer Bureau, Office of the Mayor for six years. There she oversaw all Los Angeles City volunteer programs, and was actively involved in the development of new programs and events. In that role she was a delegate to the Presidents Summit for America’s Future and served on the California Statewide Dialogue on Service and Volunteerism.

Prior to that she was Director, Council of Support Organizations at the UCLA Alumni Association, responsible for 135 alumni groups with 20,000 volunteers. She also served as a Country Desk Officer for
the Peace Corps and as Deputy Director in Costa Rica, responsible for program development, management and training for a 135-volunteer program.

She served for ten years on the steering committee for the Tel Aviv – Los Angeles Partnership, and has conducted workshops and consulted on volunteerism, fundraising and emergency management in Tel Aviv.

A member of Leo Baeck Temple, she is Chair of the Israel Action Committee. She is also on the Advisory Board of the American Jewish Committee. She has been active with KCET, UCLA (currently as an Alumni Mentor) and Christmas in April—South Central Los Angeles.

Karen earned her Bachelors Degree in Spanish at UCLA and a Masters in Portuguese at the University of Wisconsin. She also studied at New York University.

Karen is married to Tom Wagener. They have two adult children and a much beloved granddaughter.

Richard L. Jones

Mr. Jones has over 35 years experience as a specialist in Crisis Management, Organizational Development and Management Training and Education. Prior to founding Management 2000, Inc (“M2000”), Mr. Jones taught management and communications in multiple industries as an education specialist and director of management training. Since founding M2000 in 1990, the core focus of the company has been to assist executive management of companies with the development and implementation of crisis management, strategic turnaround, and growth management strategies. As such, Mr. Jones has direct experience at the senior executive level with such industries as health care, manufacturing, and technology as well as in physical and cyber security. Mr. Jones has served as an interim president of an internet service provider, as chief operating officer of a corporate anti-terrorism and anti-kidnapping security company and as the president of an information security company.

It was through this varied exposure to security that prompted Mr. Jones to create M2000/IS, an information security division of M2000, to
deal specifically with computer forensic investigations, computer crimes and cyber terrorism. Mr. Jones is also the founder of the CIRI Team™, (Computer Incident Response and Investigation Team) consisting of an integrated team of information security technologists, former law enforcement, and attorneys skilled in privacy and technology related law.

In 1998 Mr. Jones was appointed to the Executive MBA Advisory Council at Loyola Marymount University and, in 2000, was asked to join the Faculty as an Adjunct Professor in the Executive MBA program. His course-work focus is on Crisis Management, Organizational Development and Implementation of Strategy.

In January 2005, Mr. Jones was appointed President & CEO of the FBI supported InfraGard Los Angeles Members Alliance, Inc. This private-sector based 501(c) 3 California corporation is dedicated to sharing intelligence and integrating assets with local, state and federal law enforcement and other first responder resources for the protection of critical U.S. infrastructure sectors in Los Angeles and the central district of California. Concurrently, as part of those duties, Mr. Jones is a consultant to the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (“JRIC”); also known as the LA Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (“RTTAC”), for the purpose of integrating the private sector with the JRIC and its participating agencies. As a result of his efforts with InfraGard, Mr. Jones was the recipient in January 2008 of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller’s, “Directors Community Leadership Award” for Los Angeles.

Shakeel Syed

Shakeel Syed is the Executive Director of the Islamic Shura Council, a federation of Mosques & Muslim organizations serving more than half a million Muslims in Southern California.

Syed is a regular speaker at many educational institutions, Churches, Synagogues, Temples & Mosques. Syed has also spoken at several local, national and international conferences.

Syed represents the Islamic Shura Council in interfaith work and serves on the boards of several social justice organizations and currently serves as Vice-Chair of Interfaith Communities United for Justice & Peace. He also serves as a Volunteer Chaplain with the Federal Bureau

Syed has appeared on national and international media outlets and has also written & cited in a number of local, national and international newspapers such as the LA Times, NY Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, NPR, MSNBC, CNN & BBC, among others.

Syed has received several awards; most recent is a “Community Leadership Award” from the Orange County Human Relations” and “Giants of Justice Award” from the Clergy & Laity United for Economic Justice.

Syed has a Masters Degree in Natural Sciences and has been living in Southern California since 1985 with his wife and four children.

**Arif Alikhan**

In his role as Deputy Mayor, Mr. Alikhan oversees and advances all aspects of the Mayor’s criminal justice, emergency preparedness and counterterrorism policy, serves as the principal liaison to federal, state, and local law enforcement, and administers federal and state criminal justice and homeland security grants awarded to the City of Los Angeles.

Mr. Alikhan previously served as the first Section Chief of a new Cyber and Intellectual Property Crimes Section for the United States Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles, the largest judicial district in the nation. He designed a comprehensive program and successfully led a team of specially trained federal prosecutors who aggressively prosecuted hundreds of computer hackers, Internet thieves, and intellectual property offenders. In addition, he worked closely with local and federal law enforcement agencies to address local crime problems through innovative and creative strategies.

Mr. Alikhan served as a senior official at the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. where he was responsible for overseeing the national Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Program and was a key advisor to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales on intellectual property and cyber crime issues.

Mr. Alikhan began his legal career as a Judicial Law Clerk to U.S. District Judge Ronald S.W. Lew in Los Angeles and then joined the
Los Angeles law firm of Irell and Manella where he handled civil and white-collar criminal defense matters. In 1997, Mr. Alikhan joined the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles where he handled a wide variety of criminal matters as a federal prosecutor for over eight years. He received several awards from law enforcement agencies for his work and was recognized by the Department of Justice for his superior management and supervisory performance.

Mr. Alikhan graduated with honors from Loyola Law School, Los Angeles in 1993 and was recognized by the Los Angeles Daily Journal as one of the top California attorneys under the age of 40. He graduated cum laude from the University of California, Irvine in 1990 where he earned a degree in Social Ecology with an emphasis in Criminal Justice, Criminology and Legal Studies.

Farley Jay Howell

Farley Jay Howell joined the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s FEMA Region IX as the Director of the National Preparedness Division in December 2003. In this position, Mr. Howell oversees regional preparedness initiatives to include the National Response Framework and National Incident Management System, Hazardous Materials Programs, Continuity of Operations Planning, Tribal Preparedness, and exercise and evaluation programs. He provides direct oversight of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program and Citizen Corps plus the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness and Emergency Operations Center Grant programs. In conjunction with FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate, Mr. Howell consults on regional Emergency Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response Systems, and the Assistance to Firefighter Grants. These activities provide program guidance and financial assistance to state, territory, tribal, and local governments.

Prior to joining Region IX, Mr. Howell served more than 25 years in the U.S. Air Force. He commanded several Air Force hospitals and was chief of the Medical Support Division and Command Nurse assigned to Air Force Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In that capacity, he directed a diverse range of programs to include medical readiness, resource management, TRICARE,
and information management. In addition, he served as advisor to the Command Surgeon on nursing issues while monitoring nursing standards of care and practice at medical facilities located throughout the United States. Mr. Howell’s wartime experience includes Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia.

Mr. Howell has a master’s degree in Nursing from Oregon Health Sciences University in Portland, Oregon. He attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University, Ft. Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., where he earned a Master of Arts Degree in National Resource Strategy. He is Board Certified as a Nursing Administrator, Advanced and is recognized as a Certified Emergency Manager through the International Association of Emergency Managers.

Lucile M. Jones

Dr. Jones has been a seismologist with the US Geological Survey and a Visiting Research Associate at the Seismological Laboratory of Caltech since 1983. She is currently serving as the Chief Scientist for the Multi Hazards Initiative in Southern California, developing a new program to integrate hazards science in urban areas with economic analysis and emergency response to increase community resiliency to natural disasters. She is also a Commissioner of the California Seismic Safety Commission, which advises the governor and legislature on seismic safety, by appointment of Gov. Davis in 2002 and reappointment by Gov. Schwarzenegger in 2005. She serves on the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council. Dr. Jones has authored over 80 papers on research seismology with primary interest in the physics of earthquakes, foreshocks and earthquake hazard assessment, especially in southern California.

She has received numerous awards, including the Alquist Award from the California Earthquake Safety Foundation, the Shoemaker Award for Lifetime Achievements in Science Communication from the USGS, and the 2007 Award of Merit from the Los Angeles County Emergency Preparedness Commission. Dr. Jones received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Chinese Language and Literature, Magna Cum Laude,
from Brown University in 1976 and a Ph. D. in geophysics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981. She is a past Secretary of the Seismology Section of the American Geophysical Union, past Director and past Chair of the Publications Committee of the Seismological Society of America. Dr. Jones, a fourth-generation resident of southern California, currently lives in La Cañada, California. She is married to a fellow seismologist, Egill Hauksson, and they have two sons, Sven, 21 and Niels, 17.

**Gilbert Pedroza**

Mr. Pedroza is a Superintendent for the City of Los Angeles, Department of Public Works, Bureau of Street Services. Mr. Pedroza has been employed with the City of Los Angeles for 37 years, 34 of them with the Bureau of Street Services.

Mr. Pedroza’s has many years of experience responding to just about every natural or man-made disaster affecting the City of Los Angeles, which has given him the experience and dedication to head the Bureau’s Emergency Operations Center (BEOC). For the last seven years, Mr. Pedroza has been responsible for ensuring the operational readiness of this facility, as well as training BEOC responders to respond to any emergency situation that requires Bureau resources.

Mr. Pedroza has received emergency management training from the California Specialized Training Institute, the Department of Defense, the National Fire Academy, and the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center. Coursework has included earthquake response, disaster recovery, exercise design, managing the consequences of terrorism, terrorism analysis, emergency response to terrorism, domestic preparedness for terrorism, haz-mat incident commander, Standardized Emergency Management System, and the National Incident Management System.

**Tom LaTourrette**

Tom LaTourrette (Ph.D., California Institute of Technology) is a Senior Physical Scientist at RAND specializing in technology
and research needs related to homeland security and public safety. Homeland security research examines federal terrorism insurance policy, probabilistic terrorism risk modeling, security technology and operations, and individual preparedness and response for terrorism. Public safety research focuses on occupational hazards and safety & health interventions for emergency responders, management and coordination for emergency preparedness and response, and modeling emergency response operational requirements for disasters. Other research interests include energy policy, science and technology research priorities, and solar system exploration.

**Seth Jacobson**

Seth Jacobson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). For his master’s thesis in 2003, Seth co-authored an analysis of emergency response preparedness at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. This report, which was the first public review of preparedness at the port complex, took top departmental honors at UCLA and has been circulated at all levels of government. Subsequently, Seth co-authored and published two reports on Los Angeles port security with UCLA Professor Amy Zegart, and served on the local Area Maritime Security Subcommittee for Training & Exercises. In addition, Seth has served as an Analyst for both the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group and the National Terrorism Early Warning Resource Center, with emphasis on regional maritime and energy security. He holds an AB in Astrophysics from Harvard College and both a Master of Public Policy and an MBA from UCLA, and has completed training for both Terrorism Liaison Officers and Community Emergency Response Teams. Seth’s day job is with Palmer Capital, a private equity firm that finances renewable energy projects.

**Brian M. Jenkins**

A senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation and one of the world’s leading authorities on terrorism. Founded the RAND Corporation’s terrorism research program 30 years ago, has written frequently on terrorism, and has served as an advisor to the
federal government and the private sector on the subject. A former Army captain who served with Special Forces in Vietnam and also a former deputy chairman of Kroll Associates. Served as a captain in the Green Berets in the Dominican Republic and later in Vietnam (1966-1970). In 1996, was appointed by President Clinton to be a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Has served as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism (1999-2000) and in 2000 was appointed as a member of the U.S. Comptroller General’s Advisory Board. Is also a special advisor to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and a member of the board of directors of the ICC’s Commercial Crime Services. Has authored many books, including Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, the editor and coauthor of Terrorism and Personal Protection, coeditor and coauthor of “Aviation Terrorism and Security, and coauthor of The Fall of South Vietnam.

Recent Media Interviews:


Gary Winuk

Gary Winuk was appointed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as the Chief Deputy Director of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) in March, 2005 after serving as acting in that capacity since January, 2004. OHS is responsible for the coordination of all State homeland security efforts, including its core areas of: threat assessment, critical infrastructure protection, training and exercises, and homeland security grants management. He is responsible for the day-to-day management of the Office and its $350 million budget and 150 staff. Gary has worked for OHS since its inception and served as a gubernatorial homeland security advisor in California since shortly after 9/11.
Prior to serving at OHS, Gary was a Deputy Director of the Governor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning, appointed by Governor Gray Davis. He has worked as Deputy District Attorney in San Joaquin County and as a Legislative Aide in the California State Assembly for then-Assemblywoman Juanita Millender-McDonald.

Gary holds a B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University and a J.D., with distinction, from the McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento. He has also completed the Executive Crisis Management course at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Gary has served as a lecturer on homeland security issues at the IDC Hertzliya Counter-Terrorism Institute in Israel, the USC CREATE Homeland Security Executive Leadership Program, the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School, CSU San Diego, and CSU Sacramento, among others.

Gary serves as a Captain in the California Air National Guard, serving in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps since February, 2003. He is currently assigned as the Assistant Staff Judge Advocate for the 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Federal Airfield in Mountain View. He has been awarded the Army Commendation Medal, Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Ribbon, Army Service Ribbon, State Medal of Merit, State Service Ribbon, and State Drill Attendance Ribbon.
EXHIBIT C

The Audience List
Ford – CREATE – Aspen Roundtable

Los Angeles’ Preparedness for Terrorism

*Location: Davidson Conference Center (Alumni Room) University of Southern California 3415 South Figueroa Street Los Angeles, CA 90889*

March 31 – April 2nd 2008

**Audience List:**

**Lauren Armistead**
Acting Executive Director
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC)
Business Executives for National Security (BENS)

**Theophilos C. Gemelas**
Senior Advisor, Office of the Director, Homeland Security Institute (HSI) FFRDC, Analytic Services, Inc.

**Barbara A. Grewe**
Senior Policy Advisor, Homeland Security, Intelligence, and Cyber Analysis, The MITRE Corporation

**Holly Canevari**
Professional Staff
U.S House Committee on Homeland Security

**The Hauer Group**
The Hauer Group

**Joel Cohen**
DHS Intelligence Officer

**David Heyman**
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

**Megan Corro**
Program Assistant
Homeland Security
The Aspen Institute

**Marcel Hovespian**
Graduate Student
The University of Southern California

**P.J. Crowley**
The Center for American Progress

**Bonnie Jenkins**
The Ford Foundation

**Clark Kent Ervin**
Director
Homeland Security
The Aspen Institute

**Andrea Jett**
The McCormick Tribune Foundation
Peter Katona, MD  
Associate Professor of Medicine  
UCLA

Colonel Randall J. Larsen  
USAF (Ret), Director,  
The Institute for Homeland Security

Jay Lavender  
NSPVR

Nathan Miller  
UCLA

Mayank Mohan  
Graduate Student  
The University of Southern California

Terry O’Sullivan  
Graduate Student  
The University of Southern California

Kyle Olson  
The Kyle Olson Group

Mario Rueda  
Deputy Department Commander  
Los Angeles Fire Department

Craig Sharman  
Staff Director, Subcommittee  
on Emergency Communications Preparedness and Response  
U.S House Committee on Homeland Security

Sue Stengel  
Public Safety Deputy and General Council

Alan Toy, MA UP  
Associate Director  
UCLA Center for Neighborhood Knowledge

Tony Varela  
Assistant Chief, Special Operations  
Bureau of Emergency Services

Dr. Detlof von Winterfeldt  
Director  
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events

Chief Richard Warford  
Homeland Security Division  
Los Angeles Fire Department