THE POLITICS OF VULNERABILITY

Can Muslims and Evangelicals Find Common Cause in Religious Freedom?

Report of the Inclusive America Project
Based on a project led by Asma T. Uddin
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The ideas and recommendations contained in this report should not be taken as representing the views or carrying the endorsement of any individual, the organization with which he or she is affiliated, that of the Inclusive America Project, or that the Aspen Institute.

The Inclusive America Project thanks Ashley Quarcoo for serving as editor on this project and sharing her gift for turning difficult and complex conversations into readable prose.
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INTRODUCTION

Religious pluralism is a vision of the world in which diverse religious communities and non-believers engage each other in beneficial ways, maintain their distinct identities, and thrive while defending each other’s right to thrive. The Inclusive America Project¹ (IAP) is connecting diverse voices and sectors that support religious pluralism² to more fully develop the field’s potential as a unifying force for the country.

Religious freedom is both a key component of religious pluralism and a common thread that can knit communities together across politicized and polarized religious divides. Across all of the fault lines that are polarizing Americans today, one of the thorniest is the relationship between conservative White Evangelical Christians and Muslims, a relationship that has become tied up with broader ideological and political divides facing the country. These divisions drive hostility that is manifested in sustained and highly influential advocacy to deprive American Muslims of religious liberty and freedom, among other efforts. In turn, American Muslim civic organizations have also taken public positions against con-

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¹ Inclusive America Project
² Many People, Many Faiths, One Nation: A Primer on Religious Pluralism
servative Evangelical religious rights. Yet, this relationship hasn’t always been so contentious, and it doesn’t have to continue in this vein.

In 2020, IAP brought on author, attorney, and religious liberty specialist Asma T. Uddin as an IAP Fellow to lead the Politics of Vulnerability project. This project seeks to use religious freedom as a paradigm to bring Muslims and Evangelical Christians in the United States into conversation with each other around their constitutional religious freedom rights, the prominent challenges to those rights, and the impacts that deprivation of those rights would have on both communities. The project explores whether this shared “vulnerability” with regard to threats to religious liberty opens up a new space for dialogue between Muslim and Evangelical communities and for exploring common values and goals.

This paper summarizes the major findings of two closed-door convenings held in March 2020 that brought together experts in religious theology, religious freedom, and interfaith work. At those gatherings, Uddin presented her hypothesis that religious freedom has the potential to reframe Muslim-Evangelical engagement. The first section of the paper lays out Uddin’s diagnosis and proposed solution, while the second section outlines a strategy for engagement drawn from the ensuing discussions. Although American Protestantism is very diverse in theology, political leanings, and racial and ethnic makeup, Uddin’s research focuses specifically on the subgroup of White, conservative Evangelicals. The convenings, and this paper, have followed suit.

The convenings revealed both the opportunities and the challenges of engaging Muslims and Evangelicals in a shared religious freedom agenda, illuminating new strategies for engagement within and across both communities. The conversations also highlighted how the fight over religious freedom is ultimately a fight over America. For this reason, all Americans should care about religious freedom and try to understand what it is, and why it is important to religious believers and non-believers alike.

**The fight over religious freedom is ultimately a fight over American national identity and of who and what makes up America.**
THE HYPOTHESIS
Political Tribalism is a Key Driver of Anti-Muslim Hostility

In a fast-changing America that is increasingly racially and religiously diverse, White Protestant Christians are now a minority for the first time in U.S. history. A profound cultural shift has accompanied these demographic changes, leaving many conservative White Evangelicals feeling “under siege” or “persecuted.” They feel that American “elite culture” (most major news outlets and Hollywood media) scorns “traditional Christianity” and rejects its influence on American society. When Evangelicals with more conservative social stances try to defend their place in America by asserting religious freedom, elite culture derides that, too, further exacerbating the Evangelical persecution complex.

Many who resist conservative Christian religious claims do so by setting up a dichotomy between conservative White Christian interests and the interests of a diverse array of marginalized minorities. Media and political figures often paint Christian conservative religious claims as mere covers for bigotry and hate. In this view, the rights of minorities and conservative Christians are opposed to each other: to protect minorities’ interests, Christian interests have to be limited.

But Uddin insists that this is the wrong approach to the problem. Minorities’ interests and conservative Christian interests need not be in conflict. One side need not be villainized, especially because the villainizing itself is counterproductive. As Ezra Klein explains in Why We’re Polarized, “To the extent that it’s true that a loss of privilege feels like oppression,

3 Jones 2017; Moore 2015
that feeling needs to be taken seriously, both because it’s real, and because, left to fester, it can be weaponized by demagogues and reactionaries.”

Indeed, in the U.S. today, “demagogues and reactionaries” seize on White Evangelical vulnerability and weaponize it against religious minorities, including American Muslims. Muslims face the regular protesting, firebombing, and burning of mosques; a sharp rise in hate crimes; and the bullying of Muslim children in school. Voices from the highest seats of power in the U.S. regularly engage in anti-Muslim rhetoric. Some Evangelical religious leaders spew hatred from the pulpit or on Christian media, politicians use anti-Muslim messages to please their co-religionist constituency, and some Christian-led organizations engage in concerted legal advocacy against Muslims’ interests.

Uddin says these harmful actions are at least partly driven by political tribalism—the Christian in-group’s perception of Muslims as both the political and religious out-group. Many conservative White Evangelicals are struggling to adapt to a country where numerically and culturally, Protestantism is no longer dominant, and liberals are seen as the main drivers of that threat. When liberals also champion Muslims’ civic rights, it fosters a perception that liberals and Muslims are working together to “de-Christianize” America.

Other writers have proffered a series of explanations for conservative White Evangelical hostility toward Muslims: Christian nationalism; religious competition between Christianity and Islam; racism (and, relatedly, the racialization of Muslims as uniformly brown and foreign); perceptions of Muslims as a security threat; persecution of Christians in some majority-Muslim countries; and so on. These are all important analyses, but they overlook what Uddin describes as the critical role of political tribalism. At a time when America is experiencing the “ferocious politicization of everything,” Muslim-Christian relations are no exception.
The preservation of religious liberty is intrinsically linked to the religious freedom rights of every American, because ceding power to the government when it comes to one religion means putting every other religion at risk, too. Uddin hypothesizes that helping conservative White Evangelicals understand that successfully using religious freedom to preserve their own interests will require them to support Muslims’ religious rights and that this common goal can possibly help bridge the tribal divide.

This approach draws on interest convergence theory from the context of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. The theory was developed by Derrick Bell, a former Harvard law professor and civil rights activist. According to Bell, Black people only receive favorable judicial decisions to the extent that their interests coincide with the interests of White people. According to this theory, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which ended racial segregation in public schools, was not motivated by a desire to redress Black suffering; instead, the United States eliminated

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5 Bell 1980
Jim Crow in order to improve its international image during the Cold War. Almost five decades later, Professor Bell detected similar motivations for the Court’s decision in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, a case that upheld race-based affirmative action. He wrote: “When [Justice O’Connor] perceived in the Michigan Law School’s admissions program an affirmative action plan that minimizes the importance of race while offering maximum protection to Whites and those aspects of society with which she identifies, she supported it.” According to Bell, “no matter how much harm Blacks were suffering because of racial hostility and discrimination, we could not obtain meaningful relief until policymakers perceived that the relief Blacks sought furthered interests or resolved issues of more primary concern.”

While political divides are entrenched, self-interest can potentially mend even the deepest of divides.

What might an engagement approach look like that centers conservative Evangelical-Muslim dialogue on religious freedom? What are some challenges to the religious freedom approach? How do we identify the subset of Evangelicals most receptive to this approach? This paper presents a synthesis of the discussions from the March meetings as participants explored these and other questions.

1. Toward a Better Understanding of Muslim and Evangelical Communities

*Who are Evangelicals?*

Evangelicals are not a monolithic group with a uniform belief system and a singular vision for the country. The Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the University of Southern California has developed a typology of the *Varieties of American Evangelicalism* outlining five different expressions of Evangelical Christianity: Trump-vangelicals, Neo-fundamentalists,
iVangelicals, Kingdom Christians, and Peace and Justice Evangelicals. While each group shares a consensus on Evangelical theology, they differ in the ways that their theology shapes how they act in the world, their attitudes toward people who do not share their religious commitments, and whether and how they engage in social and political actions. Peace and Justice Evangelicals, for example, are already invested in social justice issues, and would be natural allies for interest convergence with Muslims on religious freedom. Kingdom Christians and iVangelicals may also be sympathetic and potential partners, while Trump-vangelicals are less likely to be enthusiastic partners. Understanding these differences can help inform more effective entry points for engagement with different segments of the Evangelical community.

Racial minorities who are also religious conservatives can present a double political dilemma for these groups. One the one hand, they may face exclusionary treatment from White people on the Right, while people on the Left may not respect their religious beliefs. As a result, minority social conservatives are neglected by both sides and sometimes have difficulty finding allies. For example, leaders of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church felt abandoned after the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville because they were questioned about their positions on LGBTQ issues. Other minority religious communities such as Orthodox Jews and Hispanic Catholics are also caught in this dichotomy. These groups need safe spaces in order to express their vulnerability, because they are invisible in the media discourse. They are vulnerable as racial minorities and vulnerable as religious groups, experiencing discrimination while also losing their flocks.

The differences between White and Black Evangelical communities also reflects the theological tension between preserving traditional social and sexual mores (moral order) and fighting for equal protection for all humans (justice). AND Campaign says both of these values can be found in the Bible, and that the contributions of both Black and White Evangelical churches are needed to apply them in personal lives and to bear public witness to them in the world.

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6 The Varieties of American Evangelicalism
7 AND Campaign
Additionally, within Evangelical communities, there are a variety of perspectives on religious freedom and competing perspectives on the ideal relationship between church and state. Engagement with the Evangelical community should acknowledge there are deep divisions regarding applications of both the Establishment Clause (which involves limits on government’s support of religion) and the Free Exercise Clause (which protects a broad array of religious practice). The engagement should welcome people who have different views on controversial religious freedom questions, such as those involving religion and LGBTQ rights (see *Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission*). Trying to overcome tribalism in the religious liberty debate could create a public good—not only between Evangelicals and Muslims, but between Evangelicals themselves.

**Who are Muslims?**

Muslims in America, too, are not a monolith, and greater nuance is necessary to understand the diversity of views and experiences of the American Muslim community. Muslims are the third-largest religious group in America today, and are on track to be the second-largest by 2050. American Muslims have widely differing views on the role that religion plays in their daily lives, and, according to Pew Research Center, they are as religiously observant as American Christians.8

Educating non-Muslim Americans about Islam remains an important way to dispel misinformation about Muslims in the United States.9 According to 2019 survey data from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), American Muslims exhibit high levels of private religious devotion, while their public assertiveness of their religious identity and beliefs is low.9 This contradicts some public perceptions that Muslims have attempted to impose a foreign value system on the United States. The survey evidence shows that educating non-Muslim Americans about Islam remains an important way to dispel misinformation about Muslims in the United States.

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8 Sciupac Podrebarac 2017

9 *American Muslim Poll 2019: Predicting and Preventing Islamophobia* | ISPU
African-American Muslims are also a significant part of the Muslim community, and there is a reported history of discrimination of Black Muslims by Muslims of other backgrounds and the broader public.\(^\text{10}\) Whereas most Muslims experienced a significant degradation in their treatment by the broader public in the months after 9/11, African American Muslims report no change in how the public perceived them, noting that public opinion towards them had always been poor.

Muslims also have diverse views on Establishment and Free Exercise Clause issues and also have diverse political views. Historically, Muslims were an important part of the Republican Party’s coalition, particularly in the election of President George W. Bush. Public opinion towards Muslims at the time was also much more positive. According to Pew public opinion polls, in March of 2000, 50 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of American Muslims.\(^\text{11}\) In November of 2001, that number had increased to nearly 60 percent positive, often credited to the actions of President Bush after 9/11 in visiting a mosque and offering statements of support to Muslims. That perception quickly changed as the country moved towards war in Afghanistan and later Iraq, due in part to a change in Bush’s rhetoric. Muslims drifted away from the Republican Party, and Islam was subsequently weaponized against President Barack Obama, revealing the latent anti-Muslim sentiment among many conservatives. These sentiments have worsened during the tenure of Congressional representatives Ilhan Omar (D-MN) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI). Anti-Muslim rhetoric is closely tied to elections and sees an uptick during election cycles. According to the Brookings Institution, the 2013 Boston bombing or the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting did not lead more Americans to associate Islam with violence.\(^\text{12}\) Instead, those perceptions rise during election season, because politicians—especially Republican ones—draw these connections. This use of anti-Muslim rhetoric during elections reveals that its core purpose is political.

\(^{10}\) Mohamed and Diamant 2019

\(^{11}\) The Super Survey: Two Decades of Americans’ Views on Islam & Muslims 2015

\(^{12}\) “Islamophobia is Made Up” 2013
2. Challenges to a Common Religious Freedom Agenda

Political polarization

The United States is experiencing an unprecedented degree of political polarization. “Severe” or “pernicious” polarization of this kind reflects an alignment of a multiplicity of societal differences along one single dimension, producing two distinct groups – “Us” and “Them” – pitted in a zero-sum power struggle. One of the features of this kind of polarization is that formerly apolitical cross-cutting identities, like religious identities, have become increasingly sorted into political camps.

According to data from ISPU, political affiliation is a strong predictor of Islamophobia. Specifically, being a Republican is strongly associated with Islamophobia, even stronger than being a White Evangelical. This can be seen as anti-Muslim speech becomes a part of Republican political discourse, amplified by the voices on the extreme, which tend to be the loudest. When it comes to state-level legislative action on issues of disenfranchisement for marginalized groups, another ISPU study linked support for “Anti-Sharia Law” bills with support for policies restricting voter access and abortion rights, anti-immigration proposals, and bans on same sex marriage.13 If a lawmaker supported legislation in one of these areas, there was an 80 percent chance of support in any other area. According to this view, ignoring the political dimensions of the debate is missing a critical reality, and the implications are significant.

Political and social polarization makes forming cross-cutting alliances, even on narrow issues like religious freedom, more challenging. Because White Evangelical Christians are currently aligned with the Right and religious minorities like Muslims tend to align with the Left, using a multi-faith frame can create an opening to depolarize the discussion and open up the possibility of sharing vulnerability across religious and partisan lines.

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13 Manufacturing Bigotry | ISPU 2014
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The Politics of Vulnerability

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The Dominance of the Judeo-Christian Narrative

The dominance of the Judeo-Christian narrative in the United States excludes other religious identities from America’s story of self. At the time of the nation’s founding, there were two prominent visions of religious freedom. Thomas Jefferson espoused an individual-conscience version of religious freedom, writing it was “a concern purely between our god and our consciences,” while the Puritan vision of religious freedom was the freedom to set up a “godly society.” The Puritan version was opposed to religious pluralism and religious freedom for other religious groups, and Puritans persecuted new religious groups such as Quakers and Catholics as they arrived in the colonies. Catholics were seen as un-American and anti-democratic, rhetoric very similar to that now used against Muslims. Puritans wanted a Christian nation and did not view Catholics as Christians. Today’s White Evangelicals have inherited the Puritan version of religious freedom to create and enforce the boundaries of a godly society, and so they describe the United States as a “Christian nation.” The idea that Islam is non-American is consistent with the Puritan view.

The Judeo-Christian narrative emerged out of this Protestant-Catholic conflict, as the country came to include these groups in its understanding of American identity. Some argue that it was created so that Jews and Catholics could come to the United States and have a story in this country (while the stories of indigenous people and religions continued to be ignored). This implies that a new American narrative of religious freedom is possible: one that could be inclusive of new religious identities that have come into the country, or who have been here all along, giving them a place in America’s story.

14 America Has Outgrown Its ‘Judeo-Christian’ Label. What’s next? - Big Think
15 Founders Online
16 Who Were the Puritans and What Did They Believe?
The Cost of Deviating from the Group

There are certain in-group costs on the Right for advocating on behalf of the out-group’s religious freedom. Some Evangelical organizations risk alienating their constituencies or losing funding or board support if they advocate for the religious freedom rights of Muslims or other non-Christians. Nevertheless, conveners and leaders of these Evangelical spaces are asking: How do we forge ahead with this advocacy even in the face of this resistance? What is our responsibility to care about the religious freedom rights of others? The costs are high, but if we are committed to changing our communities and the world, how do we do so?

Grieving the Loss of “America”

The feeling of vulnerability is real for conservative Evangelical Christians. In the 1980s, white Protestants comprised 80 percent of the American population; now, they comprise 40 percent. This is a huge shift in a short time frame, and feels particularly salient for Protestants who were historically accustomed to having their religious beliefs inform American culture and politics. In many ways, there is the feeling of loss of the soul of America, and many Evangelicals wonder how their own theologies will change over time.

The diagnosis of American Evangelical anxiety at this time of demographic change is a critical piece of the path forward. Conducting this diagnosis in a way that does not become politicized is a key challenge. Participants at the IAP convenings discussed how certain terminology triggers anxiety among conservative Evangelicals and causes them to retreat into their political corners. But the conversation is critical, is not taking place in churches, and needs to happen in a way that does not lead people to feel attacked. Evangelical congregants are hungry to discuss questions such as: Who are we as a nation? Who are we as Christians? And how do our answers to these questions impact how we treat others?

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3. A Way Forward - Beyond Interfaith

The Importance of Language

Language and terminology play a crucial role in whether and how one can open up space for engagement with Evangelical communities. Certain terms can invite an openness that could lead to space for vulnerability, while others trigger defensiveness, shame, and close off the space for dialogue. In particular, terms like “Islamophobia” spark negative reactions because many conservatives feel that liberals use this term to shame conservatives. For this reason, participants at IAP’s closed-door convenings advised using “anti-Muslim hate” instead. Other terms like “social justice” or “interfaith” may sound too liberal to a conservative audience and invoke fear of pressure to compromise theological beliefs or even signal an attempted conversion. Participants advised using “multi-faith” instead, and invoking language from the country’s founding documents.

For some, the idea of a detente on Muslim bigotry will be a bitter pill to swallow, even if the right language can be found. How can we reach an audience that may not want to hear this message? Framing this message in terms of values that matter to conservatives is one way to help this “bitter pill” go down. One participant, speaking from personal experience, said that an effective approach is to highlight how Muslims contribute to the nation’s security by serving in the military and as police officers and firefighters. Such messaging connects Muslims to the American flag in a way that is culturally relevant to conservatives.

Lowering In-Group Costs

Within Evangelical communities, engagement around religious freedom must come from trusted figures within their own group. Social referents, or individuals who have an influential role and a number of connections to other members of the group, can play a significant role in shaping perceptions of acceptable behavior, and therefore in licensing members of the group to also engage in that behavior. Church leaders, for example, are critical social referents within Evangelical communities and can play a key role in shaping norms around Muslim engagement and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Imams, too, can play an important role in shaping
behavioral norms within a specific Muslim community. If influential religious and community leaders – social referents – are sharing a central message, this is a powerful mechanism to change behavioral norms.

But the costs of such bridge-building are high, particularly if an individual pastor does not have validation from their peer group. One way to diminish in-group costs is to facilitate closed-door strategizing sessions for Evangelical pastors who have a sincere desire to support each other, providing them with a space to reflect, strategize, and learn from each other before facing the backlash of their community. Other important entry points could be Evangelical seminaries that are training pastors, Evangelical elites and publications, and Evangelical networks and organizations that are willing to engage in the hard conversations about how they can take responsibility for engagement within their own community while also managing the costs of doing so.

How can Muslims lower in-group costs for Evangelicals? Muslims can approach Evangelical leaders who have trust and standing in their communities and say: “I care about religious freedom too. How can I be helpful to you?” Outside organizations can also be credible interlocutors for conservative venues. For example, Neighborly Faith is bringing an Imam onto a stage at a conservative Christian college, serving as a gatekeeper that makes it safe to give a platform to a voice that many in the audience will perceive as an enemy. Ultimately, Muslim leaders cannot yet enter into churches on their own and be a credible voice on this issue; engagement has to come from within the Evangelical community itself.

Building Solidarity and Finding Allies

Building trust and solidarity amongst a like-minded community of allies takes time and needs to be fostered by neutral organizations. Closed-door meetings are an important way to build the trust that can lead to

17 Home - Neighborly Faith
larger and more public events and conversations. Capacity-building and training with peers also helps to build a broader knowledge base, improve skills, and develop collective strategies that could be deployed in specific contexts.

Finding allies from the other side is critically important both because of the gate-keeping role allies can play in facilitating access to the spaces and audiences on the other side, and because of the legitimizing role they play in creating an openness to hear a new and perhaps uncomfortable message. For example, having an Evangelical write an article for the Religious News Service on religious freedom for Muslims might carry a more powerful “punch” than a Muslim writing for that same publication. Asking allies how you can help in what they are doing - or discussing interest convergence - can help to mitigate against tokenism and instrumentalization.

Engagement with Evangelical communities on religious freedom needs to include religious minority communities as well, and needs to facilitate their engagement with each other. There are many potential bridges between conservative white Evangelicals and Muslims. For example, greater dialogue between White and Black Evangelical communities that navigates racial tensions could move the intra-faith relationship beyond defensiveness to greater understanding and collective self-examination, and that is also an opening for better communication with Muslims.

**Confronting Secularism as a Common Foe**

Secularism is another potential area of interest convergence for Muslims and Evangelicals – both sets of communities are concerned about the unchurched and the unmosqued. Religious discrimination in labor practices and schools also affect both groups. Moreover, conservative Muslims and Evangelicals are often looked upon by the public as anti-democratic, intolerant, and backward. Discussing common concerns around the decline of religiosity and the shared fears of losing their traditions and their flocks could be a way for conservative Muslims and Evangelicals to share their stories. These groups can collectively combat
a narrative that tells both groups they need to be enlightened and are holding their country back. For Evangelicals, there is some moral hazard in wielding the anti-religious bias against Muslims but fighting anti-religious bias against themselves.
CONCLUSION
Building a Strategy of Engagement

Religious freedom, the rise of secularism, and other areas of interest convergence between American Muslims and Evangelicals offer space for building a shared understanding that allows for the peaceful co-existence of both faith communities. At its best, it could also be a space for collaboration on issues that threaten both, whether those threats come from the state or from society. However, a strategy for engagement must draw on the right messages, use terms that are not alienating, and rely upon Evangelical allies who over time can help to shift the norms within their own congregations and communities.
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Uddin has worked on religious liberty cases at the U.S. Supreme Court, federal appellate courts, and federal trial courts. She has defended religious claimants as diverse as Evangelicals, Sikhs, Muslims, Native Americans, Jews, Catholics, and members of the Nation of Islam. Her legal, academic, and policy work focuses on freedom of expression such as religious garb, land use, access to religious materials in prison, rights of parochial schools, religious arbitration, etc. Uddin worked with the U.S. Department of State on advocacy against the UN Defamation of Religions Resolution. She received a State Department grant to develop the Legal Training Institute in the Middle East and North Africa and Southeast Asian countries.

In addition to her legal work, Uddin writes and speaks on Muslims and gender. As the founding editor-in-chief of altmuslimah.com, she has managed the web-magazine, and organized vigorous debates and confer-
ences on the multifaceted issues of gender, politics, and religion. Uddin has advised numerous media projects on American Muslims, including most recently as Executive Producer for the Emmy and Peabody nominated docu-series, The Secret Life of Muslims.

After graduating from The University of Chicago Law School, Uddin served as Counsel for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and as Director of Strategy for the Center for Islam and Religious Freedom in Washington, D.C. She is an expert advisor on religious liberty to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Senior Scholar at the Newseum’s Religious Freedom Center, a Visiting Scholar at Brigham Young University Law school, and a non-residential fellow at UCLA and Georgetown University. She is also a term-member with the Council on Foreign Relations and an adjunct law professor at George Mason University Law School.
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